For most Americans, the "exit" from Indochina occurred in 1973, with the withdrawal of the U.S. military from South Vietnam. In fact, the final exit did not occur until two decades later, after the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, the Cambodian revolution, and a decade of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Only in the early 1990s were the major powers able to negotiate a settlement of the Cambodia conflict and withdraw from the region. This book recounts the diplomacy that brought an end to great power involvement in Indochina, including the negotiations for a UN peace process in Cambodia and construction of a "road map" for normalizing U.S.-Vietnam relations. In so doing, this volume also highlights the changing character of diplomacy at the beginning of the 1990s, when, at least temporarily, an era of military confrontation among the major world powers gave way to political management of international conflicts.

Although the Paris Peace Accords ended direct United States military involvement in Vietnam on January 27, 1973, the process of withdrawal lasted over three years. This illuminating volume chronicles this withdrawal, its background, and its impact through a combination of official history and first-person accounts from key players at every level. Brief historical narratives join recollections from U.S. servicemen and support staff, North and South Vietnamese soldiers, and such notable figures as Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig and Richard Nixon to reveal the human story behind the history. A biographical dictionary summarizes the lives of important individuals, a glossary presents unusual terms and acronyms, and an appendix analyzes the war casualties under each U.S. president.

"The hills of northern Indochina, the frontiers of a region called Tonkin where stark highlands merge with those of the neighboring Chinese provinces and, to the west, give way to the valleys of Laos, were the backdrop to the death throes of France's imperial designs of Indochinese domination. Blood would be spilt here - in torrents. It was an ugly war, a war of contempt, of treachery, of sabotage. It was a war of victims and abandonment and atonement; a war of desecration, of mutilation, of evisceration. Above all, it was a war of a geography as malignant as the combatants within. And for those sent to heal, a war of sweat, death, isolation, and uncommon benevolence"--

Prominent American historian Robert D. Schulzinger sheds light on how deeply etched memories of the devastating conflict in Vietnam have altered America's political, social, and cultural landscape. Schulzinger examines the impact of the war from many angles. He ranges from the heated controversy over soldiers who were missing in action, to the influx of over a million Vietnam refugees into the US, to the many ways the war has continued to be fought in books and films and, perhaps most important, the power of the Vietnam War as a metaphor influencing foreign policy in places like Iraq.

This balanced, comprehensive guide to Southeast Asian politics offers a sensible but nondogmatic realist approach to the region's international relations. In this revised, second edition, Donald E. Weatherbee lucidly explains the dynamics of the Southeast Asian subsystem as a struggle for autonomy in pursuit of national interests. He explores three important questions, the answers to which will shape the future Southeast Asia. Will democratic regimes transform international relations in Southeast Asia? Will national leaders succeed in reinventing ASEAN as a more effective collaborative mechanism? Finally, how will the evolving Chinese position, balancing and perhaps displacing the United States as Asia's great power, affect Southeast Asia's struggle for autonomy?

Using recently released archival materials from the United States and Europe, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam explains how and why the United States came to assume control as the dominant western power in Vietnam during the 1950s. Acting on their conviction that American methods had a better chance of building a stable, noncommunist South Vietnamese nation, Eisenhower administration officials systematically ejected French military, economic, political, bureaucratic, and cultural institutions from Vietnam. Kathryn C. Statler examines diplomatic maneuvers in Paris, Washington, London, and Saigon to detail how Western alliance members sought to transform South Vietnam into a modern, westernized, and democratic ally but ultimately failed to counter the Communist threat. Abetted by South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem, Americans in Washington, D.C., and Saigon undermined their French counterparts at every turn, resulting in the disappearance of a French presence by the time Kennedy assumed office. Although the United States ultimately replaced France in South Vietnam, efforts to build South Vietnam into a nation failed. Instead, it became a dependent client state that was unable to withstand increasing Communist aggression from the North. Replacing France is a fundamental reassessment of the origins of U.S. involvement in Vietnam that explains how Franco-American conflict led the United States to pursue a unilateral and ultimately imperialist policy in Vietnam.

How did the conflict between Vietnamese nationalists and French colonial rulers erupt into a major Cold War struggle between communism and Western liberalism? To understand the course of the Vietnam wars, it is essential to explore the connections between events within Vietnam and global geopolitical currents in the decade after the Second World War. In this illuminating work, leading scholars examine various dimensions of the struggle between France and Vietnamese revolutionaries that began in 1945 and reached its climax at Dien Bien Phu. Several essays break new ground in the study of the Vietnamese revolution and the establishment of the political and military apparatus that successfully challenged both France and the United States. Other essays explore the roles of China, France, Great Britain, and the United States, all of which contributed to the transformation of the conflict from a colonial skirmish to a Cold War crisis. Taken together, the essays enable us to understand the origins of the later American war in Indochina by positioning Vietnam at the center of the grand clash between East and West and North and South in the middle years of the twentieth century.

Military mistakes impel strategic reflection. The French Indochina War (FIW) from 1946-1954 furnishes useful insights with some resonance for current challenges. A combination of pre-exiting conditions, catalysts and operational drivers caused the cathartic 1954 French defeat. Pre-conditions included the illegitimacy of the colonial regime, repression that polarised nationalist sentiment. Economically, pernicious terms of trade suppressed industrialisation but oiled speculation until suddenly reversed by devaluation in 1953 that reflected financial disengagement by France but increased American involvement. Vacillating metropolitan and the dubious colonial regime of the ‘night club’ Emperor, Bảo Đại, fuelled political instability. Militarily, after the disastrous evacuation of the RC4 in 1950, Việt Minh men and supplies poured across the Chinese frontier. In 1954, financial constraints and the looming international peace conference catalysed Navarre, the new French commander, to gamble on a battle of attrition. He bet that the Việt Minh would be unable drag artillery to the remote jungle outpost of Diên Biên Phú, but he underestimated their determination, strength, and adaptability. In early December partisans resented the bungled evacuation of Lai Châu. The entrenched camp’s defences were inadequate and neither infantry sorties nor napalm suppressed VM artillery in the surrounding hills. The French aero-logistical sub-system was overstretched, and significant parachute supplies fell into enemy hands. Navarre scattered his reserves on a futile and remote side show, Operation Atlante. The Americans prevaricated and refused to unleash their B29 fleet. ‘Iacta alea est’ - the die was cast.