Published in 1903, these are the recollections of Robert Stiles during his time as a Major in the Army of Northern Virginia during the Civil War.

Author Kevin Campbell in this work examines in detail the swirling cavalry fight at Brandy Station. He also gives a lucid, well-written account of the debacle that befell Robert H. Milroy and his ill-fated division at Winchester and Carters Woods. Those battles, bloody in their own right, were soon relegated to the back pages when the horrific Battle of Gettysburg began dominating the press and the postwar reminiscences of the veterans. We can learn much from this new work, with its treasury of pertinent eyewitness accounts and clear prose. His skill in digging through the regimentals, official records, diaries, and other materials is evident, as well as his ability to interweave them into a cohesive narrative that brings the battles, personalities, and long hours of marching to light.

This book challenges the general view that Robert E. Lee was a military genius who staved off inevitable Confederate defeat against insurmountable odds. Instead, the author contends that Lee was responsible for the South's loss in a war it could have won. Instead, as this book demonstrates, Lee unnecessarily went for the win, squandered his irreplaceable troops, and weakened his army so badly that military defeat became inevitable. It describes how Lee's army took 80,000 casualties in Lees first fourteen months of command-while imposing 73,000 casualties on his opponents. With the Confederacy outnumbered four to one, Lee's aggressive strategy and tactics proved to be suicidal. Also described arc Lee's failure to take charge of the battlefield (such as on the second day of Gettysburg), his overly complex and ineffective battle plans (such as those at Antietam and during the Seven Days' campaign), and his vague and ambiguous orders (such as those that deprived him of Jeb Stuart's services for most of Gettysburg). Bonekemper looks beyond Lee's battles in the East and describes how Lee's Virginia-first myopia played a major role in crucial Confederate failures in the West. He itemizes Lee's refusals to provide reinforcements for Vicksburg or Tennessee in mid-1863, his causing James Longstreet to arrive at Chickamauga with only a third of his troops, his idea to move Longstreet away from Chattanooga just before Grant's troops broke through the undeemanned Confederates there, and his failure to reinforce Atlanta in the critical months before the 1864 presidential election. Bonekemper argues that Lee's ultimate failure was his prolonging of the hopeless and bloody slaughter even afterUnion victory had been ensured by a series of events: the fall of Atlanta, the re-election of Lincoln, and the fall of Petersburg and Richmond. Finally, the author explores historians' treatment of Lee, including the deification of him by failed Confederate generals attempting to resurrect their own reputations. Readers will not fred themselves feeling neutral about this stinging critique of the hero of The Lost Cause.

"Focusing on the period between mid-February and late May 1862, Newton examines in detail the high-level conferences in Richmond to set strategy and the relationship of the Peninsula campaign to operations in the Shenandoah Valley and the western Confederacy. By examining what [Joseph E.] Johnston actually accomplished rather than speculating on what he might have done, Newton shows that his overall conduct of the campaign holds up well under scrutiny". -- Jacket.

Sometimes called the "wharf rats from New Orleans" and the "lowest scrapings of the Mississippi," Lee's Tigers were the approximately twelve thousand Louisiana infantrymen who served in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from the time of the campaign at First Manassas to the final days of the war at Appomattox. Terry L. Jones offers a colorful, highly readable account of this notorious group of soldiers renowned not only for their drunkenness and disorderly behavior in camp but for their bravery in battle. It was this infantry that held back the initial Federal onslaught at First Manassas, made possible General Stonewall Jackson's famed Valley Campaign, contained the Union breakthrough at Spotsylvania's Bloody Angle, and led Lee's last offensive actions at Fort Stedman and Appomattox.Despite all their vices, Lee's Tigers emerged from the Civil War with one of the most respected military records of any group of southern soldiers. According to Jones, the unsavory reputation of the Tigers was well earned, for Louisiana probably had a higher percentage of criminals, drunkards, and deserters in its commands than any other Confederate state. The author spices his narrative with well-chosen anecdotes-among them an account of one of the stormiest train rides in military history. While on their way to Virginia, the enlisted men of Coppens' Battalion uncoupled their officers' car from the rest of the train and proceeded to partake of their favorite beverages. Upon arriving in Montgomery, the battalion embarked upon a drunken spree of harassment, vandalism, and robbery. Meanwhile, having commandeered another locomotive, the officers arrived and sprang from their train with drawn revolvers to put a stop to the disorder. "The charge of the Light Brigade," one witness recalled, "was surpassed by these irate Creoles." Lee's Tigers is the first study to utilize letters, diaries, and muster rolls to provide a detailed account of the origins, enrollments, casualties, and desertion rates of these soldiers. Jones supplies the first major work to focus solely on Louisiana's infantry in Lee's army throughout the course of the war. Civil War buffs and scholars alike will find Lee's Tigers a valuable addition to their libraries.

Among the high-ranking gray uniforms Daniel Harvey Hill caused a stir as a sash of red in a bullpen would. Hot-tempered, outspoken, he stormed his way through the Civil War, leading his soldiers at Malvern Hill and Antietam, and sometimes stepping on the toes of superiors. But he was much more than a seemingly impervious shield against Union bullets: a devout Christian, a family man, a gloomy fatalist, an intellectual. Lee’s Maverick General makes clear that he was often caught in the crossfire of military politics and ultimately made a scapegoat for the costly, barren victory at Chickamauga. Hal Bridges, drawing on Hill’s unpublished papers, offers an outsider’s inside views of Lee, Jefferson Davis, Braxton Bragg, James Longstreet, Stonewall Jackson, and others up and down the embattled line. In his introduction, Gary W. Gallagher rounds out the portrait of the controversial Hill, whose reading of military affairs was always perceptive.

General Richard Stoddert Ewell holds a unique place in the history of the Army of Northern Virginia. For four months Ewell was Stonewall Jackson's most trusted subordinate; when Jackson died, Ewell took command of the Second Corps, leading it at Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania Court House. In this biography, Donald Pfanz presents the most detailed portrait yet of the man sometimes referred to as Stonewall Jackson's right arm. Drawing on a rich array of previously untapped original source materials, Pfanz concludes that Ewell was a highly competent general, whose successes on the battlefield far outweighed his failures. But Pfanz's book is more than a military biography. It also examines Ewell's life before and after the Civil War, including his years at West Point, his service in the Mexican War, his experiences as a dragoon officer in Arizona and New Mexico, and his postwar career as a planter in Mississippi and Tennessee. In all, Pfanz offers an exceptionally detailed portrait of one of the South's most important leaders.