This is a nostalgic, visual account of the best time and place to be a graffiti writer. In the 1980s, brothers Kenny, a.k.a. KEY, and Paul, a.k.a. CAVS, immersed themselves in the graffiti scene in the Boogie Down Bronx, dutifully photographing hundreds of pieces on now-discontinued MTA subway cars and capturing their proud comrades before, during, and after the act. "Bombing" "White Elephants" with their pilot markers and documenting them with their cameras, which they always carried, they were on the ride of their lives--until 1989, when the last painted train was removed from service. Tags by names like QUIK, IZTHEWIZ, and many others appear here in color exposures, and dozens of artists share stories and drop knowledge with no filter. A foreword by graffiti historian Henry Chalfant, coproducer of Style Wars--the seminal documentary on New York graffiti and hip-hop culture--kicks things off.

With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.

This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.

Drawing on interviews with Amazon workers and original empirical data, this book explores how different working conditions estrange and alienate workers, and how, despite these, workers find ways to organize and express their agency. This is an important analysis of work on the digital shop floor for the scholars of platform economy.

The main goal of this book is to provide a modern comprehensive statement on the Earth's Precambrian crust. It uses geographic and tectonic location, lithostratigraphy, geochronology, and petrogenesis as a basis for considering Precambrian coastal evolution--including the role of plate tectonics. Detailed consideration is given to the endogenic and exogenic processes which formed the continental crust and also to its subsequent secular evolution across Precambrian time**An essential reference volume for every Precambrian geologist.

Have you ever loved anyone? How can a heart never be loved!May not be on an agreement basis... A middle class boy and a rich girl get in touch with each other unexpectedly. Under unexpected circumstances, they make an agreement to love each other for a period of thirty days. The story is all about how did they end up? Why did they get in to the agreement and how far they can go to protect their love? Neither the world nor the life was easy on them; each played its own role.

One of the most culturally diverse regions of the ancient world, Mesoamerica was also one of the fledgling areas for state formation. The case studies in this volume interpret Mesoamerican civilization through the emergence, resilience, and occasional demise of Mesoamerica's early and developing political economies. An exploration of the unique adaptations and approaches taken by Mesoamerican societies to cope with their evolving landscapes provides insight on how these states were organized and the varying ways in which state affairs were conducted between regions and through time. Although several factors are presented and discussed for the rise and fall of the many complex societies, the book maintains a consistent emphasis on the political economy and its transformative effects over labor, land, and water. Inspired by the impact of the annual yearbook Research in Economic Anthropology (REA) and its longstanding editor, Barry L. Isaac, the contributors in this volume were assembled to honor Isaac and selected based on their previous association with Isaac and REA as well as their knowledge of particular regions of Mesoamerica.