Like its predecessors TC 6-71 (1988) and the first field manual-version of FM 6-71 (1994), this publication is intended for you, the combined arms brigade or battalion commander, and your staffs to help you synchronize fires with your scheme of maneuver. You know from experience that combat forces must be employed as part of the combined arms team. Maneuver and fires must be synchronized and orchestrated by the combined arms commander to realize the full potential of each arm and maximize the combat power of the combined arms team. The same applies in principle to firepower. Mortars, cannon and rocket artillery, naval gunfire, and air support on the lethal side, and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) and information operations (IO) systems on the non-lethal side, are various means of fire support. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Each provides a measure of capability the others lack: responsiveness, flexibility, and accuracy from mortars and artillery; precision and destructiveness from close air support; disruption of command and control and capability to exclude collateral damage from IEW and IO systems. Using all of these means in combination creates a synergistic effect - the whole system is far more effective than its parts. The proper application of fire support requires as much skill and orchestration from the combined arms commander as it does from the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). This is what this publication is about, to help clarify the art of applying fire support at the right time and place on the battlefield.

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-16, Fire Support Coordina- tion in the Ground Combat Element, is a framework for coordinating and em- ploying supporting arms in consonance with maneuver elements.

FM 3-09.31 MCRP 3-31.1 (Formerly MCRP 3-16C) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander Like its predecessors TC 6-71 (1988) and the first field manual-version of FM 6-71 (1994), this publication is intended for you, the combined arms brigade or battalion commander, and your staffs to help you synchronize fires with your scheme of maneuver. You know from experience that combat forces must be employed as part of the combined arms team. Maneuver and fires must be synchronized and orchestrated by the combined arms commander to realize the full potential of each arm and maximize the combat power of the combined arms team. The same applies in principle to firepower. Mortars, cannon and rocket artillery, naval gunfire, and air support on the lethal side, and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) and information operations (IO) systems on the non-lethal side, are various means of fire support. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Each provides a measure of capability the others lack: responsiveness, flexibility, and accuracy from mortars and artillery; precision and destructiveness from close air support; disruption of command and control and capability to exclude collateral damage from IEW and IO systems. Using all of these means in combination creates a synergistic effect - the whole system is far more effective than its parts. The proper application of fire support requires as much skill and orchestration from the combined arms commander as it does from the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). This is what this publication is about, to help clarify the art of applying fire support at the right time and place on the battlefield.

This publication, “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,” is intended for the combined arms brigade or battalion commander, and their staffs to help synchronize fires with their scheme of maneuver. Experience shows that combat forces must be employed as part of the combined arms team. Maneuver and fires must be synchronized and orchestrated by the combined arms commander to realize the full potential of each arm and maximize the combat power of the combined arms team. The same applies in principle to firepower. Mortars, cannon and rocket artillery, naval gunfire, and air support on the lethal side, and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) and information operations (IO) systems on the non-lethal side, are various means of fire support. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Each provides a measure of capability the others lack: responsiveness, flexibility, and accuracy from mortars and artillery; precision and destructiveness from close air support; disruption of command and control and capability to exclude collateral damage from IEW and IO systems. Using all of these means in combination creates a synergistic effect - the whole system is far more effective than its parts. The proper application of fire support requires as much skill and orchestration from the combined arms commander as it does from the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). This is what this publication is about, to help clarify the art of applying fire support at the right time and place on the battlefield.

From the foreword by Genral (ret.) David Petraeus: "In 2010, as the scale and tempo of Coalition operations in Afghanistan increased, so did the need for historical accounts of small-unit actions. As commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), I commissioned the Combat Studies Institute to research and write the cases collected in this volume and in those that will follow. By capturing key insights from both lethal and non-lethal operations, I hoped these accounts would be of immediate utility to sergeants and lieutenants at the center of future operations. The eight actions described in these pages take the reader through a wide range of platoon-level operations, from an intense firefight near Kandahar to an intricate civic action project in Kunar Province. Drawing from dozens of Soldier interviews, these accounts vividly depict the actions themselves and offer critical insights of greatest benefit to the small-unit actions leaders of today and tomorrow. The US Army always has prided itself as an institution of constant learning, strongly committed to drawing lessons from its past. This volume from the Combat Studies Institute is an excellent example of that long and honorable tradition. I hope that you will find the actions n Vanguard of Valor to be both instructive and compelling. I am sure that you will find them to be inspirational."

The U.S. Army has always touted itself as a capstone developmental experience and still does so today- You made them strong-we'll make them Army Strong. The Army is almost universally acknowledged as an organization that powerfully develops talent in areas such as leadership, teamwork behavior, work ethics, adaptability, fitness, and many others. Yet despite this well-earned reputation, the Army must remain vigilant. Authorized strength and inventory mismatches, an inverse relationship between responsibility and formal developmental time, and sparse non-operational development opportunities are serious challenges that the Army must address. Developing talent is important in all high performing organizations, but it is particularly critical to the Army for several reasons. First, the mission of fighting and winning wars requires truly championship-level talent-America's national security depends on it. Second, Americans entrust the very lives of their sons and daughters to the Army-they deserve to be led by superstars. And third, limited lateral entry into midcareer and senior level officer positions means the Army cannot rely upon poaching talent from outside organizations as corporate America does. Instead, the Army must retain and continuously develop its entrylevel talent to meet present and future demands. Army officers are hungry for the development needed to reach their full potential and perform optimally. When they do not get it, they seek it in the private sector. This is why officer developmental programs must be tailored to the needs of every talented individual. In this way, the Army can both deepen and broaden its overall talent distribution, mitigating risk in an increasingly uncertain and rapidly changing operating environment. Current practice, however, generally shunts officers down conventional career paths and through standardized "gates," regardless of their unique talents, experience, or needs. Meeting future challenges may well require a new way of doing business, a comprehensive developmental strategy rooted in sound theory. Several pioneers in the human capital field have provided a ready foundation for such a strategy. Their work demonstrates the criticality of continuing education, genuinely useful evaluations, and properly valued signals to the creation of an outstanding developmental climate. Considering officer development within this context moves the Army beyond a focus upon formal training and education. While these are certainly important, managing the nexus of individual talents and rapidly changing organizational requirements calls for careful attention to many other developmental factors. These include professional networks, mentorship and peer relationships, tenure, individual learning styles, as well as diversity of thought, experience, and culture. Lastly, to reap the full benefit of any developmental strategy, the Army must capture information on the multitude of talents that its officers possess. The uniqueness of each individual cannot be captured via skill identifiers and career field designations alone. Instead, the Army needs a mechanism to track talent development over time, gauging both its breadth and depth. Only then will it be able to effectively employ talent, the subject of the next and final monograph in this series.

The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.