This book discusses the systematic expansion of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) across the continent of Africa. This book posits that AFRICOM expansion in Africa is part of a broader system of accumulation based on a government-business-media (GBM) complex. Applying the concept at both structural and descriptive levels, the GBM complex is a function of the synergy between the state’s quest for power, businesses’ need for expansion, and the informational and hegemonic functions of media actors. The United States’ GBM complex in Africa is supported—and in some locations spearheaded—by its military, with dispossessing effects on local actors. Drawing from African case studies, analytical accounts and empirical case studies, this book explores AFRICOM’s role within this broader strategy. The volume maps both the methods and the scope of this expansion, as well as local resistance to this process, and comprises perspectives from the five regions of Africa, key sub-regional organizations and voices from Africa’s regional hegemons. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, strategic studies, African politics and International Relations.

On Feb. 6, 2007, the Bush Admin. announced the creation of a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM¿s establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among 3 commands: European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. The new command¿s area of responsibility includes all African countries except Egypt. Contents of this report: (1) Issues for Congress; (2) The DoD Proposal for a New Africa Command; (3) U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa; (4) U.S. Mil. Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role; (5) Regional Perspectives; (6) Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues.

The expanding U.S. oil demands on the Gulf of Guinea have become overwhelming. Hence, the strategic need for the U.S. to effectively sustain oil flows from the Guinean Gulf as well as surmount the existing militant threats therein are medley of events which saw to the birth of AFRICOM in October, 2008. The study unraveled that any U.S military intervention in the oil region will inversely intensify and expand militant activities to a higher proportion and also magnet some anti-U.S terrorist groups into Nigeria. This may degenerate to the destabilization of the country in which the U.S. may choose to promote balkanization for its own oil interest. Further, any presence of AFRICOM in the country will necessarily subjugate and overwhelm the national defense role of the Nigerian military, and as well, automatically warrant the relinquishment of Nigeria's military intelligence to America. In view of this, we suggested, a non-military U.S. involvement, through the redirection of the billions of US dollars, budgeted for AFRICOM's operations, towards a multidimensional development paradigm in the Niger Delta, in order to guarantee sustainable peace and business friendly environment.

This report provides information on Africa Command's (AFRICOM) mission, structure, interagency coordination, and its basing and manpower requirements. The report also gives a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of Africa Command.

On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to create a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM's establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The new command's area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and became a stand-alone command on October 1, 2008. In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa's growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are Africa's role in the Global War on Terror and potential threats posed by uncontrolled spaces; the growing importance of Africa's natural resources, particularly energy resources; and ongoing concern for Africa's many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa to consolidate current operations and activities on the continent under one commander. As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM will promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen regional stability and security through improved security capability and military professionalization. If directed by national command authorities, its military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.

In Feb. 2007, the Pres. announced the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a DoD command with a focus on strengthening U.S. security coop. with Africa, creating opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, and enhancing peace and security efforts on the continent. AFRICOM is designed to integrate DoD and non-DoD personnel into the command to stimulate greater coordination among U.S. gov¿t. agencies to achieve a more whole-of-gov¿t. approach. This testimony addresses: (1) the status of DoD¿s efforts to establish and fund AFRICOM; and (2) challenges that may hinder the command¿s ability to achieve interagency participation and a more integrated, whole-of-gov¿t. approach to DoD activities in Africa. Illus.

Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? examines the question of whether the US Department of Defense (DOD) has assumed too large a role in influencing and implementing US foreign policy while confronting the challenges arising from terrorism, Islamic radicalism, insurgencies, ethnic conflicts and failed states.

Africa is a continent of growing economic, social, political, and geostrategic importance. The establishment of a new Combatant Command for Africa -- AFRICOM -- marks an important milestone in the evolution of relations between the United States and the governments of Africa. Through AFRICOM, the U.S. Department of Defense will consolidate the efforts of three existing command headquarters as it seeks a more stable environment for political and economic growth in Africa. In line with this goal, AFRICOM is pioneering a bold new method of military engagement focused on war prevention, interagency cooperation, and development rather than on traditional war fighting. The author contends that to achieve its goals vis-à-vis the African security landscape, AFRICOM must depart from the model of U.S. military operations on the continent since September 11, 2001. Using case studies from North and East Africa, the author argues that by amalgamating threats, overemphasizing "hard" counterterrorism initiatives, and intertwining military operations with humanitarianism, AFRICOM's predecessors have harmed U.S. strategic interests. In line with this conclusion, he offers policy recommendations to maximize AFRICOM's potential for future success.