How the executive branch—not the president alone—formulates executive orders, and how this process constrains the chief executive's ability to act unilaterally The president of the United States is commonly thought to wield extraordinary personal power through the issuance of executive orders. In fact, the vast majority of such orders are proposed by federal agencies and shaped by negotiations that span the executive branch. By Executive Order provides the first comprehensive look at how presidential directives are written—and by whom. In this eye-opening book, Andrew Rudalevige examines more than five hundred executive orders from the 1930s to today—as well as more than two hundred others negotiated but never issued—shedding vital new light on the multilateral process of drafting supposedly unilateral directives. He draws on a wealth of archival evidence from the Office of Management and Budget and presidential libraries as well as original interviews to show how the crafting of orders requires widespread consultation and compromise with a formidable bureaucracy. Rudalevige explains the key role of management in the presidential skill set, detailing how bureaucratic resistance can stall and even prevent actions the chief executive desires, and how presidents must bargain with the bureaucracy even when they seek to act unilaterally. Challenging popular conceptions about the scope of presidential power, By Executive Order reveals how the executive branch holds the power to both enact and constrain the president’s will.

Executive orders and proclamations afford presidents an independent means of controlling a wide range of activities in the federal government—yet they are not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. In fact, the controversial edicts known as universal presidential directives seem to violate the separation of powers by enabling the commander-in-chief to bypass Congress and enact his own policy preferences. As Clinton White House counsel Paul Begala remarked on the numerous executive orders signed by the president during his second term: "Stroke of the pen. Law of the land. Kinda cool." Although public awareness of unilateral presidential directives has been growing over the last decade—sparked in part by Barack Obama's use of executive orders and presidential memoranda to reverse many of his predecessor's policies as well as by the number of unilateral directives George W. Bush promulgated for the "War on Terror"—Graham G. Dodds reminds us that not only has every single president issued executive orders, such orders have figured in many of the most significant episodes in American political history. In Take Up Your Pen, Dodds offers one of the first historical treatments of this executive prerogative and explores the source of this authority; how executive orders were legitimized, accepted, and routinized; and what impact presidential directives have had on our understanding of the presidency, American politics, and political development. By tracing the rise of a more activist central government—first advanced in the Progressive Era by Theodore Roosevelt—Dodds illustrates the growing use of these directives throughout a succession of presidencies. More important, Take Up Your Pen questions how unilateral presidential directives fit the conception of democracy and the needs of American citizens.

Contents: Intro.; Admin. Orders; Certificates; Designations of Officials; Exec. Orders; General Licenses; Homeland Security Pres. Directives; Interpretations; Letters on Tariffs and Internat. Trade; Military Orders; National Security Instruments: NSC Policy Papers; National Security Action Memo; National Security Study Memo and National Security Decision Memo; Pres. Review Memo and Pres. Directives; National Security Study Memo and National Security Decision Directives; National Security Reviews and National Security Directives; Pres. Review Directives and Pres. Decision Directives; National Security Pres. Directives; Pres. Announcements; Pres. Findings; Pres. Reorg. Plans; Proclamations; Reg¿s.; Source Tools. A print on demand report.

Looking beyond the individual office holders to the office itself, this Fourth Edition of Vital Statistics on the Presidency covers George Washington’s tenure through the 2012 election. The book’s expansive view of the presidency allows readers to recognize major themes across administrations and to reach overall conclusions about the nature of the institution and its future. The illuminating data is put into context by thoughtful essays explaining key statistical patterns, making this edition an intriguing and comprehensive reference to important patterns throughout the history of the presidency.

This book reinterprets how and when presidents use unilateral power, arguing that these orders are used not only to press the president's agenda, but also to share power with Congress and facilitate the work of government.

