This text opens with the theory of 2-person zero-sum games, 2-person non-zero sum games, and n-person games, at a level between non-mathematical introductory books and technical mathematical game theory books. Includes introductory explanations of gaming and meta games. Includes numerous exercises anbd problems with solutions and over 30 illustrations. 1986 edition.

This book integrates the fundamentals, methodology, and major application fields of noncooperative and cooperative games including conflict resolution. The topics addressed in the book are discrete and continuous games including games represented by finite trees; matrix and bimatrix games as well as oligopolies; cooperative solution concepts; games under uncertainty; dynamic games and conflict resolution. The methodology is illustrated by carefully chosen examples, applications and case studies which are selected from economics, social sciences, engineering, the military and homeland security. This book is highly recommended to readers who are interested in the in-depth and up-to-date integration of the theory and ever-expanding application areas of game theory.

Professor Zagare provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players.

Dynamic games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in modelling competitive as well as conflict situations exhibiting an intertemporel aspect. Applications of dynamic games have proven to be a suitable methodology to study the behaviour of players (decision-makers) and to predict the outcome of such situations in many areas including engineering, economics, management science, military, biology and political science. Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications collects thirteen articles written by established researchers. It is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in both cooperative and non-cooperative games in different areas of applications, especially in economics and management science.

DIVSequel to Two-Person Game Theory introduces necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), presents basic concepts and models, and provides applications to social situations. /div

Drawing on examples from current economic literature and politics, this is the first book on game theory at an introductory, but not elementary, level. The author covers topics of great actual or potential use in economics, such as noncooperative games, infinitely repeated games, finitely repeated games, two-person cooperative games, and cooperative games with and without side payments. Thoroughly revised, the new second edition of this authoritative book includes greatly expanded coverage of equilibrium refinements, and the "folk theorem" for repeated games as well as a new chapter on finite noncooperative games.

In this book applications of cooperative game theory that arise from combinatorial optimization problems are described. It is well known that the mathematical modeling of various real-world decision-making situations gives rise to combinatorial optimization problems. For situations where more than one decision-maker is involved classical combinatorial optimization theory does not suffice and it is here that cooperative game theory can make an important contribution. If a group of decision-makers decide to undertake a project together in order to increase the total revenue or decrease the total costs, they face two problems. The first one is how to execute the project in an optimal way so as to increase revenue. The second one is how to divide the revenue attained among the participants. It is with this second problem that cooperative game theory can help. The solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be applied to arrive at revenue allocation schemes. In this book the type of problems described above are examined. Although the choice of topics is application-driven, it also discusses theoretical questions that arise from the situations that are studied. For all the games described attention will be paid to the appropriateness of several game-theoretic solution concepts in the particular contexts that are considered. The computation complexity of the game-theoretic solution concepts in the situation at hand will also be considered.

This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

This book is on applications of game theory. The title of this book is not "Game Theory and its Applications" because it does not construct a general theory for considered games. The book contains a lot of examples of applica tion of game theory together with the background of those games considered and a list of unsolved problems. Also we consider only the game where the optimal strategies of the players are found in closed form. This book is an attempt to carryon the approach developed in nice books "Search Games" by Gal and "Geometric Games and their Applications" by Ruckle. The first chapter of this book supplies the required definitions and theorems from game theory. The second chapter deals with discrete search games where both players act simultaneously: the games of protection of a channel from infiltration of a submarine, the submarine versus helicopter game, the matrix search games and others. The third chapter considers the game where the players allocate their contin uous efforts. In these games players face up an alternative either not to come into contest if the cost of efforts seems too high, or come into it. In the last case the player have to decide how much resources they can afford to spend. The allocation models of search, antiballistic protection and marketing are investigated.

Covering all the essential topics for undergraduate courses, this is the ideal student introduction to game theory. The book sets out the basics of the subject in a non-technical way. All discussion and explanation is clear, well structured, and entirely accessible to students of botheconomics and business.In addition to describing and explaining the basic theory, Game Theory uses illustrations and examples to show its application to realistic, topical, and interesting problems-ranging from strategic decision-making within companies to international environmental policy-making.The book also features exercises with accompanying solutions to allow the student to check progress throughout the course, and a guide to further reading at the end of each chapter.