This highly relevant study provides an incisive analysis of a critical phase in recent East Asian financial history, exploring the underlying causes of the financial crisis that struck Indonesia during the second half of 1997. Matsumoto’s extensive commercial experience in Indonesian finance during these critical years, allows him to skilfully argue that the roots of the crisis lay in the period of capital liberalization undertaken during the boom years from 1994 to 1997 which encouraged the development of fragile and unstable financial structures, involving increased corporate leverage, reliance on external debt, and the introduction of riskier and more complicated financial instruments and transactions. In-depth fieldwork data and four detailed case studies illuminate the microeconomic foundations of the crisis, showing how Indonesian capitalists sought to liquidate their Indonesian assets without losing control of their corporate empires, by taking advantage of increased access to foreign loans and complex financial re-engineering, actions which ultimately precipitated instability and crisis throughout the entire financial system. Finally, it reflects upon the policy implications of this episode, putting forward the case for comprehensive capital controls for open and developing economies until they establish appropriate financial institutions to monitor and manage the level of indebtedness and the volatility of capitalists’ behaviour.

Indonesia recovered quickly after being hit hard by contagion from the global financial crisis. Banking fundamentals have improved, with most Indonesian banks reporting high capital, comfortable levels of liquidity, and solid profitability. Banks exhibit rising credit exposures to retail and SMEs. The Crisis Management Protocol functioned well during the crisis, but it has lapsed. A viable capital market will diversify the sources of funding and provide long-term investment opportunities. The small insurance industry should be restructured and gradually expanded to broaden the institutional investor base.

Risks and uncertainties?market, financial, operational, social, humanitarian, environmental, and institutional?are the inherent realities of the modern world. Stock market crashes, demonetization of currency, and climate change constitute just a few examples that can adversely impact financial institutions across the globe. To mitigate these risks and avoid a financial crisis, a better understanding of how the economy responds to uncertainties is needed. Maintaining Financial Stability in Times of Risk and Uncertainty is an essential reference source that discusses how risks and uncertainties affect the financial stability and security of individuals and institutions, as well as probable solutions to mitigate risk and achieve financial resilience under uncertainty. Featuring research on topics such as financial fraud, insurance ombudsman, and Knightian uncertainty, this book is developed for researchers, academicians, policymakers, students, and scholars.

"Indonesia is one of the few countries that came through the global economic crisis in 2008-09 with positive economic growth. Despite some recorded positive domestic economic performances, Indonesia faces new challenges as its economy keeps growing and the global economy remains uncertain. A new economic development paradigm is needed to overcome old problems (poverty and unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, corruption, a complex regulatory environment, and unequal resource distribution among regions) with global market opportunities. This book provides a new perspective on how Indonesian’s economic policies should be developed by considering its past and future challenges." - Firmanzah, Professor of Economics and Dean of Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia "Aris Ananta, Muljana Soekarni and Sjamsul Arifin gather excellent researchers and practitioners to discuss important economic policy issues for Indonesia today. They discuss monetary and fiscal policies and real economic sector issues based not only on theoretical analysis but also on their day-to-day experience in economic management. By reviewing Indonesia's economic policy reform and subsequent Asian financial crisis and sub-prime loan crisis, the authors present a new economic development paradigm and explore economic strategy and policies for the new era. The book offers many timely lessons from history, as well as the real policy experiences of the authors, and guides readers in exploring economic policies under the globalized world economy. This book is very useful for both practitioners and researchers." - Masaaki Komatsu, Professor of Economics, Hiroshima University

This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.

From 1716 to 1845, Scotland’s banks were among the most dynamic and resilient in Europe, effectively absorbing a series of adverse economic shocks that rocked financial markets in London and on the continent. Legislating Instability explains the seeming paradox that the Scottish banking system achieved this success without the government controls usually considered necessary for economic stability. Eighteenth-century Scottish banks operated in a regulatory vacuum: no central bank to act as lender of last resort, no monopoly on issuing currency, no legal requirements for maintaining capital reserves, and no formal limits on bank size. These conditions produced a remarkably robust banking system, one that was intensely competitive and served as a prime engine of Scottish economic growth. Despite indicators that might have seemed red flags—large speculative capital flows, a fixed exchange rate, and substantial external debt—Scotland successfully navigated two severe financial crises during the Seven Years’ War. The exception was a severe financial crisis in 1772, seven years after the imposition of the first regulations on Scottish banking—the result of aggressive lobbying by large banks seeking to weed out competition. While these restrictions did not cause the 1772 crisis, Tyler Beck Goodspeed argues, they critically undermined the flexibility and resilience previously exhibited by Scottish finance, thereby elevating the risk that another adverse economic shock, such as occurred in 1772, might threaten financial stability more broadly. Far from revealing the shortcomings of unregulated banking, as Adam Smith claimed, the 1772 crisis exposed the risks of ill-conceived bank regulation.

Contributes to a better understanding of the policy, economic, and legal options of countries struggling with debt problems.

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.