The People’s Republic of China has experienced numerous challenges and undergone tremendous structural changes over the past four decades. The party-state now faces a fundamental tension in its pursuit of social stability and regime durability. Repressive state strategies enable the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its monopoly on political power, yet the quality of governance and regime legitimacy are enhanced when the state adopts more inclusive modes of engagement with society. Based on a dynamic typology of state–society relations, this volume adopts an evolutionary framework to examine how the Chinese state relates with non-state actors across several fields of governance. Drawing on original fieldwork, the authors identify areas in which state–society interactions have shifted over time, ranging from more constructive engagement to protracted conflict. This evolutionary approach provides nuanced insight into the circumstances wherein the party-state exerts its coercive power versus engaging in more flexible responses or policy adaptations.

The People's Republic of China has experienced numerous challenges and undergone tremendous structural changes over the past four decades. The party-state faces a fundamental tension in its pursuit of social stability and regime durability. Repressive state strategies enable the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its monopoly on political power, which is consistent with the regime's authoritarian essence. Yet the quality of governance and regime legitimacy are enhanced when the state adopts more inclusive modes of engagement with society. How can the assertion of political power be reconciled with responsiveness to societal demands? This dilemma lies at the core of evolutionary governance under authoritarianism in China. Based on a dynamic typology of state-society relations, this volume adopts an evolutionary framework to examine how the Chinese state relates with non-state actors across several fields of governance: community, environment and public health, economy and labor, and society and religion. Drawing on original fieldwork, the authors identify areas in which state-society interactions have shifted over time, ranging from more constructive engagement to protracted conflict. This evolutionary approach provides nuanced insight into the circumstances wherein the party-state exerts its coercive power versus engaging in more flexible responses or policy adaptations.

The changing relationship between East and West, principally between China and America, has brought the whole matter of achieving peaceful and harmonious relations between nations to the fore — particularly with regard to China's recent ascendancy in world affairs. Competition among nations with different forms of governance raises important questions such as: What forms of governance work best to enable people to have harmonious and peaceful life together — both within and amongst nations? What principles can we discover in human history that might point us toward some answers to this fundamental governance question? What might the answers from the past suggest about the future? Where might the future lead?To find answers to these questions, we set out upon a discovery adventure, going back some 30,000 years in time — to trace the evolutionary progress in human governance from the hunter-gatherer period until today. We also adopted a framework provided by Dr Stephen Pinker's landmark study of the nature of violence over time entitled The Better Angels of Our Nature to provide context and contrast to our own discoveries.We discovered several basic principles: First, the forms of human governance made an evolutionary progress over the past 30,000 years. Second, the most basic driver for this progress was and still is technological change, which forces complementary changes in governance — or seals institutional failure. Third, we discovered that just three basic factors determined whether a particular form of governance succeeded in flourishing as a tribe, nation, empire or nation-state. Those fundamental factors are: boundaries, founding mythology, and the Rule of Three.Indeed, our most fundamental finding has been the Rule of Three itself: the principle that says that dyads have inherently unstable natures, whereas triads — like three-legged stools — possess inherent stability. Throughout time, the most successful human arrangements have been those with intricate hierarchies of governance that have the Rule of Three deeply woven into each level.As for the future, we claim that the best international structure would take the symbolic form of an archipelago of nations interconnected with a system of bridges — where each bridge consists of an intercourse route between two nations, and the nature of the intercourse is largely trade in goods and services followed by cultural exchanges of ideas. A Basic Principle: It is far easier to build bridges between nations than to rebuild nations in some other nation's image. Bad actors amongst nations may then get dealt with as villagers used to deal with nasty neighbors — through shunning and shaming, where shunning means the ceasing of trade intercourse.

In Varieties of State Regulation, Yukyung Yeo explores how the Chinese central party-state continues to oversee the most strategic sectors of its economy, and how the form of central state control varies considerably across leading industrial sectors, depending on the dominant mode of state ownership, conception of control, and governing structure.

This book elucidates fundamental governance features and issues in contemporary China. While especially focusing on principal governance areas, it offers comprehensive coverage, capturing the dynamics of governance across vertical and horizontal connexions. The book is succinctly written and systematically addresses essential governance aspects that to date have only been dealt with separately and sporadically: state governance, the executive branch and administration, organization of production and approaches to production, and governance conventions and protocols. Further, it examines the evolution of governance practice in terms of both political and legal superstructure and economic base/infrastructure. Adopting a purely analytical approach and making no value judgments on the country’s social institutions and political systems, the book offers a vital resource to help readers grasp the complexities of governance in China.

​This short books offers the reader a remarkable new perspective on the way markets, laws and societies evolve together. It can be of use to anyone interested in development, market and public sector reform, public administration, politics & law. Based on a wide variety of case studies on three continents and a variety of conceptual sources, the authors develop a theory that clarifies the nature and functioning of dependencies that mark governance evolutions. This in turn delineates in an entirely new manner the spaces open for policy experiment. As such, it offers a new mapping of the middle ground between libertarianism and social engineering. Theoretically, the approach draws on a wide array of sources: institutional & development economics, systems theories, post-structuralism, actor- network theories, planning theory and legal studies.

As the rest of the world worries about what a future might look like under Chinese supremacy, Edward Luttwak worries about China’s own future prospects. Applying the logic of strategy for which he is well known, Luttwak argues that the most populous nation on Earth—and its second largest economy—may be headed for a fall. For any country whose rising strength cannot go unnoticed, the universal logic of strategy allows only military or economic growth. But China is pursuing both goals simultaneously. Its military buildup and assertive foreign policy have already stirred up resistance among its neighbors, just three of whom—India, Japan, and Vietnam—together exceed China in population and wealth. Unless China’s leaders check their own ambitions, a host of countries, which are already forming tacit military coalitions, will start to impose economic restrictions as well. Chinese leaders will find it difficult to choose between pursuing economic prosperity and increasing China’s military strength. Such a change would be hard to explain to public opinion. Moreover, Chinese leaders would have to end their reliance on ancient strategic texts such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. While these guides might have helped in diplomatic and military conflicts within China itself, their tactics—such as deliberately provoking crises to force negotiations—turned China’s neighbors into foes. To avoid arousing the world’s enmity further, Luttwak advises, Chinese leaders would be wise to pursue a more sustainable course of economic growth combined with increasing military and diplomatic restraint.

This volume is a selection of Chinese political scholar Xianglin Xu’s published works spanning nearly 20 years of research that explore and discuss the socio-economic transition in China under state political reform. Contextualized within the decades following the 80s, the author analyzes patterns observed from empirical studies, and breaks down the underlining reasoning, conditions and functionalities behind the incremental reform policies pushed forward by the Party and government. The collection is broken up into four sections: the first provides a general framework and theoretical / historical introduction to social transition research in the case of China; the second section discusses the underpinning logic behind political reform in China and practical concerns; the third section follows with discussions on reform policy practices within China including application and trajectory; the final section concludes with an analysis of reform within state institutional infrastructure and policy innovation.