Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

"In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, offers a systematic overview of recent developments in regulatory frameworks in advanced and emerging-market countries, outlining challenges to improving regulation, markets, and access in developing economies"--Provided by publisher.

This document outlines the Government's programme of reform to renew the UK's system of financial regulation. It believes that weaknesses were inherent in the tripartite approach whereby three authorities - the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury - were collectively responsible for financial stability. The Government will create a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the Bank of England with primary statutory duty to maintain financial stability. The FPC will be given control of macro-prudential tools to ensure that systemic risks to financial stability are dealt with. This macro-prudential regulation must be co-ordinated with the prudential regulation of individual firms. Operational responsibility for prudential regulation will transfer from the FSA to a new subsidiary of the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority. The third development is the creation of a dedicated Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) with a primary statutory responsibility to promote confidence in financial services and markets. Protection of consumers will be delivered though a strong consumer division within CPMA. The document also covers: the issue of market regulation; co-ordination of the regulatory bodies in a potential crisis; the next steps, including public consultation, legislative passage and operational implementation. The Government will, after considering responses, produce more detailed proposals - including draft legislation - for further consultation in early 2011, with a view to having legislation on the statute book within two years.

First proposed in 1994, the Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation employs two specialist peak regulators: one charged with the maintenance of financial system stability, and the other with market conduct and consumer protection. This volume, with contributions from over thirty scholars and senior regulators, provides an in-depth analysis of the similarities and differences in the Twin Peaks regimes that have been adopted around the world. Chapters examine the strengths and weaknesses of the model, provide lessons from Australia (the first to adopt the model), and offer a comparative look at the potential suitability of the model in leading non-Twin Peaks jurisdictions. A key resource for central bankers, public policy analysts, lawyers, economists, politicians, academics and students, this work provides readers with a comprehensive understanding of the Twin Peaks model, and a roadmap for countries considering its adoption.

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.