Analyzing nineteen cases, this title offers practical perspective on the implications of constitution-making procedure, and explores emerging international legal norms.

The University of Chicago Law Review's 4th issue of 2014 features articles and essays from recognized legal scholars, as well as extensive student research. Contents include: Articles: • The Legal Salience of Taxation, by Andrew T. Hayashi • Tax-Loss Mechanisms, by Jacob Nussim & Avraham Tabbach • Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, by Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz • American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, by Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin Comments: • Bursting the Speech Bubble: Toward a More Fitting Perceived-Affiliation Standard, by Nicholas A. Caselli • Payments to Not Parent? Noncustodial Parents as the Recipients of Child Support, by Emma J. Cone-Roddy • Too Small to Fail: A New Perspective on Environmental Penalties for Small Businesses, by Nicholas S. Dufau • Understanding Equal Sovereignty, by Abigail B. Molitor • "Widespread" Uncertainty: The Exclusionary Rule in Civil-Removal Proceedings, by Michael J. O’Brien • Clogged Conduits: A Defendant's Right to Confront His Translated Statements, by Casen B. Ross • "Integral" Decisionmaking: Judicial Interpretation of Predispute Arbitration Agreements Naming the National Arbitration Forum, by Daniel A. Sito Volume 81, Number 4 also features Review Essays by Lisa Bernstein, Avery W. Katz, and Eyal Zamir, analyzing three recent books on contract law and theory.

When building democracy through new constitutions, the level of participation matters more than the content of the constitution itself. This book examines this theory.

This volume focuses on constitutional ratification, the procedure in which a draft constitution is submitted by its creators to the people or their representatives in an up or down vote determining implementation. Ratification is increasingly common and routinely recommended by experts. Nonetheless, it is neither neutral nor inevitable. Constitutions can be made without it and when it is used it has significant effects. This raises the central question of the book: should ratification be recommended? Put another way: is there a reason for treating the procedure as a default for the constitution-making process? Surprisingly, these questions are rarely asked. The procedure's worth is assumed, not demonstrated, while ratification is generally overlooked in the literature. In fact, this is the first sustained study of ratification. To address these oversights, this book defines ratification and its types, explains the procedure's effects, conceptual origins, and history, and then concentrates on finding reasons for its use. Specifically, it builds up and analyzes the three most likely normative justifications. These urge the implementation of ratification because the procedure: enables the constituent power to make its constitution; fosters representation during constitution-making; or helps create a legitimate constitution. Ultimately, these justifications are found wanting, leading to the conclusion that ratification lacks a convincing, context-independent justification. Thus, until new arguments are developed, experts should not give recommendations for ratification as a matter of course, practitioners should not reach for it uncritically, and-more generally-one should avoid the blanket application of concepts from democratic theory to extraordinary contexts such as constitution-making.

Constitutions are no longer exclusively national projects, but increasingly result from broader transnational processes that form a transnational legal order.

This collection of essays surveys the full range of challenges that territorial conflicts pose for constitution-making processes and constitutional design. It provides seventeen in-depth case studies of countries going through periods of intense constitutional engagement in a variety of contexts: small distinct territories, bi-communal countries, highly diverse countries with many politically salient regions, and countries where territorial politics is important but secondary to other bases for political mobilization. Specific examples are drawn from Iraq, Kenya, Cyprus, Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the UK (Scotland), Ukraine, Bolivia, India, Spain, Yemen, Nepal, Ethiopia, Indonesia (Aceh), the Philippines (Mindanao), and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the volume draws significant normative conclusions, it is based on a realist view of the complexity of territorial and other political cleavages (the country's "political geometry"), and the power configurations that lead into periods of constitutional engagement. Thematic chapters on constitution-making processes and constitutional design draw original conclusions from the comparative analysis of the case studies and relate these to the existing literature, both in political science and comparative constitutional law. This volume is essential reading for scholars of federalism, consociational power-sharing arrangements, asymmetrical devolution, and devolution more generally. The combination of in-depth case studies and broad thematic analysis allows for analytical and normative conclusions that will be of major relevance to practitioners and advisors engaged in constitutional design.

This volume analyses the social and political forces that influence constitutions and the process of constitution making. It combines theoretical perspectives on the social and political foundations of constitutions with a range of detailed case studies from nineteen countries. In the first part leading scholars analyse and develop a range of theoretical perspectives, including constitutions as coordination devices, mission statements, contracts, products of domestic power play, transnational documents, and as reflection of the will of the people. In the second part these theories are examined through in-depth case studies of the social and political foundations of constitutions in countries such as Egypt, Nigeria, Japan, Romania, Bulgaria, New Zealand, Israel, Argentina and others. The result is a multidimensional study of constitutions as social phenomena and their interaction with other social phenomena.

Hudson provides new evidence about the roles of political parties, leaders, and citizen-participants in constitution-making processes.

Public participation has become a core element of modern constitution-building. Robust participation is credited with a range of benefits—from improving individual behaviours and attitudes to democracy to shaping elite bargaining dynamics, improving constitutional content, and strengthening outcomes for democracy and peace. Yet it is not well understood whether and how public participation can achieve these ends. Much of what we think we know about participatory constitution-building remains theoretical. No two processes are alike, and there is no agreed definition of what constitutes a ‘participatory process’. Yet national decision-makers must contend with the key question: What does a robust participation process look like for a particular country, at a particular time, in a particular context? What considerations and principles can be derived from comparative experience to guide decisions? This Policy Paper unpacks the forms and functions of public participation across different stages of the constitution-building process and considers the ways in which public engagement can influence the dynamics of the process, including political negotiations.

After 1989, the function of transitional governance changed. It became a process whereby transitional authorities introduce a constitutional transformation on the basis of interim laws. In spite of its domestic nature, it also became an international project and one with formidable ambitions: ending war, conflict or crisis by reconfiguring the state order. This model attracted international attention, from the UN Security Council and several regional organisations, and became a playing field of choice in international politics and diplomacy. Also without recourse to armed force, international actors could impact a state apparatus – through state renaissance. This book zooms in on the non-forcible aspects of conflict-related transitional governance while focusing on the transition itself. This study shows that neither transitional actors nor external actors must respect specific rules when realising or contributing to state renaissance. The legal limits to indirectly provoking regime change are also being unveiled.