A lengthy critique of Kant's apriorism precedes discussions on the ethical principles of eudaemonism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, and positivism.

Previous studies on Max Scheler’s philosophy have either exclusively discussed his moral philosophy or his social philosophy. The present project explicates the link between Scheler’s non-formal ethics of values and sociology by showing how the former serves as framework for the latter. To realize that, this study adapts the qualitative-historical method using Scheler’s main texts, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism and Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge as well as his related works, analyzing them through the methodological hermeneutics as analytic framework. The results of the analysis show that Scheler’s phenomenological ethics goes beyond the generally teleological ethics of the classical period, and predominantly deontological ethics of the modern time. Whereas the ancient-medieval finds its moral life in following the natural moral law, and the modern, in the obedience to the categorical imperative of duty, fundamental in Scheler’s ethics is the operation of the logic of the heart. This logic brings about the reality of the person who is the center of valuation and moral action. It is also through the heart that values become accessible. For Scheler, values are a priori, immutable, and hierarchically arranged. They are variedly expressed by and actualized in a person who is primarily considered as a loving being. With the variations to values come the ideal persons, and the extent of their knowledge as well as their possible inversion called ressentiment. In social life, sociology investigates this extent of application of values. In particular, Scheler’s phenomenological sociology penetrates into the ethos and logos of community, exploring its sympathetic, intersubjective relations i.e., the co-feelings, co-experiences. Such a phenomenological sociology aims at a synthesis of Eastern and Western tendencies, and projects a World-Age of Adjustment. Arguably, non-formal ethics of values is the conceptual framework for sociology to proceed.

Formal Ethics is the study of formal ethical principles. The most important of these, perhaps even the most important principle of life, is the golden rule: "Treat others as you want to be treated". Although the golden rule enjoys support amongst different cultures and religions in the world, philosophers tend to neglect it. Formal Ethics gives the rule the attention it deserves. Modelled on formal logic, Formal Ethics was inspired by the ethical theories of Kant and Hare. It shows that the basic formal principles of ethics, like the golden rule, are very similar to principles of logic, and gives a firm basis for our ethical thinking. As an introduction to moral rationality, Formal Ethics also considers non-formal elements, and is applied to areas of practical concern such as racism and moral education

Formal Ethics is the study of formal ethical principles. The most important of these, perhaps even the most important principle of life, is the golden rule: "Treat others as you want to be treated". Although the golden rule enjoys support amongst different cultures and religions in the world, philosophers tend to neglect it. Formal Ethics gives the rule the attention it deserves. Modelled on formal logic, Formal Ethics was inspired by the ethical theories of Kant and Hare. It shows that the basic formal principles of ethics, like the golden rule, are very similar to principles of logic, and gives a firm basis for our ethical thinking. As an introduction to moral rationality, Formal Ethics also considers non-formal elements, and is applied to areas of practical concern such as racism and moral education

In The Wisdom of Our Ancestors, the authors mount a powerful defense of Western civilization, sketching a fresh vision of conservatism in the present age. In this book, Graham McAleer and Alexander Rosenthal-Pubul offer a renewed vision of conservatism for the twenty-first century. Taking their inspiration from the late Roger Scruton, the authors begin with a simple question: What, after all, is the meaning of conservatism? In reply, they make a case for a political orientation that they call “conservative humanism,” which threads a middle way between liberal universalism and its ideological alternatives. This vision of conservatism is rooted in the humanist tradition (that is, classical humanism, Christian humanism, and secular humanism), which the authors take to be the hallmark of Western civilizational identity. At its core, conservative humanism attempts to reconcile universal moral values (rooted in natural law) with local, particularist loyalties. In articulating this position, the authors show that the West—contra various contemporary critics—does, in fact, have a great deal of wisdom to offer. The authors begin with an overview of the conservative thought world, situating their proposal relative to two major poles: liberalism and nationalism. They move on to show that conservatism must fundamentally take the form of a defense of humanism, the “master idea of our civilization.” The ensuing chapters articulate various aspects of conservative humanism, including its metaphysical, institutional, legal, philosophical, and economic dimensions. Largely rooted in the Anglo-Continental conservative tradition, the work offers fresh perspectives for North American conservatism.

Included are essays in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophical psychology by one of the most important twentieth-century continental philosophers.

Despite sustained scholarly interest in the politics of modernism, astonishingly little attention has been paid to its relationship to Conservatism. Yet modernist writing was imbricated with Tory rhetoric and ideology from when it emerged in the Edwardian era. By investigating the many intersections between Anglophone modernism and Tory politics, Conservative Modernists offers new ways to read major figures such as T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, T. E. Hulme, and Ford Madox Ford. It also highlights the contribution to modernism of lesser-known writers, including Edward Storer, J. M. Kennedy, and A. M. Ludovici. These are the figures to whom it most frequently returns, but, cutting through disciplinary delineations, the book simultaneously reveals the inputs to modernism of a broad range of political writers, philosophers, art historians, and crowd psychologists: from Pascal, Burke, and Disraeli, to Nietzsche, Le Bon, Wallas, Worringer, Ribot, Bergson, and Scheler.

The Nature of Sympathy explores, at different levels, the social emotions of fellow-feeling, the sense of identity, love and hatred, and traces their relationship to one another and to the values with which they are associated. Scheler criticizes other writers, from Adam Smith to Freud, who have argued that the sympathetic emotions derive from self-interested feelings or instincts. He reviews the evaluations of love and sympathy current in different historical periods and in different social and religious environments, and concludes by outlining a theory of fellow-feeling as the primary source of our knowledge of one another.A prolific writer and a stimulating thinker, Max Scheler ranks second only to Husserl as a leading member of the German phenomenological school. Scheler's work lies mostly in the fields of ethics, politics, sociology, and religion. He looked to the emotions, believing them capable, in their own quality, of revealing the nature of the objects, and more especially the values, to which they are in principle directed.