The conventional wisdom holds that the president of the United States is weak, hobbled by the separation of powers and the short reach of his formal legal authority. In this first-ever in-depth study of executive orders, Kenneth Mayer deals a strong blow to this view. Taking civil rights and foreign policy as examples, he shows how presidents have used a key tool of executive power to wield their inherent legal authority and pursue policy without congressional interference. Throughout the nation's life, executive orders have allowed presidents to make momentous, unilateral policy choices: creating and abolishing executive branch agencies, reorganizing administrative and regulatory processes, handling emergencies, and determining how legislation is implemented. From the Louisiana Purchase to the Emancipation Proclamation, from Franklin Roosevelt's establishment of the Executive Office of the President to Bill Clinton's authorization of loan guarantees for Mexico, from Harry Truman's integration of the armed forces to Ronald Reagan's seizures of regulatory control, American presidents have used executive orders (or their equivalents) to legislate in ways that extend far beyond administrative activity. By analyzing the pattern of presidents' use of executive orders and the relationship of those orders to the presidency as an institution, Mayer describes an office much more powerful and active than the one depicted in the bulk of the political science literature. This distinguished work of scholarship shows that the U.S. presidency has a great deal more than the oft-cited "power to persuade."

Scholars and citizens alike have endlessly debated the proper limits of presidential action within our democracy. In this revised and expanded edition, noted scholar Phillip Cooper offers a cogent guide to these powers and shows how presidents from George Washington to Barack Obama have used and abused them in trying to realize their visions for the nation. As Cooper reveals, there has been virtually no significant policy area or level of government left untouched by the application of these presidential “power tools.” Whether seeking to regulate the economy, committing troops to battle without a congressional declaration of war, or blocking commercial access to federal lands, presidents have wielded these powers to achieve their goals, often in ways that seem to fly in the face of true representative government. Cooper defines the different forms these powers take—executive orders, presidential memoranda, proclamations, national security directives, and signing statements—demonstrates their uses, critiques their strengths and dangers, and shows how they have changed over time. Cooper calls on events in American history with which we are all familiar but whose implications may have escaped us. Examples of executive action include, Washington’s “Neutrality Proclamation”; Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation; the more than 1,700 executive orders issued by Woodrow Wilson in World War I; FDR also issued the order to incarcerate Japanese Americans during World War II; Truman’s orders to desegregate the military; Eisenhower’s numerous national security directives. JFK’s order to control racial violence in Alabama. As Cooper demonstrates in his balanced treatment of these and subsequent presidencies, each successive administration finds new ways of using these tools to achieve policy goals—especially those goals they know they are unlikely to accomplish with the help of Congress. A key feature of the second edition are case studies on the post-9/11 evolution of presidential direct action in ways that have drawn little public attention. It clarifies the factors that make these policy tools so attractive to presidents and the consequences that can flow from their use and abuse in a post-9/11 environment. There is an important new chapter on “executive agreements” which, though they are not treaties within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution and not subject to Senate ratification, appear in many respects to be rapidly replacing treaties as instruments of foreign policy.

Since the early 1960s, scholarly thinking on the power of U.S. presidents has rested on these words: "Presidential power is the power to persuade." Power, in this formulation, is strictly about bargaining and convincing other political actors to do things the president cannot accomplish alone. Power without Persuasion argues otherwise. Focusing on presidents' ability to act unilaterally, William Howell provides the most theoretically substantial and far-reaching reevaluation of presidential power in many years. He argues that presidents regularly set public policies over vocal objections by Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. Throughout U.S. history, going back to the Louisiana Purchase and the Emancipation Proclamation, presidents have set landmark policies on their own. More recently, Roosevelt interned Japanese Americans during World War II, Kennedy established the Peace Corps, Johnson got affirmative action underway, Reagan greatly expanded the president's powers of regulatory review, and Clinton extended protections to millions of acres of public lands. Since September 11, Bush has created a new cabinet post and constructed a parallel judicial system to try suspected terrorists. Howell not only presents numerous new empirical findings but goes well beyond the theoretical scope of previous studies. Drawing richly on game theory and the new institutionalism, he examines the political conditions under which presidents can change policy without congressional or judicial consent. Clearly written, Power without Persuasion asserts a compelling new formulation of presidential power, one whose implications will resound.