Documents the institutional growth of the intelligence community under Directors Walter Bedell Smith and Allen W. Dulles, and demonstrates how Smith, through his prestige, ability to obtain national security directives from a supportive President Truman, and bureaucratic acumen, truly transformed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

"This volume is part of a retrospective subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that fills in gaps in the volumes of the Truman and Eisenhower subseries. At the time the Truman and Eisenhower volumes were prepared, the Office of the Historian did not have access to documents related to intelligence. This is the second volume that documents the institutional foundations of the relationship between foreign policy and intelligence. The first, Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, was published in 1996"--Page iii-iv.

Contains one long chapter covering 195055, and a second chapter that includes the key Nat. Security Council (NSC) Intelligence Directives of the period. Documents the institutional growth of the intelligence community during the first half of the 1950s. When Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith took over as Dir. of Central Intelligence in October 1950, he inherited an agency that was widely believed to have been unable to establish itself as the central institution of the U.S. intelligence community. Utilizing his prestige, and a national security directive from Pres. Truman, Smith established the multiple directorate structure within the CIA that has continued to this day, brought the clandestine service into the CIA, and worked to effect greater inter-agency coordination through a strengthened process to produce Nat. Intelligence Estimates. The exponential growth of the nat. security establishment and of the intelligence community was due to two factors: NSC 68 (a call for more active containment of the Soviet Union) and the Korean War. The CIA was called upon to expand the clandestine service, and the intelligence community was required to provide better and more definitive intelligence on the Soviet bloc and China. When Allen Dulles took over as Dir. of Central Intelligence in Feb. 1953, these pressures continued. By 1955, the consensus of two commissions appointed by Pres. Eisenhower to review the intelligence effort was that the clandestine service had grown too rapidly and was plagued by poor management. This is a print on demand report.