The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) rightly identified the proliferation, privatization, and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups and rogue states as the critical nontraditional threat of the 21st century. However, the NSS argues that in the 21st century, technology has advanced and become so readily available that we "must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." This reconceptualization of preemption defines the core question-What military strategy is appropriate for using force "to act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed"? We argue preemption is ill-suited for disrupting the converged threat of terrorists and rogue states pursuing WMD. Instead, we propose that a forcible counterproliferation (FCP) strategy is most effective for fighting in the "gray zone." Using the 2002 NSS and the problems associated with justifying the preemptive use of force in Iraq as starting points, we examine three questions: 1) How has the threat environment changed since the end of the Cold War? 2) If there is a new threat environment, what is the appropriate military strategy for that threat? 3) How can the United States justify a new strategy to domestic critics and gain international support?

In the aftermath of 9/11 the Bush administration published the 2002 National Security Strategy. The strategy identified the gravest danger to our Nation as the "crossroads of radicalism and technology." By announcing that "America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed," the strategy brought preemption to the forefront of the national security debate. Three 2003-2004 Harvard National Security Fellows, Commander Joanne Fish, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel McCraw, and Colonel Christopher Reddish, argue that, when the National Security Strategy introduced the strategy of preemption, it simultaneously and unknowingly created a conceptual "gray zone" by failing to clarify the substantive difference between "imminent threats" and the "adapted imminent threats" identified by the Bush administration. The resulting strategic confusion is most problematic when facing the nexus of rogue states, terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction.

In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.

As society continues to rely heavily on technological tools for facilitating business, e-commerce, banking, and communication, among other applications, there has been a significant rise in criminals seeking to exploit these tools for their nefarious gain. Countries all over the world are seeing substantial increases in identity theft and cyberattacks, as well as illicit transactions, including drug trafficking and human trafficking, being made through the dark web internet. Sex offenders and murderers explore unconventional methods of finding and contacting their victims through Facebook, Instagram, popular dating sites, etc., while pedophiles rely on these channels to obtain information and photographs of children, which are shared on hidden community sites. As criminals continue to harness technological advancements that are outpacing legal and ethical standards, law enforcement and government officials are faced with the challenge of devising new and alternative strategies to identify and apprehend criminals to preserve the safety of society. The Encyclopedia of Criminal Activities and the Deep Web is a three-volume set that includes comprehensive articles covering multidisciplinary research and expert insights provided by hundreds of leading researchers from 30 countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Finland, South Korea, Malaysia, and more. This comprehensive encyclopedia provides the most diverse findings and new methodologies for monitoring and regulating the use of online tools as well as hidden areas of the internet, including the deep and dark web. Highlighting a wide range of topics such as cyberbullying, online hate speech, and hacktivism, this book will offer strategies for the prediction and prevention of online criminal activity and examine methods for safeguarding internet users and their data from being tracked or stalked. Due to the techniques and extensive knowledge discussed in this publication it is an invaluable addition for academic and corporate libraries as well as a critical resource for policy makers, law enforcement officials, forensic scientists, criminologists, sociologists, victim advocates, cybersecurity analysts, lawmakers, government officials, industry professionals, academicians, researchers, and students within this field of study.

Bush and Asia analyzes the changing nature of relations between the East Asian nations and the United States since the election of George W. Bush in 2000 and the events of September 11, 2001.

The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."

Sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center and in collaboration with the Joint Staff's Deputy Directorate for Global Operations (Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch), this report examines the emergence of gray zone competition and conflict as important pacers for U.S. defense strategy. The authors argue that gray zone challenges are unique defense-relevant issues sharing three common characteristics-hybridity, menace to defense and military convention, and profound and paralyzing risk-confusion. This report and its authors offer an important opening venture into a vexing strategic question for senior defense and military leadership on the subject of gray zone threats. Namely, how can the American defense enterprise adjust to an era of relentless revisionist and rejectionist opposition to U.S. power? On the one hand, purposeful U.S. competitors pursue meaningful revision of the U.S.-led status quo through campaign-quality combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression.

Grand strategy integrates military, political, and economic means to pursue states ultimate objectives in the international system. American grand strategy had been in a state of ux prior to 2001, as containment of the Soviet Union gave way to a wider range of apparently lesser challenges. The 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade towers, however, transformed the grand strategy debate and led to a sweeping reevaluation of American security policy. It may still be too early to expect this reevaluation to have produced a complete or nal response to 9/11 policies as complex as national grand strategy do not change overnight. But after 3 years of sustained debate and adaptation, it is reasonable to ask what this process has produced so far, and how well the results to date serve American interests.