A militant Marxist atheist and a “Radical Orthodox” Christian theologian square off on everything from the meaning of theology and Christ to the war machine of corporate mafia. “What matters is not so much that Žižek is endorsing a demythologized, disenchanted Christianity without transcendence, as that he is offering in the end (despite what he sometimes claims) a heterodox version of Christian belief.”—John Milbank “To put it even more bluntly, my claim is that it is Milbank who is effectively guilty of heterodoxy, ultimately of a regression to paganism: in my atheism, I am more Christian than Milbank.”—Slavoj Žižek In this corner, philosopher Slavoj Žižek, a militant atheist who represents the critical-materialist stance against religion's illusions; in the other corner, “Radical Orthodox” theologian John Milbank, an influential and provocative thinker who argues that theology is the only foundation upon which knowledge, politics, and ethics can stand. In The Monstrosity of Christ, Žižek and Milbank go head to head for three rounds, employing an impressive arsenal of moves to advance their positions and press their respective advantages. By the closing bell, they have not only proven themselves worthy adversaries, they have shown that faith and reason are not simply and intractably opposed. Žižek has long been interested in the emancipatory potential offered by Christian theology. And Milbank, seeing global capitalism as the new century's greatest ethical challenge, has pushed his own ontology in more political and materialist directions. Their debate in The Monstrosity of Christ concerns the future of religion, secularity, and political hope in light of a monsterful event—God becoming human. For the first time since Žižek's turn toward theology, we have a true debate between an atheist and a theologian about the very meaning of theology, Christ, the Church, the Holy Ghost, Universality, and the foundations of logic. The result goes far beyond the popularized atheist/theist point/counterpoint of recent books by Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and others. Žižek begins, and Milbank answers, countering dialectics with “paradox.” The debate centers on the nature of and relation between paradox and parallax, between analogy and dialectics, between transcendent glory and liberation. Slavoj Žižek is a philosopher and cultural critic. He has published over thirty books, including Looking Awry, The Puppet and the Dwarf, and The Parallax View (these three published by the MIT Press). John Milbank is an influential Christian theologian and the author of Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason and other books. Creston Davis, who conceived of this encounter, studied under both Žižek and Milbank.

Michael Rosen discusses the philosophical issues involved in historical interpretation before presenting a novel and challenging solution to the problem of Hegel's openness to criticism. Contrary to received opinion, Hegel's philosophy does not, he argues, draw upon a universal and pre-suppositionless conception of rationality.

Here, 13 major scholars reassess the place of Hegel in contemporary theory and the philosophy of religion. The contributors focus not only on Hegelian analysis but also on the transformative value of his thought in relation to our current 'turn to religion'.

Doran draws extensively on the thought of Bernard Lonergan, and the work develops Lonergan's methodological insights.

Hegel's analysis of his culture identifies nihilistic tendencies in modernity i.e., the death of God and end of philosophy. Philosophy and religion have both become hollowed out to such an extent that traditional disputes between faith and reason become impossible because neither any longer possesses any content about which there could be any dispute; this is nihilism. Hegel responds to this situation with a renewal of the ontological argument (Logic) and ontotheology, which takes the form of philosophical trinitarianism. Hegel on the Proofs and Personhood of God examines Hegel's recasting of the theological proofs as the elevation of spirit to God and defense of their content against the criticisms of Kant and Jacobi. It also considers the issue of divine personhood in the Logic and Philosophy of Religion. This issue reflects Hegel's antiformalism that seeks to win back determinate content for truth (Logic) and the concept of God. While the personhood of God was the issue that divided the Hegelian school into left-wing and right-wing factions, both sides fail as interpretations. The center Hegelian view is both virtually unknown, and the most faithful to Hegel's project. What ties the two parts of the book together--Hegel's philosophical trinitarianism or identity as unity in and through difference (Logic) and his theological trinitarianism, or incarnation, trinity, reconciliation, and community (Philosophy of Religion)--is Hegel's Logic of the Concept. Hegel's metaphysical view of personhood is identified with the singularity (Einzelheit) of the concept. This includes as its speculative nucleus the concept of the true infinite: the unity in difference of infinite/finite, thought and being, divine-human unity (incarnation and trinity), God as spirit in his community.

This book explores the contested place of metaphysics since Kant and Hegel, arguing for a renewed metaphysical thinking about the intimate strangeness of being.

This engaging and instructive analysis of the first half of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason continues to be valuable to both practiced Kant scholars and newcomers. Jonathan Bennett examines the arguments and themes of Kant's work in relation to those of the works of philosophers old and new, including Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Ayler, Quine, Warnock, and others. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by James Van Cleve, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work is available for a new generation of readers.

Could it be that atheism and belief in God are both forms of avoidance behavior? It's easier to focus on belief than it is to take up a new practice of living. Perhaps both are ideological distractions that mystify the nature of reality and what knowledge is. What if we admit that we are neither believers nor atheists: Does that mean we're nothing?Philosophy aims to help us understand the world without appealing to something beyond. It's considered to be rooted in the search for eternal truths, and when the truth is unclear, philosophy is expected to embrace modesty and have a willingness to say I don't know. Rejecting the false dialectic of God/atheism will help us recognize that the world is our construction and our responsibility so long as we are here.Drawing on Georg Luk�cs and Max Horkheimer, the author argues that belief in God and atheism are both ideological distractions. They are both forms of immaturity that can only be transcended through action. The real good news is that we can do away with belief in the supernatural, but it will take more than non-belief; it will take philosophical action.He takes us on a journey through our philosophical practices to purge ourselves of mystified notions. The journey is long, but at least the path is strewn with the charm of Socrates, Descartes, Marx, and Sartre.In short, Prof. Donovan says, Nothing exists but this world, our world... Nothing is beyond God and atheism. Why not become nothing? Make yourself and those who matter proud.