Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Suppose you are promising or resolving to do something that you have evidence is difficult for you to do. For example, suppose you are promising to be faithful for the rest of your life, or you are resolving to quit smoking. Should you believe that you will follow through, or should you believe that there is a good chance that you won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe the latter, you seem to be insincere since you can't sincerely say that you will follow through. Hence, it seems, your promise or resolution must be improper. Nonetheless, we make such promises and resolutions all the time. Indeed, as the examples illustrate, such promises and resolutions are very important to us. The challenge is to explain this apparent inconsistency in our practice of promising and resolving. To meet this challenge, Berislav Marusic considers a number of possible responses, including an appeal to 'trying', an appeal to non-cognitivism about practical reason, an appeal to 'practical knowledge', and an appeal to evidential constraints on practical reasoning. He rejects all these and defends a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something we can rationally believe that we will do it, even if our belief goes against the evidence.

The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief.

This sixth book in the Prevention Practice Kit provides an introduction to evidence-based prevention in psychology. Counselors, psychologists and mental health workers in schools, government agencies, community settings, and in private practice are increasingly expected to select evidence-based practices and programs, and to document the effectiveness of the care they provide. The book addresses the types of questions that may be most pertinent to counselors, psychologists, and other mental health workers who are engaged in prevention and interested in understanding evidence-based programs, including: What does it mean to for a program to be evidence-based? How should I go about selecting an evidence-based program? How do I know if evidence is trustworthy? How do I gather evidence to evaluate my own prevention program? The book introduces several definitions of evidence-based practice and the common components of these definitions. A broad overview of considerations for evaluating the quality and trustworthiness of prevention research is provided along with a discussion of common features of effective prevention programs. Guidance is provided on identifying evidence-based programs, including detailed descriptions of online registries of prevention programs. The book also provides recommendations for determining the need for a prevention program, selecting and implementing an appropriate program, and evaluating outcomes. Throughout the text, examples from research and practice are used to illustrate important concepts, and learning exercises at the end of each chapter augment comprehension and relevance. This book is part of the Prevention Practice Kit: Action Guides for Mental Health, a collection of eight books each authored by scholars in the specific field of prevention and edited by Dr. Robert K. Conyne and Dr. Arthur M. Horne. The books in the collection conform to the editors′ outline to promote a consistent reading experience. Designed to provide human services practitioners, counselors, psychologists, social workers, instructors, and students with concrete direction for spreading and improving the practice of prevention, the series provides thorough coverage of prevention application including a general overview of prevention, best practices, diversity and cultural relevance, psychoeducational groups, consultation, program development and evaluation, evidence base, and public policy. This book is endorsed by the Prevention Section of the Society of Counseling Psychology of the American Psychological Association. Fifty percent of all royalties are donated to Division 17 of the APA.

The sports agent has become a highly significant figure in contemporary sport business. The role of the agent is essential to our understanding of labour markets and labour relations in an increasingly globalised sports industry. Drawing on extensive empirical research into football around the world, this book explains what agents do, how their role has changed, and why this is important for future sport business. Offering analysis from economic, legal, social and historical perspectives, the book explores key topics such as: the history of sports agents including the emergence of the modern agent in US sport typologies and demographic profiles of agents in football valuations and organisational analysis of leading European agents and agencies relations between agents and clubs future directions for research into sports agents. Focusing on the major European leagues, this book goes further than any other in illuminating an important but under-researched aspect of contemporary sport business. It is a valuable resource for any student, researcher or policy-maker with an interest in sport business, sport management, sport policy, the economics of sport or labour economics.

John Banville’s stunning powers of mimicry are brilliantly on display in this engrossing novel, the darkly compelling confession of an improbable murderer. Freddie Montgomery is a highly cultured man, a husband and father living the life of a dissolute exile on a Mediterranean island. When a debt comes due and his wife and child are held as collateral, he returns to Ireland to secure funds. That pursuit leads to murder. And here is his attempt to present evidence, not of his innocence, but of his life, of the events that lead to the murder he committed because he could. Like a hero out of Nabokov or Camus, Montgomery is a chillingly articulate, self-aware, and amoral being, whose humanity is painfully on display.

This new work provides a useful and accessible reminder of the principles of agency law for experienced practitioners, as well as an invaluable guide for students looking for an approachable text on this topic.

"Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We've missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we've failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging - at least usually - changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn't rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency"--