Formosa Betrayed is the authoritative account of the Kuomintang takeover of Taiwan and the 1947 "228 Incident" in which tens of thousands of Taiwanese people - an entire generation of intellectuals and leaders - were massacred by the new government. Kerr was there, knew Taiwan well, and paints a compelling picture of Taiwan's tragic past.

Peking ceded Formosa to Japan in 1895, whereupon Japan became the first Asian power in modern times to possess a colony, and the island became a testing ground for imperial policies. For two centuries the Formosan Chinese had resisted authority imposed upon them by inefficient continental Chinese. Now, Tokyo extended to insular Formosa many organizing, modernizing measures characterizing Japan's own vigorous Meiji Revolution. During the next fifty years, as living standards rose to approach those of Japan proper, early leaderless Formosan resistance to alien rule developed into organized appeals for effective representation in local government and at Tokyo. With reversion to continental Chinese control at the end of World War II, Formosans expected to conserve and enhance gains made during the Japanese era. Bitter disappointment promptly led again to rebellious relations with the continent. The author, long resident in Formosa and exclusively concerned with Formosan affairs while in government service during and after World War II, is well qualified to comment upon Formosa's history and prospects. He concludes that the Japanese era left an ineradicable mark upon the island people, an understanding of which will illuminate developments when Peking later undertakes the formidable task of converting Formosa into a fully disciplined and integrated province of the People's Republic of China.

Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.

This volume describes the central issues animating the dynamic U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship and the salient international and domestic legal issues shaping U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific region. Lung-Chu Chen gives particular attention Taiwan's status under international law and the role of the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

A first-hand account of the "228 Incident," a massacre in which somewhere between ten thousand and thirty thousand local leaders and intellectuals in Taiwan were systematically slaughtered by the Nationalist Chinese regime.