"The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 forged a cultural revolution in the U.S. armed forces by improving the way in which the Department of Defense (DoD) prepares for and executes its mission, in part by addressing joint officer personnel policies and management requirements. In the past 15 years, successes in Iraq (Operations Desert Shield/Storm), Bosnia, and Afghanistan, and more recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom, testify to the effectiveness of the joint military force and its warfighting potential. However, recent studies and assessments have suggested that a strategic approach for joint officer management in terms of education, assignment, and promotion is necessary to address the challenges that DoD confronts in preparing officers to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. This RAND research, sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), revisits Goldwater-Nichols and defines and frames a strategic approach to further officers' development in joint matters."--Rand web site.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 forged a cultural revolution in the U.S. Armed Forces by improving the way the Department of Defense (DoD) prepares for and executes its mission. Title IV of the GNA addresses joint officer personnel policies and provides specific personnel management requirements for the identification, education, training, promotion, and assignment of officers to joint duties. Recent studies suggest the need for DoD to revisit joint manpower matters and develop a strategic approach to joint officer management and joint professional military education (JPME). Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 directed an independent study of joint officer management, JPME, and the roles of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the independent study was in progress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an assessment of DoD actions to implement provisions in law that address the development of officers in joint matters. It also evaluated DoD's ability to fully respond to the provisions of the GNA. The GAO stated that "a significant impediment affecting DoD's ability to fully realize the cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DoD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters." A strategic approach to human resource management determines the need for critical workforce characteristic(s) given missions, goals, and desired organizational outcomes; assesses availability of the characteristic(s) now and in the future; and suggests changes in management practices for personnel with the characteristic(s) to minimize gaps between need and availability. This report applies a strategic approach to the development of officers in joint matters.

This research frames a strategic approach to reserve joint officer management that addresses the requirements for, and the supply of, joint officers in the reserve component, and also accounts for the unique constraints and challenges involved in joint officer management for reserve active-status list officers. Because the work required of many reservists is becoming increasingly joint, the need for a systematic examination of how reserve active-status list officers are trained and developed in joint matters is becoming more and more urgent-especially given the dramatic increase in the use of the reserve forces. A strategic approach to joint officer management for reserve active-status list officers must assess the need for officers with prior joint knowledge, experience, and acculturation in certain positions as well as their availability. The authors estimate the supply of joint reserve officers and make several recommendations to help implement a strategic approach to reserve component joint officer management.

The Department of Defense (DoD) management processes for active component joint duty assignments, education, and training were built around the solid foundation provided by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986. However, it is being increasingly recognized that the current approach to joint matters needs to evolve from its current static format to a more dynamic approach that broadens the definitions of "joint matters" and "joint qualifications" and allows for multiple paths to growing the number of joint officers. An important extension of the current strategic plan is a more explicit and strategic consideration of reserve component joint officer management. The need for a systematic examination of how reserve component joint officers are trained and developed is becoming increasingly urgent, given the dramatic increase in the use of the reserve forces. Building on work done earlier for the active component with respect to joint officer management, this research focuses on framing a strategic approach to reserve joint officer management that does the following: (1) addresses the requirements for and the supply of joint officers for the reserve component, and (2) accounts for the unique constraints of and challenges to reserve joint officer management. A strategic approach for reserve component joint officer management must deliberately determine which jobs require joint experience or which provide it. In particular, given the current strategic intent of the DoD with respect to jointness ("push it to its lowest appropriate level"), the need for joint experience should be measurable in a much larger number of billets, in particular in billets internal to the service. Moreover, valid joint experience might now be provided by service in billets internal to the services, particularly those associated with Joint Task Forces (JTFs), with service component commands, and with joint planning and operations.

Several recent studies, including a study authorized under the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, have indicated the need for the Department of Defense (DoD) to update the practice, policy, and law applied to Joint Officer Management (JOM) and Joint Professional Military Education. In 2003, DoD asked the RAND Corporation to undertake an analysis that would provide guidance on officer training and development in joint matters. This work builds on that earlier effort. As a lead-in to this study, the 2005 Joint Officer Management Census survey polled officers serving in billets that were likely to require joint experience or joint education or provide such experience. More than 21,000 survey responses were collected. This report examines the extent to which officers believe their jobs provide them with joint experience or require them to have had prior joint education, training, or experience, and it examines how respondents' answers differ across organizations and military services in which the billets are located. This report provides a comprehensive reference source for the JOM survey data and demonstrates how the data can be used to anchor a strategic approach to joint officer management.

