Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, born in 1879, died prematurely in 1918. He left only a few law journal articles as his published work. His 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions', originally published as two articles in the 'Yale Law Journal' for 1913 and 1917 and left incompletely revised at his death is, however, one of the principal foundations of analytic jurisprudence. The analysis of rights that Hohfeld offers is still regularly cited and relied upon by both lawyers and philosophers, and it is treated as a source of insight into the nature of moral rights as well as the legal rights that were Hohfeld's own focus of concern. Although some of his analytical distinctions were anticipated by earlier jurists, their insights were fragmentary and imperfect by comparison. Hohfeld's systematic and exhaustive (yet concise) treatment is generally regarded as unsurpassed. This is not to say that he has not been criticized, but his book forms the essential starting point for any discussion of the nature and structure of rights. 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions' has long been difficult to obtain. This new edition makes this classic of analytic jurisprudence available with a comprehensive introduction by Dr. N.E. Simmonds of Corpus Christi, University of Cambridge, UK.

With newly uncovered personal papers, this volume offers in-depth analysis of Wesley Hohfeld's pioneering contributions to legal theory.

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, born in 1879, died prematurely in 1918. He left only a few law journal articles as his published work. His 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions', originally published as two articles in the 'Yale Law Journal' for 1913 and 1917 and left incompletely revised at his death is, however, one of the principal foundations of analytic jurisprudence. The analysis of rights that Hohfeld offers is still regularly cited and relied upon by both lawyers and philosophers, and it is treated as a source of insight into the nature of moral rights as well as the legal rights that were Hohfeld's own focus of concern. Although some of his analytical distinctions were anticipated by earlier jurists, their insights were fragmentary and imperfect by comparison. Hohfeld's systematic and exhaustive (yet concise) treatment is generally regarded as unsurpassed. This is not to say that he has not been criticized, but his book forms the essential starting point for any discussion of the nature and structure of rights.

Présentation de l'éditeur: "This work offers a new theory of what it means to be a legal person and suggests that it is best understood as a cluster property. The book explores the origins of legal personhood, the issues afflicting a traditional understanding of the concept, and the numerous debates surrounding the topic."

This book investigates competing constructions of areas beyond national jurisdiction, and their role in the creation and articulations of legal principles, providing a broader perspective on the ongoing negotiation at the UN on marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, born in 1879, died prematurely in 1918. He left only a few law journal articles as his published work. His 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions', originally published as two articles in the 'Yale Law Journal' for 1913 and 1917 and left incompletely revised at his death is, however, one of the principal foundations of analytic jurisprudence. The analysis of rights that Hohfeld offers is still regularly cited and relied upon by both lawyers and philosophers, and it is treated as a source of insight into the nature of moral rights as well as the legal rights that were Hohfeld’s own focus of concern. Although some of his analytical distinctions were anticipated by earlier jurists, their insights were fragmentary and imperfect by comparison. Hohfeld’s systematic and exhaustive (yet concise) treatment is generally regarded as unsurpassed. This is not to say that he has not been criticized, but his book forms the essential starting point for any discussion of the nature and structure of rights. 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions' has long been difficult to obtain. This new edition makes this classic of analytic jurisprudence available with a comprehensive introduction by Dr. N.E. Simmonds of Corpus Christi, University of Cambridge, UK.

Where can religions find sources of legitimacy for human rights? How do, and how should, religious leaders and communities respond to human rights as defined in modern International Law? When religious precepts contradict human rights standards - for example in relation to freedom of expression or in relation to punishments - which should trump the other, and why? Can human rights and religious teachings be interpreted in a manner which brings reconciliation closer? Do the modern concept and system of human rights undermine the very vision of society that religions aim to impart? Is a reference to God in the discussion of human rights misplaced? Do human fallibilities with respect to interpretation, judicial reasoning and the understanding of human oneness and dignity provide the key to the undeniable and sometimes devastating conflicts that have arisen between, and within, religions and the human rights movement? In this volume, academics and lawyers tackle these most difficult questions head-on, with candour and creativity, and the collection is rendered unique by the further contributions of a remarkable range of other professionals, including senior religious leaders and representatives, journalists, diplomats and civil servants, both national and international. Most notably, the contributors do not shy away from the boldest question of all - summed up in the book's title. The thoroughly edited and revised papers which make up this collection were originally prepared for a ground-breaking conference organised by the Clemens Nathan Research Centre, the University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies and Martinus Nijhoff/Brill.