“His collection of nine essays offers a comprehensive and insightful assessment of the Chinese defense science and technology (S&T).” —Pacific Affairs Among the most important issues in international security today are the nature and the global implications of China’s emergence as a world-class defense technology power. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Chinese defense industry has reinvented itself by emphasizing technological innovation and technology. This reinvention and its potential effects, both positive and negative, are attracting global scrutiny. Drawing insights from a range of disciplines, including history, social science, business, and strategic studies, Tai Ming Cheung and the contributors to Forging China’s Military Might develop an analytical framework to evaluate the nature, dimensions, and spectrum of Chinese innovation in the military and broader defense spheres. Forging China’s Military Might provides an overview of the current state of the Chinese defense industry and then focuses on subjects critical to understanding short- and long-term developments, including the relationship among defense contractors, regulators, and end-users; civil-military integration; China’s defense innovation system; and China’s place in the global defense economy. Case studies look in detail at the Chinese space and missile industry. “Constitutes high-quality, cutting-edge research on China’s defense industries. It should enjoy broad appeal—among academics, policy makers, security analysts, and business people in countries around the world.” —Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation “Forging China’s Military Might belongs in any political science shelf interested in China’s issues and international security and considers the nature of China’s emergence as a world power.” —Midwest Book Review

Fortifying China explores the titanic struggle to turn China into an aspiring world-class military technological power. The defense economy is leveraging the country's vibrant civilian economy and gaining access to foreign sources of technology and know-how. Drawing on extensive Chinese-language sources, Tai Ming Cheung explains that this transformation has two key dimensions. The defense economy is being reengineered to break down bureaucratic barriers and reduce the role of the state, fostering a more competitive and entrepreneurial culture to facilitate the rapid diffusion and absorption of technology and knowledge. At the same time, the civilian and defense economies are being integrated to form a dual-use technological and industrial base. In Cheung's view, the Chinese authorities believe this strategy will play a key role in supporting long-term defense modernization. For China's neighbors and the United States, understanding China's technological, industrial, and military capabilities is critical to the formulation of economic and security policies. Fortifying China provides crucial insight into the impact of China's dual-use technology strategy. Cheung's "systems of innovation" framework considers the structure, dynamics, and performance of the defense economy from a systems-level perspective.

Forging Leninism in China is a re-examination of the events of the Chinese revolution and the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from the years 1927 to 1934. Describing the transformation of the party as 'the forging of Leninism', Joseph Fewsmith offers a clear analysis of the development of the party. Drawing on supporting statements of party leaders and a wealth of historical material, he demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party reshaped itself to become far more violent, more hierarchical, and more militarized during this time. He highlights the role of local educated youth in organizing the Chinese revolution, arguing that it was these local organizations, rather than Mao, who introduced Marxism into the countryside. Fewsmith presents a vivid story of local social history and conflict between Mao's revolutionaries and local Communists.

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operation capabilities- on land, sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains. The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations, Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger joint operations capability. The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping's control over the PLA and to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military. Xi Jinping's ability to push through reforms indicates that he has more authority over the PLA than his recent predecessors. The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts.

Since the early 1980s, a prominent and consistent conclusion drawn from research on China's defense-industrial complex has been that China's defense-production capabilities are rife with weaknesses and limitations. This study argues for an alternative approach: From the vantage point of 2005, it is time to shift the focus of current research to the gradual improvements in and the future potential of China's defense-industrial complex. The study found that China's defense sectors are designing and producing a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the short term, are relevant to a possible conflict over Taiwan but also to China's long-term military presence in Asia. Part of a larger RAND Project AIR FORCE study on Chinese military modernization, this study examines the current and future capabilities of China's defense industry. The goals of this study are to 1.

Through extensive primary source analysis and independent analysis, this report seeks to answer a number of important questions regarding the state of China’s armed forces. The authors found that the PLA is keenly aware of its many weaknesses and is vigorously striving to correct them. Although it is only natural to focus on the PLA’s growing capabilities, understanding the PLA’s weaknesses—and its self-assessments—is no less important.

To help the U.S. Air Force assess the resources the government of the People's Republic of China is likely to spend on its military over the next two decades, this study projects future growth in Chinese government expenditures as a whole and the military in particular, evaluates the current and likely future capabilities of China's defense industries, and compares likely future Chinese expenditures on defense with recent expenditures by the United States and the U.S. Air Force. Although economic growth in China is destined to slow, output will still triple by 2025. In addition, government reforms hold the promise of improving the weak performance of China's defense industries. Although the researchers' high-end forecast of military expenditures is based on the assumption that the Chinese government would be able to spend 5.0 percent of GDP on defense, they believe that pressures within China to increase social spending on health care, pensions, education, and the environment, coupled with the costs of paying the Chinese government's liabilities, make it more likely that military spending will not rise above 2.3 percent of GDP. Using a combination of projected market and purchasing power parity exchange rates, the authors forecast that Chinese military spending is likely to rise from an estimated $69 billion in 2003 to $185 billion by 2025-approximately 61 percent of what the Department of Defense spent in 2003.

As entrenched bureaucracies, military organizations might reasonably be expected to be especially resistant to reform and favor only limited, incremental adjustments. Yet, since 1945, the U.S. Army has rewritten its capstone doctrine manual, Operations, fourteen times. While some modifications have been incremental, collectively they reflect a significant evolution in how the Army approaches warfare—making the U.S. Army a crucial and unique case of a modern land power that is capable of change. So what accounts for this anomaly? What institutional processes have professional officers developed over time to escape bureaucracies' iron cage? Forging the Sword conducts a comparative historical process-tracing of doctrinal reform in the U.S. Army. The findings suggest that there are unaccounted-for institutional facilitators of change within military organizations. Thus, it argues that change in military organizations requires "incubators," designated subunits established outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy, and "advocacy networks" championing new concepts. Incubators, ranging from special study groups to non-Title 10 war games and field exercises, provide a safe space for experimentation and the construction of new operational concepts. Advocacy networks then connect different constituents and inject them with concepts developed in incubators. This injection makes changes elites would have otherwise rejected a contagious narrative.

In late 2015, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) initiated reforms that have brought dramatic changes to its structure, model of warfighting, and organizational culture, including the creation of a Strategic Support Force (SSF) that centralizes most PLA space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities. The reforms come at an inflection point as the PLA seeks to pivot from land-based territorial defense to extended power projection to protect Chinese interests in the "strategic frontiers" of space, cyberspace, and the far seas. Understanding the new strategic roles of the SSF is essential to understanding how the PLA plans to fight and win informationized wars and how it will conduct information operations.

This edited volume examines the recalibration of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) roles and missions in China’s domestic and foreign policymaking since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in late 2012. This book explores how China’s growing military prowess, along with Beijing’s ongoing shift away from "keeping a low profile," owes much to the policies of the China’s Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership. The chapters in the book share a central theme: the recalibration of the PLA roles and missions since Xi Jinping assumed the trifecta of party-state-military power. These contributions seek to explore in depth some of the key issues and scrutinize the enhancements in the PLA’s operational capabilities, both in terms of its hardware as well as its "heartware" – the human elements of its development such as operational culture and doctrine. In all, the chapters document the transformative change the PLA has undergone since the profound realization of its previous limitations vis-à-vis the United States’ advanced military operations of the previous century as well as pointing to continuity amid change. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Chinese politics, Asian security, defense studies, and international relations, in general.