German Idealism as Constructivism is the culmination of many years of research by distinguished philosopher Tom Rockmore—it is his definitive statement on the debate about German idealism between proponents of representationalism and those of constructivism that still plagues our grasp of the history of German idealism and the whole epistemological project today. Rockmore argues that German idealism—which includes iconic thinkers such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—can best be understood as a constructivist project, one that asserts that we cannot know the mind-independent world as it is but only our own mental construction of it. Since ancient Greece philosophers have tried to know the world in itself, an effort that Kant believed had failed. His alternative strategy—which came to be known as the Copernican revolution—was that the world as we experience and know it depends on the mind. Rockmore shows that this project was central to Kant’s critical philosophy and the later German idealists who would follow him. He traces the different ways philosophers like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel formulated their own versions of constructivism. Offering a sweeping but deeply attuned analysis of a crucial part of the legacy of German idealism, Rockmore reinvigorates this school of philosophy and opens up promising new avenues for its study.

The culmination and distillation of distinguished philosopher Tom Rockmore's researches over some forty years, this book is his definitive statement on the debate between representationalism and constructivism that plagues both the history of German Idealism and the whole epistemological project today. Rockmore contends against prevailing opinion that Kant himself is an idealist and that his idealism centers on the Copernican revolution or a constructivist approach to knowledge. He shows that despite what Kant says in the first Critique he is not and cannot be a representationalist, and that the so-called double aspect thesis also fails. Positioning Kant as responding to Plato, he reads Plato as in turn responding to Parmenides. In Rockmore's view the Parmenidean intervention has two singularly important consequences: it focuses attention, running throughout the entire tradition, on the grasp of the mind-independent world--metaphysical realism--and it points toward the criterion of knowledge as the identity of identity and difference, a thesis that becomes explicit in Hegel. Rockmore examines the constructivist dimensions of the views of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in detail, pointing out that Fichte's effort to reformulate constructivism while intended to solve a residual difficulty in Kant's version of constructivism actually undermines the claim for objective cognition. Moreover Schelling's view of the parallel between transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature, which is influenced by Spinoza, is based on a different kind of identity and it follows that Schelling does not later leave German idealism behind since in a deep sense he was never a German idealist. The book concludes with a short discussion of cognitive constructivism arguing that it remains viable at the present time as an alternative to metaphysical realism, while preserving the other Parmenidean suggestion, the identity of identity and difference.

"In After Parmenides, Tom Rockmore takes us all the way back to the beginning of philosophy. Parmenides held that thought and being are one: what we know is what is. For Rockmore, this established both the good view that we should think of the world in terms of what the mind constructs as knowable entities as well as the bad view that there is some non-mind-dependent "thing"-the world, the real-which we can know or fail to know. No, Rockmore says: what we need to do is give up on the idea that there is any extra-mental "real" for us to know. We know and become acquainted with the objects of cognition that our mind constructs. After Parmenides illustrates the contest between variants of the "standard" view and variants of the "non-standard, constructivist view" in the history of philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes and Locke, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, post-Kantians including Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, Marx, the early pragmatists, analytic philosophy, contemporary French speculative realism, and more. This ambitious but accessibly written book shows how new connections can be made in the history of philosophy when it is reread through a new lens"--

Phenomenology, together with Marxism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, dominated philosophy in the twentieth century—and Edmund Husserl is usually thought to have been the first to develop the concept. His views influenced a variety of important later thinkers, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who eventually turned phenomenology away from questions of knowledge. But here Tom Rockmore argues for a return to phenomenology’s origins in epistemology, and he does so by locating its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant and Phenomenology traces the formulation of Kant’s phenomenological approach back to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In response to various criticisms of the first edition, Kant more forcefully put forth a constructivist theory of knowledge. This shift in Kant’s thinking challenged the representational approach to epistemology, and it is this turn, Rockmore contends, that makes Kant the first great phenomenologist. He then follows this phenomenological line through the work of Kant’s idealist successors, Fichte and Hegel. Steeped in the sources and literature it examines, Kant and Phenomenology persuasively reshapes our conception of both of its main subjects.

In "I that is We, We that is I", an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of naturalism; and the reassessment of the relevance of work and power for our understanding of human life. This collection addresses the shortcomings of Kantian and constructivist normative approaches to social practices and practical rationality it involves. It sheds new light on Hegel’s take on metaphysics and puts into question some presuppositions of the post-metaphysical interpretative paradigm.

