Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.

This project pulls together classic and modern readings and essays that explore theories of federalism. Spanning the Seventeenth through Twenty-first-centuries of European, U.S. and Canadian thinkers, this attempts to be a comprehensive reader for students in political theory. The emphasis throughout is on the normative argument, the advantages or disadvantages of federal and confederal arrangements compared to unitary states, and on the relative merits of various proposals to improve particular federations or confederations. These also draw on the full range of political science subfields: from political sociology, political economy and constitutional studies to comparative politics and international relations. There are also readings, both contemporary and historical, that attempt to clarify conceptual issues.

Federalism refers to a system of government where power is divided and shared between a central authority (national or federal government) and constituent units (such as states or provinces). In India, federalism plays a significant role in the governance structure, as outlined in the Constitution. Here’s an exploration of federalism in the Indian context: Features of Federalism in India: Distribution of Powers: The Indian Constitution divides powers between the Union (central government) and the States through three lists: Union List: Exclusive powers of the central government, including defence, foreign affairs, banking, and currency. State List: Exclusive powers of state governments, such as police, public health, agriculture, and local government. Concurrent List: Powers shared between the Union and States, such as criminal law, marriage, bankruptcy, and education. This distribution ensures autonomy for both levels of government in their respective spheres. Supremacy of the Constitution: The Indian Constitution is supreme, and both the Union and State governments must operate within its framework. The judiciary acts as the guardian of the Constitution, ensuring that federal principles are upheld and disputes between Union and State jurisdictions are resolved. Dual Polity: India operates as a dual polity with governments at the Union and State levels, each with its own elected representatives, legislative bodies, and executive authorities. State governments have the power to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction, independent of the central government. Cooperative Federalism: Collaborative Governance: Cooperative federalism emphasizes collaboration and partnership between the Union and State governments to address national issues, economic growth, and development. It promotes joint decision-making and coordination in policy formulation and implementation. Inter-State Council: The Inter-State Council, established by the Constitution, facilitates cooperation among states and between the Union and States on matters of common interest. Challenges and Debates: Centre-State Relations: Tensions often arise over issues like distribution of financial resources, legislative authority, and administrative powers. Disputes may require intervention from the judiciary to clarify constitutional provisions and resolve conflicts. Asymmetry: India's federal structure accommodates diverse regional needs and aspirations, leading to demands for asymmetric federalism to address unique challenges faced by different states. Conclusion: Federalism in India is a dynamic system that balances centralized authority with regional autonomy, promoting unity while respecting diversity. It provides states with substantial powers to legislate and govern independently in areas vital to local interests, while ensuring a cohesive national framework through collaboration and constitutional principles. The evolution and effective functioning of federalism are crucial for maintaining democratic governance, equitable development, and national integration in India.

Federalism is regarded as one of the signal American contributions to modern politics. Its origins are typically traced to the drafting of the Constitution, but the story began decades before the delegates met in Philadelphia. In this groundbreaking book, Alison LaCroix traces the history of American federal thought from its colonial beginnings in scattered provincial responses to British assertions of authority, to its emergence in the late eighteenth century as a normative theory of multilayered government. The core of this new federal ideology was a belief that multiple independent levels of government could legitimately exist within a single polity, and that such an arrangement was not a defect but a virtue. This belief became a foundational principle and aspiration of the American political enterprise. LaCroix thus challenges the traditional account of republican ideology as the single dominant framework for eighteenth-century American political thought. Understanding the emerging federal ideology returns constitutional thought to the central place that it occupied for the founders. Federalism was not a necessary adaptation to make an already designed system work; it was the system. Connecting the colonial, revolutionary, founding, and early national periods in one story reveals the fundamental reconfigurations of legal and political power that accompanied the formation of the United States. The emergence of American federalism should be understood as a critical ideological development of the period, and this book is essential reading for everyone interested in the American story.

Considers the social requirements for a thriving democracy

"Federalism, defined generally as a collection of self-governing regions under a central government, is widely viewed as a sensible choice of polity both for emerging democracies and for established states. But while federal institutions are positively correlated with valued economic, democratic, and justice outcomes, ultimately it is unclear how they are connected and which cause which. In Democratic Federalism, Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld explore how federalism works and propose concrete and proven policy guidance on how federalist policies can be designed and implemented successfully. The authors define federalism according to three parameters: how much federal revenue comes through local governmental bodies, the number of local governmental bodies, and the extent to which these local bodies are represented federally. In applying these parameters to economic concepts and theory, Inman and Rubinfeld explain how federalism works in a way meant to engage scholars in political science and sociology and policymakers drafting regulation in federalist governments. The book offers applicable ideas and comparative case studies on how to assess potential policies and how to actually design federalist institutions from scratch. Both authors have real experience with both, most notably in their work advising the South African government on how to build a federalist democracy. This book will be an essential guide to understanding and applying federalist concepts and principles"--

Samuel Beer reveals the provenance, purpose, and origins of the ideas of nationalism and federalism in American political philosophy. From the great English republicans of the 17th century to the conflicts of ideas that exist to this day, he reveals unsuspected dimensions that have shaped--and are still shaping--America.

Challenging orthodox assumptions concerning British federalism, The British Tradition of Federalism offers a unique revisionist critique of Britain's recent constitutional past. The central themes of Empire, Ireland and Europe provide the empirical focus of this volume. Together, they reveal a fundamental continuity of British federal ideas: a single intellectual tradition which spans the last century. By reinstating a neglected dimension of the larger British political tradition, Burgess shows how the continuing relevance of this federal tradition serves as both the source of and inspiration for a wide range of constitutional reform proposals in the 1990s.

“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system,” Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in 1932, “that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” It is one of the features of federalism in our day, Paul Nolette counters, that these “laboratories of democracy,” under the guidance of state attorneys general, are more apt to be dictating national policy than conducting contained experiments. In Federalism on Trial, Nolette presents the first broadscale examination of the increasingly nationalized political activism of state attorneys general. Focusing on coordinated state litigation as a form of national policymaking, his book challenges common assumptions about the contemporary nature of American federalism. In the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, a number of state attorneys general managed to reshape one of America’s largest industries—all without the involvement of Congress or the executive branch. This instance of prosecution as a form of regulation is just one case among many in the larger story of American state development. Federalism on Trial shows how new social policy regimes of the 1960s and 1970s—adopting national objectives such as cleaner air, wider access to health care, and greater consumer protections—promoted both “adversarial legalism” and new forms of “cooperative federalism” that enhanced the powers and possibilities open to state attorneys general. Nolette traces this trend—as AGs took advantage of these new circumstances and opportunities—through case studies involving drug pricing, environmental policy, and health care reform. The result is the first full account—far-reaching and finely detailed—of how, rather than checking national power or creating productive dialogue between federal and state policymakers, the federalism exercised by state attorneys general frequently complicates national regulatory regimes and seeks both greater policy centralization and a more extensive reach of the American regulatory state.