This report presents an approach to strengthening the U.S. defense planning process. The approach centers on a simple but rigorous framework that links official statements of national security and national military strategy and the operational capabilities of force elements to programs for developing and procuring military systems and services. The author recommends adopting a force-planning procedure that includes the following elements: (1) an operational focus, (2) guidance to Department of Defense components in operational terms, (3) discussion at the level of force elements rather than systems and hardware, (4) outlines of capability goals, (5) allocation of resources to best overall effect, (6) a better process for decisionmaking, (7) streamlined process for upgrading basic systems, (8) determination of performance features of new basic systems, and (9) reduction of turmoil and paralysis.

Many observers have noted that past formulations of American militarystrategy, such as the Shape, Respond, Prepare Now approach that theDepartment of Defense used from 1997 until 2001, have been longer onphilosophy than on practicalities. To address those shortcomings, thisreport outlines a preliminary framework designed to better link strategywith resource priorities and more accurately frame key investment choices.This report contains the results of a study designed to assist theDepartment of Defense in its efforts to refine the defense strategy in lightof recent experiences and to address expectations about future challenges toU.S. national security. The framework model presented in this reportprovides a space in which decisionmakers can display strategic options andtheir inherent tradeoffs, debate the merits of those competing choices, andthen decide on a specific strategy.

The author focuses on the spending policy, deficit and debt, and retirement and healthcare entitlement dynamics that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to fund current defense plans. Transformational strategies, he concludes, must be adjusted to lower and more volatile future spending levels. The most important adjustment is to shift spending priorities to readiness and traditional modernization needs that are more urgent in terms of capabilities than transformational technologies, as well as more predictable and controllable in terms of costs.

This Note establishes the utility of concepts of operations as the central feature of more logical and coherent framework for planning. The overall framework involves six levels of activity, each of which takes place in a specific organizational setting. The activities proceed from the definition and announcement of national security policies objectives, strategies, and commitments to the development of operations 1 plans and deployment and employment of forces. The organizational meetings range from the National Security Council to the operational commands. The Note focuses on Levels III (formulation of operational concepts to attain specific operational capabilities) and IV (development and acquisition of systems and equipment). An appendix offers an example package for Levels I and II/ No new directive is required for adoption; the framework need only be used. (Author).

The U.S. military strategy of "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now" was developed during the course of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. Specifically, this strategy stated that the DoD had an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment, that it must be capable of responding to the full spectrum of crises, and that it needed to be preparing now for an uncertain future. With slight modifications, this QDR strategy remained the rationale for the employment of U.S. military forces until late 2001. This strategy, as defined more extensively in the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Cohen, 1997) and subsequent defense reports, had many virtues: It was defined broadly enough to encompass the spectrum of military operations from peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance through high-intensity warfare, it had a prominent focus on future challenges, and it made explicit the important role of the military in deterring conflict.

This report suggests a straightforward approach for linking defense system acquisition programs with our national security objectives. It reflects two related defense planning issues: lack of clarity regarding the relative importance and relevance of the military capabilities we are trying to achieve, and excessive consumption of time, energy, and dollars in acquiring the systems to achieve these capabilities. To structure the Department of Defense effort to enhance operational capabilities, the authors propose a framework with five components: (1) assess abilities to achieve projected operational objectives, identify critical deficiencies, determine the importance of enhancing capabilities, assess opportunities to do so, and direct concept formulation; (2) formulate, define, evaluate, and demonstrate new concepts; (3) decide, allocate, and budget; (4) acquire systems; and (5) organize and equip force elements. The framework provides a clear audit trail from national objectives to military tasks; it also defines a coherent flow of functions among forums and identifies which official and which forum is responsible for taking action. -- Publisher's description.

How has North Korea developed and managed its military readiness to achieve its strategic ends? Hinata-Yamaguchi analyzes North Korea’s defense planning by looking at how political, economic, and societal factors affect the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) readiness and strategies. He answers four key questions: How have the internal and external factors shaped North Korea’s security strategy? How do the political, economic, societal, and environmental factors impact North Korea’s defense planning? What are North Korea’s defense planning dilemmas and how do they impact the KPA’s readiness? What are the key implications for regional security and the strategies against North Korea? This analysis, drawing on various Korean, English, Japanese, and Chinese sources on North Korea and military affairs, will be of great value to strategists and policy analysts as well as scholars of East Asian security issues.

Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty explores and examines why and how security communities prepare purposefully for their future defence. Professor Gray argues that our understanding of human nature, of politics, and of strategic history, does allow us to make prudent choices in defence planning.