The papers included in this book cover different aspects of the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions. They explore different options for reform and show that enhancing the participation of developing and emerging market countries in resolving the major monetary and financial problems confronting the world economy, would improve global economic performance and contribute to the elimination of world poverty.

The author-a top decision maker at the IMF for two decades-first focuses on the system of quotas and voting power in the IMF and concludes that it calls for reforms to enhance equity among the membership. He then examines decision making in the Executive Board, with an emphasis on consensus building in a cooperative institution, and the record of political oversight of the international monetary system through the Interim Committee and its successor, the International Monetary and Financial Committee. In that context, the author also comments on the impact on IMF decision making of the activities of groups of members, and of the differing interests of major shareholders. Thereafter, he recalls the distinctive features of the financial crises of the 1990s and examines their evolving implications for IMF governance. The essay concludes with an appraisal of IMF governance.

The papers in this volume draw on background work done in preparation for the study Governance of the IMF: An Evaluation, Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund, May 28, 2008 (available at http://www.ieo-imf.org). This compilation presents in one collection the most recent work to date on the subject of governance of the IMF and contributes to the ongoing dialogue on how best to strengthen the governance of this important global institution. Good governance can contribute to the IMF’s legitimacy by ensuring appropriate voice and representation for the membership, by allowing the Fund to fulfill its mandates effectively and efficiently, and by facilitating accountability for relevant stakeholders. Three main conclusions follow from the studies in this volume. First, to strengthen its legitimacy and effectiveness, the Fund needs greater, higher level and more transparent involvement of member country authorities in its governance. Second, the Board needs to play a stronger role in strategy development and oversight, which requires a shift away from the day-to-day business of the organization. Finally, there are significant accountability gaps that need to be addressed if the IMF is to remain effective and regain legitimacy.

This paper assesses the degree to which the IMF governance is effective and efficient, and whether it provides sufficient accountability and channels for stakeholders to have their views heard. The focus is on institutional structures as well as on the formal and informal relationships between the IMF’s main bodies of governance: the Executive Board, Management, and the International Monetary and Financial Committee. The evaluation highlights that for much of the past six decades, gradual reforms in its governance allowed the IMF to remain relevant in a changing world economy.

Good governance is important for countries at all stages of development... Our approach is to concentrate on those aspects of good governance that are most closely related to our surveillance over macroeconomic policies- namely, the transparency of government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource management, and the stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for privalte sector activity. Michael Camdessus, IMF Managing Director

In 2008, the IEO undertook an evaluation on the IMF governance and concluded that effectiveness had been the strongest aspect of IMF governance, while accountability and voice had been the weakest. Since then, IMF governance has been strengthened aided by quota and voice reforms to address misalignments in shares and chairs as well as numerous improvements in governance procedures and practices. The update finds that IMF governance has proven its effectiveness in supporting the Fund to fulfill its mandates, but concerns remain on voice and accountability. Challenges remain related to representation and voice, interaction between governance bodies, the selection process for management, and the role of the G20 in IMF governance. Addressing these challenges will take time and may be subject to difficult tradeoffs between governance objectives such as preserving effectiveness while ensuring appropriate representation.

This volume presents 18 IMF research studies on the causes and consequences of corruption, as well as how it can most effectively be combated to improve governance, increase economic growth, and reduce poverty. The authors examine how civil service wages affect corruption, the impact of natural resource availability on corruption, the impact of corruption on a country’s income distribution and incidence of poverty, and the effect of corruption on government expenditures on health and education.

This paper attempts to set out the principal issues that need to be resolved in formulating a proposal for quotas and voice reform in the IMF that could command broad support. Following John Rawls, we argue that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions," and we use his theory of justice to provide a method for understanding what should be the case, in the context of voice and voting shares, before international institutions, such as the IMF, are to be justifiable to their members. The implementation of this process suggests, among other things, that a major revision of the quota formulas is long overdue, and leaving this unaddressed raises serious questions regarding the IMF's governance which could develop into a core mission risk and jeopardize the relevance of the institution.

This paper summarizes the main governance challenges and reform options facing the IMF, drawing together the analysis and reform proposals in the reports of the Eminent Persons Group (headed by Trevor Manuel), the IEO, and a range of other recent work on Fund governance. Lest the wide scope of these inputs result in a laundry list, judgment has been exercised in selecting key issues and proposals, and in laying out some of the pros and cons. With reform of quotas/voting power on a separate track, the focus here is on the institutional framework through which members express voting power, weaknesses in which are seen by many to have eroded the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness, thereby displacing the debate and initiative to outside entities. While an overall reform package would have to include quota shares, the key proposals discussed here aim to: increase political engagement and oversight; enhance Executive Board effectiveness and representation; modify voting rules; better delineate responsibilities; open up management selection; and tackle problems with mandate and institutional culture that limit the issues and approaches taken. Civil society has expressed a range of concerns related to IMF governance, including with regard to accountability at all levels (IMFC, Executive Board, management, and staff), mechanisms for responding to complaints and feedback from the broader public, and transparency. Given the diversity of their interests, and to provide unfiltered access to CSO views, the supplement: Fourth Pillar Recommendations from Civil Society; Preliminary Summary of Principles, Issues and Recommendations; has been prepared by CSO groups.

Global governance of international banks is breaking down after the Great Financial Crisis, as national regulators are withdrawing on their home turf. New evidence presented illustrates that the global systemically important banks underpin the global financial system. This book offers solutions for the effective governance of global banks.