Project FICON (Fighter conveyer): In the early 1950s, the Air Force conducted a series of experiments to establish the feasibility of carrying, launching, and retrieving jet reconnaissance airplanes from giant Convair RB-36 bombers. It was hoped that the bombers would carry the reconnaissance jets to the perimeter of the Soviet Union and then release them to penetrate the air defenses. Tests of the concept were conducted in 1952 and 1953 with a Republic F-84E Thunderjet and the YF-84F Thunderstreak prototype. Twenty-six Republic RF-84F Thunderflashes and ten Convair GRB-36D carriers were modified for the project. In 1955, a squadron of carriers was established at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington. A squadron of parasites was established at nearby Larson Air Force Base. Training operations began in December 1955, but the composite aircraft system faced competition from the Boeing RB-52B, Lockheed U-2, and the development of aerial refueling.

The P-85 Goblin was the only airplane that ever flew which was designed from scratch to be operated entirely from another airplane. The development of the B-36 by the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation of Fort Worth, Texas resulted in a requirement for fighter protection for the bomber at distances from any friendly base that far exceeded the range of currently available escort fighter airplanes. Due to the inability of contemporary fighters to escort B-36 bombers all the way to their targets, the Army Air Corps initiated Project MX-472, Unconventional Fighter Design Studies, on December 3, 1942. The primary objective of the project was the development of a suitable method of protecting the B-36 on long-range bombing missions. The McDonnell Aircraft Corporation designed the P-85 Goblin to fit entirely within the confines of the bomb bay of the B-36. The little fighter was just fifteen feet long with a wing sapn of twenty-one feet.

During and after World War II, aircraft designers were faced with the problem of increasing the range of strategic bombers. Dr. Richard Vogt, a German immigrant to the United States, proposed that floating wing panels carrying fuel tanks could be attached to the wing tips of an airplane with hinges to extend its range. The floating wing panels would support their own weight, without increasing the load on the airplane's wings. The Air Force initiated a project to simulate floating wing panels with a piloted light plane that coupled to a larger airplane in flight. Soon the scope of the project expanded to explore the possibility of towing fighters coupled to the wing tips of bombers.

Except in a few instances, since World War II no American soldier or sailor has been attacked by enemy air power. Conversely, no enemy soldier orsailor has acted in combat without being attacked or at least threatened by American air power. Aviators have brought the air weapon to bear against enemies while denying them the same prerogative. This is the legacy of the U.S. AirForce, purchased at great cost in both human and material resources.More often than not, aerial pioneers had to fight technological ignorance, bureaucratic opposition, public apathy, and disagreement over purpose.Every step in the evolution of air power led into new and untrodden territory, driven by humanitarian impulses; by the search for higher, faster, and farther flight; or by the conviction that the air way was the best way. Warriors have always coveted the high ground. If technology permitted them to reach it, men, women andan air force held and exploited it-from Thomas Selfridge, first among so many who gave that "last full measure of devotion"; to Women's Airforce Service Pilot Ann Baumgartner, who broke social barriers to become the first Americanwoman to pilot a jet; to Benjamin Davis, who broke racial barriers to become the first African American to command a flying group; to Chuck Yeager, a one-time non-commissioned flight officer who was the first to exceed the speed of sound; to John Levitow, who earned the Medal of Honor by throwing himself over a live flare to save his gunship crew; to John Warden, who began a revolution in air power thought and strategy that was put to spectacular use in the Gulf War.Industrialization has brought total war and air power has brought the means to overfly an enemy's defenses and attack its sources of power directly. Americans have perceived air power from the start as a more efficient means of waging war and as a symbol of the nation's commitment to technology to master challenges, minimize casualties, and defeat adversaries.

CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of white papers on U.S. military forces, including their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. This report is a compilation of these papers and takes a deep look at each of the military services, the new Space Force, special operations forces, DOD civilians, and contractors in the FY 2021 budget. This report further includes a foreword regarding how the Biden administration might approach decisions facing the military forces, drawing on insights from the individual chapters.