While policy makers are perpetually conceptualizing new reform packages, the actual enactment of those reforms is typically more challenging. Remarkably, the one public institution that is able to meet that challenge is also the largest. The United States Department of Defense, which employs over 600,000 people and deals with $500 billion in fundin

The following steps are recommended for consistent, efficient, and effective plans and means for improving the development of U.S. Air Force officers in their career fields: (1) identify the demand for jobs in the field grades-major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel; (2) ascertain the backgrounds that officers have accumulated (assess the supply); (3) compare supply with demand (gap analysis); and (4) plan ways to close the gaps.

The challenges facing the U.S. military at home and abroad have highlighted the need for officers, including health care officers, who are educated and trained in joint matters and prepared to take on the new roles and responsibilities demanded by the current environment. This research, part of a larger project examining the preparation and support of leaders in the medical field in the civilian and military sectors, evaluates the need for and feasibility of qualifying health care officers as "joint" officers. Traditionally, officers could attain joint qualification by attending joint professional military education courses and serving in billets that provide them with joint duty experience and are included on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). New policy states that officers can also receive this experience in non-JDAL billets. However, both the traditional and current policies preclude the inclusion of certain positions, particularly health care officer positions, on the JDAL and allow waivers on a case-by-case basis from the joint requirement for promotion to general or flag officer positions. In addition to an extensive policy review, the study included an assessment of data from the 2005 Joint Officer Management Census survey suggesting that some health care officers are indeed serving in billets that need and provide joint duty experience for which they should receive credit.

Leadership development in the military is a multifaceted process that takes place over an officer's entire career. At its most basic level, this development occurs through professional experiences and a progressive series of professional military education, of which joint professional military education (JPME) is a subset. In May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a vision statement with guidance and objectives for leadership development in the armed services. This vision calls for an outcomes-based approach that emphasizes ingenuity, intellectual application, and military professionalism. The new approach focuses on what students must accomplish rather than traditional metrics, such as curriculum content or the amount of time spent learning specific material. The JCS also emphasized the need to integrate officer talent management (TM) and JPME because these functions are so closely connected. To support the implementation of this vision, the authors reviewed foundational, policy, and implementation documents; conducted semistructured interviews with senior representatives of relevant joint and service offices; and analyzed officer personnel data. They used these methods to (1) describe joint educational institutions' transitions to an outcomes-based approach, (2) examine performance expectations and the qualities needed in effective joint officers, (3) explore how joint performance is measured, and (4) see how challenges in TM systems and processes affect the implementation of JPME, Phase II. They also provide recommendations for how joint stakeholders and the military services can best integrate the TM and JPME processes to support the outcomes-based approach.

War is waged not only on battlefields. In the mid-1980s a high-stakes political struggle to redesign the relationships among the president, secretary of defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and warfighting commanders in the field resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Author James R. Locher III played a key role in the congressional effort to repair a dysfunctional military whose interservice squabbling had cost American taxpayers billions of dollars and put the lives of thousands of servicemen and women at risk. Victory on this front helped make possible the military successes the United States has enjoyed since the passage of the bill and to prepare it for the challenges it must still face.Victory on the Potomac provides the first detailed history of how Congress unified the Pentagon and does so with the benefit of an insider's view. In a fast-paced account that reads like a novel, Locher follows the bill through congressional committee to final passage, making clear that the process is neither abstract nor automatic. His vivid descriptions bring to life the amazing cast of this real-life drama, from the straight-shooting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Barry Goldwater, to the peevishly stubborn secretary of defense, Caspear Weinberger.Locher's analysis of political maneuvering and bureaucratic infighting will fascinate anyone who has an interest in how government works, and his understanding of the stakes in military reorganization will make clear why this legislative victory meant so much to American military capability. James R. Locher III, a graduate of West Point and Harvard Business School began his career in Washington as an executive trainee in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has worked in the White House, the Pentagon, and the Senate. During the period covered by this book, he was a staff member for the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Since then, he has served as an assistant secretary of defense in the first Bush and the early Clinton administrations. Currently, he works as a consultant and lecturer on defense matters.