While Kantian constructivism has become one of the most influential and systematic schools of thought in analytic moral and political philosophy, Hegelian approaches to practical normativity hold out the promise of building upon Kantian insights into individual self-determination while avoiding their dualistic tendencies. James Gledhill and Sebastian Stein unite distinguished scholars of German idealism and contemporary Anglophone practical philosophy with rising stars in the field, to explore whether Hegelian idealist philosophy can offer the categories that analytic practical philosophy requires to overcome the contradictions that have so far plagued Kantian constructivism. The volume organizes the contributions into three parts. The first of these engages debates in metaethics regarding the relationship between realism and constructivism. The second part sees contributors draw on debates about the nature of political normativity, focusing primarily on the problems of historical contextualism, relativism, and critical reflection. The concluding part considers the application of the Hegelian framework to contemporary debates about specific ethical issues, including multiculturalism, democracy, and human rights. Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophy contributes to the on-going debate about the importance of systematic philosophy in the context of practical philosophy, engages with contemporary discussions about the shape of a rational social order, and gauges the timeliness of Hegelian philosophy. This book is a must read for scholars interested in Hegel and in the contemporary tradition of Kantian constructivism in moral and political philosophy.

This much-needed book examines one of the great lacunae of contemporary philosophical discussion - idealism. Addressing the widespread confusion about the meaning and use of the term, Tom Rockmore surveys and classifies some of its major forms. He argues that Kant provides the essential link between three main types of idealism associated with Plato, the new way of ideas, and German idealism. The author also makes a case for the contemporary relevance of at least one strand in the tangled idealist web, a strand most clearly identified with Kant. In terms of the philosophical tradition, Rockmore contends, constructivism offers a lively, interesting, and important approach to knowledge after the decline of metaphysical realism.

Kant, Fichte, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism contains ten new essays by leading and rising scholars from the United States, Europe, and Asia who explore the historical development and conceptual contours of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. The collection begins with a set of comparative essays centered on Kant’s transcendental idealism, placing special stress on the essentials of Kant’s moral theory, the metaphysical outlook bound up with it, and the conception of the legitimate role of religion supported by it. The spotlight then shifts to the post-Kantian period, in a series of essays exploring a variety of angles on Fichte’s pivotal role: his uncompromising constructivism, his overarching conception of the philosophical project, and his radical accounts of the nature of reason and the constitution of meaning. In the remaining essays, the focus falls on German idealism after Fichte, with particular attention to Jacobi’s critique of idealism as “nihilism,” Schelling’s development of an idealistic philosophy of nature, and Hegel’s development of an all-encompassing idealistic “science of logic.” The collection, edited by Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel, will be of great value to scholars interested in Kant, Fichte, German idealism, post-Kantian philosophy, European philosophy, or the history of ideas.

The Politics of German Idealism reconstructs the political philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel against the background of their social-historical context. Christopher Yeomans' guiding thought is to understand German Idealist political philosophy as political, i.e., as a set of policy options and institutional designs aimed at a broadly but distinctively German set of social problems. 'Political' here refers to use of the state's power to enforce law, and 'social' to the norms and groups which are regulated by that enforcement, but which also antedate or exceed that enforcement. Because the power to enforce law is very much still being actualized by state-building in the period at issue, 'political' refers quite narrowly to a certain kind of practical legal project rather than to a perennial set of problems from the history of philosophy. By way of method, Yeomans claims that to reveal the political nature of German Idealist political philosophy requires understanding German Idealism as both taking place in and conceptualizing its own historical present--this is the sense in which it is not only political, but political philosophy. The most important general feature of the historical present of the German Idealists is the way in which the period from 1770 to 1830 was a transitional period between early and late modernity, a so-called saddle period (Sattelzeit) in which the metaphor is of a Bergsattel or shallow valley between two mountain peaks.

Distinguished scholar and philosopher Tom Rockmore examines one of the great lacunae of contemporary philosophical discussion--idealism. Addressing the widespread confusion about the meaning and use of the term, he surveys and classifies some of its major forms, giving particular attention to Kant. He argues that Kant provides the all-important link between three main types of idealism: those associated with Plato, the new way of ideas, and German idealism. The author also makes a case for the contemporary relevance of at least one strand in the tangled idealist web, a strand most clearly identified with Kant: constructivism. In terms of the philosophical tradition, Rockmore contends, constructivism offers a lively, interesting, and important approach to knowledge after the decline of metaphysical realism.