An incisive, authoritative account of the West's failures in Afghanistan, from 9/11 to the fall of Kabul In 1958, Richard Nixon described Afghanistan as "unconquerable." On 15th August 2021, he was proven right. After twenty years of intervention, US and NATO forces retreated, enabling the Taliban to return to power. Tens of thousands were killed in the long, unwinnable war, and millions more were displaced--leaving the future of Afghanistan hanging in the balance. Leading expert Amin Saikal traces the full story of America's intervention, from 9/11 to the present crisis. After an initial swift military strike, the US became embroiled in a drawn-out struggle to change Afghanistan but failed to achieve its aims. Saikal shows how this failure was underlined by protracted attempts to capture Osama bin Laden, an inability to secure a viable government via "democracy promotion" efforts, and lack of wider strategy in the "war on terror." How to Lose a War offers an insightful account of one of the US's most significant foreign policy failures--and considers its dire consequences for the people of Afghanistan.

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, "homegrown" and "domestic" are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities.

This report assesses domestic political support for internationalist foreign policy by analyzing the motivations of members of Congress on key foreign policy issues. It includes case studies on major foreign policy debates in recent years, including the use of force, foreign aid, trade policy and U.S.-Russia relations. It also develops a new series of archetypes for describing the foreign policy worldviews of members of the 115th Congress to replace the current stale and unsophisticated labels of internationalist, isolationist, hawk and dove. Report findings emphasize areas of bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy issues given member ideologies.

A growing number of states use private military and security companies (PMSCs) for a variety of tasks, which were traditionally fulfilled by soldiers. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the law that applies to PMSCs active in situations of armed conflict, focusing on international humanitarian law. It examines the limits in international law on how states may use private actors, taking the debate beyond the question of whether PMSCs are mercenaries. The authors delve into issues such as how PMSCs are bound by humanitarian law, whether their staff are civilians or combatants, and how the use of force in self-defence relates to direct participation in hostilities, a key issue for an industry that operates by exploiting the right to use force in self-defence. Throughout, the authors identify how existing legal obligations, including under state and individual criminal responsibility should play a role in the regulation of the industry.