Evolutionary Games And Equilibrium Selection
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Author |
: Larry Samuelson |
Publisher |
: MIT Press |
Total Pages |
: 332 |
Release |
: 1997 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0262692198 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780262692199 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (98 Downloads) |
Synopsis Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection by : Larry Samuelson
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Author |
: Larry Samuelson |
Publisher |
: MIT Press (MA) |
Total Pages |
: 309 |
Release |
: 1997 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0262193825 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780262193825 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (25 Downloads) |
Synopsis Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection by : Larry Samuelson
"Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions." -- Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Author |
: Jun Tanimoto |
Publisher |
: Springer |
Total Pages |
: 223 |
Release |
: 2015-10-23 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9784431549628 |
ISBN-13 |
: 4431549625 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (28 Downloads) |
Synopsis Fundamentals of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications by : Jun Tanimoto
This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Author |
: American Mathematical Society. Short Course |
Publisher |
: American Mathematical Soc. |
Total Pages |
: 186 |
Release |
: 2011-10-27 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780821853269 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0821853260 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (69 Downloads) |
Synopsis Evolutionary Game Dynamics by : American Mathematical Society. Short Course
This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Author |
: Jörgen W. Weibull |
Publisher |
: MIT Press |
Total Pages |
: 292 |
Release |
: 1997 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0262731215 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780262731218 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (15 Downloads) |
Synopsis Evolutionary Game Theory by : Jörgen W. Weibull
Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.
Author |
: Oddvar M. Kaarbøe |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 179 |
Release |
: 1999 |
ISBN-10 |
: OCLC:460689522 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (22 Downloads) |
Synopsis Five Essays on Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games by : Oddvar M. Kaarbøe
Author |
: Drew Fudenberg |
Publisher |
: MIT Press |
Total Pages |
: 304 |
Release |
: 1998 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0262061945 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780262061940 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (45 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Theory of Learning in Games by : Drew Fudenberg
This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Author |
: William H. Sandholm |
Publisher |
: MIT Press |
Total Pages |
: 618 |
Release |
: 2010-12-17 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780262195874 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0262195879 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (74 Downloads) |
Synopsis Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics by : William H. Sandholm
Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.
Author |
: Reinhard Selten |
Publisher |
: Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages |
: 338 |
Release |
: 2013-06-29 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9783662026748 |
ISBN-13 |
: 3662026740 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (48 Downloads) |
Synopsis Game Equilibrium Models I by : Reinhard Selten
There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
Author |
: Tone Dieckmann |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 132 |
Release |
: 1995 |
ISBN-10 |
: UCSD:31822021321799 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (99 Downloads) |
Synopsis Learning and evolution in games by : Tone Dieckmann