In February 1999, only a few weeks before the U.S. Air Force spearheaded NATO's Allied Force air campaign against Serbia, Col. C.R. Anderegg, USAF (Ret.), visited the commander of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. Colonel Anderegg had known Gen. John Jumper since they had served together as jet forward air controllers in Southeast Asia nearly thirty years earlier. From the vantage point of 1999, they looked back to the day in February 1970, when they first controlled a laser-guided bomb strike. In this book Anderegg takes us from "glimmers of hope" like that one through other major improvements in the Air Force that came between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. Always central in Anderegg's account of those changes are the people who made them. This is a very personal book by an officer who participated in the transformation he describes so vividly. Much of his story revolves around the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, where he served two tours as an instructor pilot specializing in guided munitions.

Annually, CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian publishes a series of papers on U.S. military forces—their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. The overall theme of this year’s report is the struggle to align forces and strategy because of budget tradeoffs that even defense buildups must make, unrelenting operational demands that stress forces and prevent force structure reductions, and legacy programs whose smooth operations and strong constituencies inhibit rapid change. This report takes a deeper look at the strategic and budget context, the military services, special operations forces, DOD civilians and contractors, and non-DOD national security organizations in the FY 2020 budget.

While successful developments in aviation receive considerable attention, the projects that failed or otherwise did not live up to expectations receive far less, if any, scrutiny. Typically, unsuccessful efforts are briefer in duration and have a less visible paper trail. Thus, while the literature is rich in success stories, we tend to “forget” or simply bury our failures. And, as one observer has suggested, “that there were failures, mistakes, and wrong turns reminds us that progress is not inevitable, that acknowledged error can be as instructive as success, and that roads not taken impose a price all their own.” Here, author Kenneth P. Werrell tells of a race to overcome obstacles—politics, resources, competing technologies, timing—in the quest to deliver quality, if not war-winning machinery. The focus of Air Force Disappointments, Mistakes, and Failures: 1940–1990 is on aircraft (e.g., bombers, fighters, transports) and missiles (e.g., cruise missiles, standoff missiles, ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles). An intelligence system is also evaluated. These case studies give the context and details of the development, testing, and, as appropriate, operational service. Highlighting the problems and criticisms of these systems then provides an opportunity to determine what went wrong. The reasons for the failures of these systems vary from the obvious (money, delays, technical problems) to more complex reasons, such as the foe’s reaction, politics, new technologies, and timing. The tale of these disappointments is a heretofore untold story. These projects, in which the US Air Force stumbled, are outliers within the overall success of the service, and, fortunately, its successes outnumber the failures.

General aviation encompasses all the ways aircraft are used beyond commercial and military flying: private flights, barnstormers, cropdusters, and so on. Authors Janet and Michael Bednarek have taken on the formidable task of discussing the hundred-year history of this broad and diverse field by focusing on the most important figures and organizations in general aviation and the major producers of general aviation aircraft and engines. This history examines the many airplanes used in general aviation, from early Wright and Curtiss aircraft to the Piper Cub and the Lear Jet. The authors trace the careers of birdmen, birdwomen, barnstormers, and others who shaped general aviation—from Clyde Cessna and the Stinson family of San Antonio to Olive Ann Beech and Paul Poberezny of Milwaukee. They explain how the development of engines influenced the development of aircraft, from the E-107 that powered the 1929 Aeronca C-2, the first affordable personal aircraft, to the Continental A-40 that powered the Piper Cub, and the Pratt and Whitney PT-6 turboprop used on many aircraft after World War II. In addition, the authors chart the boom and bust cycle of general aviation manufacturers, the rising costs and increased regulations that have accompanied a decline in pilots, the creation of an influential general aviation lobby in Washington, and the growing popularity of “type” clubs, created to maintain aircraft whose average age is twenty-eight years. This book provides readers with a sense of the scope and richness of the history of general aviation in the United States. An epilogue examining the consequences of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, provides a cautionary note.