"Professor Joseph Brennan has a gift for bringing philosophy to life, making it a practical tool for evaluating day-to-day decisions as well as the great issues of our times. Morality and ethics have never been more necessary than in our brave, new world order of downsizing, intolerance, corruption, sexism, racism and all other "isms"." "About the Stockdale Course: Shot down over North Vietnam, U.S. Navy pilot James Stockdale spent seven and a half years as a prisoner of the communists. Although he was systematically tortured and brainwashed, Stockdale resisted his captors, led and sustained his fellow prisoners, and remained loyal to the principles he had joined the navy to defend. That incredible moral strength in adversity earned him the Medal of Honor. He found the inspiration to go on by recalling the teachings of Epictetus, an ancient Roman Stoic philosopher whom he had studied in college. After his release from captivity, Stockdale became president of the Naval War College, where he established and team-taught a course with Professor Brennan on ethics. The class was extremely popular because it made philosophy relevant to the needs of professional military men and women. Professor Brennan's lectures ultimately became the basis for this book."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

C. Stephen Evans defends the claim that moral obligations are best understood as divine commands or requirements; hence an important part of morality depends on God. God's requirements are communicated in a variety of ways, including conscience, and that natural law ethics and virtue ethics provide complementary perspectives to this view.

A systematic analysis considers the objectivity of ethics, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist worldview and its role in a person's rational lifespan.

Seumas Miller provides an exciting new philosophical theory of contemporary social institutions and the ethical challenges they confront.

Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner—along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue—result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject—falling back on non-moral values or practical, first-person considerations—Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community. As Darwall defines it, the concept of moral obligation has an irreducibly second-person aspect; it presupposes our authority to make claims and demands on one another. And so too do many other central notions, including those of rights, the dignity of and respect for persons, and the very concept of person itself. The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality’s supreme authority—an account that Darwall carries from the realm of theory to the practical world of second-person attitudes, emotions, and actions.

Most people believe that parents have moral rights and responsibilities regarding their children. These rights and responsibilities undergird the nuclear family and are essential to the flourishing of its members. However, their basis and contents are hotly contested. Do a child's genetic parents have a right to parent her? The importance of genetic ties is affirmed by many people's gut responses, everyday talk, and many court decisions, but the moral justification for tying parenthood rights to genetics is unclear. Parents are routinely permitted to make far-reaching decisions about their children's medical care, education, religious practice, and even how to punish them. When can parental rights be limited by the interests of the child or society? Matters are no more settled when it comes to parental responsibilities. It is commonly thought that if a man conceives a child through voluntary sexual intercourse he acquires parental responsibilities, even if he took every precaution against conception. On the other hand, sperm donors are widely-though not universally-thought to have no responsibilities towards their progeny. What is the basis for these disparate judgments? Parents are expected to do a lot for their children as they raise them. But there are surely limits. Sometimes parents have to balance the needs of multiple family members or just want to have time for themselves. What is the extent of their parental responsibilities? In The Moral Foundations of Parenthood, Joseph Millum provides a philosophical account of moral parenthood. He explains how parental rights and responsibilities are acquired, what those rights and responsibilities consist in, and how parents should go about making decisions on behalf of their children. In doing so, he provides a set of frameworks to help solve pressing ethical dilemmas relating to parents and children.

The principal aim of this book is to develop and defend an analysis of the concept of moral obligation. What it seeks to do is generate new solutions to a range of philosophical problems concerning obligation and its application. Amongst these problems are deontic paradoxes, the supersession of obligation, conditional obligation, actualism and possibilism, dilemmas, supererogation, and cooperation. By virtue of its normative neutrality, the analysis provides a theoretical framework within which competing theories of obligation can be developed and assessed.

In bioethics, discussions of justice have tended to focus on questions of fairness in access to health care: is there a right to medical treatment, and how should priorities be set when medical resources are scarce. But health care is only one of many factors that determine the extent to which people live healthy lives, and fairness is not the only consideration in determining whether a health policy is just. In this pathbreaking book, senior bioethicists Powers and Faden confront foundational issues about health and justice.

The Dignity of Commerce is a rigorous and novel exploration of moral justification of contract law through how it fosters well-functioning markets. Nathan B. Oman demonstrates how contract law deals overwhelmingly with the matters of commercial exchange, and how commerce in turn breeds habits of mind, or virtues, that support a liberal society. He also shows how markets provide a framework for peaceful cooperation across the fault lines of race, culture, religion, and politics that outdo even democratic political institutions. The Dignity of Commerce is ambitious in its aims and its conclusions and the implications are powerful. It is sure to elicit a serious discussion at the very heart of one of the most central areas of legal studies, and Nathan B. Oman has provided a clear, engaging, and comprehensive vehicle to get the discussion started.

Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing how each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard.