At a time when Congressional investigations have taken on added importance and urgency in American politics, this book offers readers a rare, insider’s portrait of the world of US Congressional oversight. It examines specific oversight investigations into multiple financial and offshore tax scandals over fifteen years, from 1999 to 2014, when Senator Levin served in a leadership role on the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), the Senate’s premier investigative body. Despite mounting levels of partisanship, dysfunction, and cynicism swirling through Congress during those years, this book describes how Congressional oversight investigations can be a powerful tool for uncovering facts, building bipartisan consensus, and fostering change, offering detailed case histories as proof. Grounded in fact, and written as only an insider could tell it, this book will be of interest to financial and tax practitioners, policymakers, academics, students, and the general public.

Policymakers and program managers are continually seeking ways to improve accountability in achieving an entity's mission. A key factor in improving accountability in achieving an entity's mission is to implement an effective internal control system. An effective internal control system helps an entity adapt to shifting environments, evolving demands, changing risks, and new priorities. As programs change and entities strive to improve operational processes and implement new technology, management continually evaluates its internal control system so that it is effective and updated when necessary. Section 3512 (c) and (d) of Title 31 of the United States Code (commonly known as the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA)) requires the Comptroller General to issue standards for internal control in the federal government.

In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.

A clear understanding of what we know, don't know, and can't know should guide any reasonable approach to managing financial risk, yet the most widely used measure in finance today--Value at Risk, or VaR--reduces these risks to a single number, creating a false sense of security among risk managers, executives, and regulators. This book introduces a more realistic and holistic framework called KuU --the K nown, the u nknown, and the U nknowable--that enables one to conceptualize the different kinds of financial risks and design effective strategies for managing them. Bringing together contributions by leaders in finance and economics, this book pushes toward robustifying policies, portfolios, contracts, and organizations to a wide variety of KuU risks. Along the way, the strengths and limitations of "quantitative" risk management are revealed. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Ashok Bardhan, Dan Borge, Charles N. Bralver, Riccardo Colacito, Robert H. Edelstein, Robert F. Engle, Charles A. E. Goodhart, Clive W. J. Granger, Paul R. Kleindorfer, Donald L. Kohn, Howard Kunreuther, Andrew Kuritzkes, Robert H. Litzenberger, Benoit B. Mandelbrot, David M. Modest, Alex Muermann, Mark V. Pauly, Til Schuermann, Kenneth E. Scott, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, and Richard J. Zeckhauser. Introduces a new risk-management paradigm Features contributions by leaders in finance and economics Demonstrates how "killer risks" are often more economic than statistical, and crucially linked to incentives Shows how to invest and design policies amid financial uncertainty

An authoritative guide to the new economics of our crisis-filled century. Published in collaboration with the Institute for New Economic Thinking. The 2008 financial crisis was a seismic event that laid bare how financial institutions’ instabilities can have devastating effects on societies and economies. COVID-19 brought similar financial devastation at the beginning of 2020 and once more massive interventions by central banks were needed to heed off the collapse of the financial system. All of which begs the question: why is our financial system so fragile and vulnerable that it needs government support so often? For a generation of economists who have risen to prominence since 2008, these events have defined not only how they view financial instability, but financial markets more broadly. Leveraged brings together these voices to take stock of what we have learned about the costs and causes of financial fragility and to offer a new canonical framework for understanding it. Their message: the origins of financial instability in modern economies run deeper than the technical debates around banking regulation, countercyclical capital buffers, or living wills for financial institutions. Leveraged offers a fundamentally new picture of how financial institutions and societies coexist, for better or worse. The essays here mark a new starting point for research in financial economics. As we muddle through the effects of a second financial crisis in this young century, Leveraged provides a road map and a research agenda for the future.

Managing Extreme Financial Risk addresses the need for better management strategies in light of increased market risk and volatility in financial institutions' revenue models. Top officials from the financial and regulatory industries point to real corporate issues, showing how institutions react to financial crises. From first-hand experiences, they explain how effective sustainability management does not just prevent being blindsided; it also leads to proactive solutions that enhance an institution's strength to weather a sudden financial crisis, add significant shareholder value, and reduce systemic risk. Readable, coherent, and logical, Managing Extreme Financial Risk shows how extreme risk needs to be handled when the cost of being wrong means the difference between life and death of the institution. - Based on the firsthand experiences and perspectives of senior-level executives - Concentrates on extreme risk, when the cost of being wrong is not the loss of profits, but the death of the institution - Written to be easily understood without algorithms, models, and quants

This edition of the OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook reviews developments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic for government borrowing needs, funding conditions and funding strategies in the OECD area.

In the field of financial risk management, the 'sell side' is the set of financial institutions who offer risk management products to corporations, governments, and institutional investors, who comprise the 'buy side'. The sell side is often at a significant advantage as it employs quantitative experts who provide specialized knowledge. Further, the existing body of knowledge on risk management, while extensive, is highly technical and mathematical and is directed to the sell side.This book levels the playing field by approaching risk management from the buy side instead, focusing on educating corporate and institutional users of risk management products on the essential knowledge they need to be an intelligent buyer. Rather than teach financial engineering, this volume covers the principles that the buy side should know to enable it to ask the right questions and avoid being misled by the complexity often presented by the sell side.Written in a user-friendly manner, this textbook is ideal for graduate and advanced undergraduate classes in finance and risk management, MBA students specializing in finance, and corporate and institutional investors. The text is accompanied by extensive supporting material including exhibits, end-of-chapter questions and problems, solutions, and PowerPoint slides for lecturers.