Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Suppose you are promising or resolving to do something that you have evidence is difficult for you to do. For example, suppose you are promising to be faithful for the rest of your life, or you are resolving to quit smoking. Should you believe that you will follow through, or should you believe that there is a good chance that you won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe the latter, you seem to be insincere since you can't sincerely say that you will follow through. Hence, it seems, your promise or resolution must be improper. Nonetheless, we make such promises and resolutions all the time. Indeed, as the examples illustrate, such promises and resolutions are very important to us. The challenge is to explain this apparent inconsistency in our practice of promising and resolving. To meet this challenge, Berislav Marusic; considers a number of possible responses, including an appeal to 'trying', an appeal to non-cognitivism about practical reason, an appeal to 'practical knowledge', and an appeal to evidential constraints on practical reasoning. He rejects all these and defends a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something we can rationally believe that we will do it, even if our belief goes against the evidence.

Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Suppose you are promising or resolving to do something that you have evidence is difficult for you to do. For example, suppose you are promising to be faithful for the rest of your life, or you are resolving to quit smoking. Should you believe that you will follow through, or should you believe that there is a good chance that you won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe the latter, you seem to be insincere since you can't sincerely say that you will follow through. Hence, it seems, your promise or resolution must be improper. Nonetheless, we make such promises and resolutions all the time. Indeed, as the examples illustrate, such promises and resolutions are very important to us. The challenge is to explain this apparent inconsistency in our practice of promising and resolving. To meet this challenge, Berislav Marusic considers a number of possible responses, including an appeal to 'trying', an appeal to non-cognitivism about practical reason, an appeal to 'practical knowledge', and an appeal to evidential constraints on practical reasoning. He rejects all these and defends a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something we can rationally believe that we will do it, even if our belief goes against the evidence.

Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Suppose you are promising or resolving to do something that you have evidence is difficult for you to do. For example, suppose you are promising to be faithful for the rest of your life, or you are resolving to quit smoking. Should you believe that you will follow through, or should you believe that there is a good chance that you won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe the latter, you seem to be insincere since you can't sincerely say that you will follow through. Hence, it seems, your promise or resolution must be improper. Nonetheless, we make such promises and resolutions all the time. Indeed, as the examples illustrate, such promises and resolutions are very important to us. The challenge is to explain this apparent inconsistency in our practice of promising and resolving. To meet this challenge, Berislav Marusic; considers a number of possible responses, including an appeal to 'trying', an appeal to non-cognitivism about practical reason, an appeal to 'practical knowledge', and an appeal to evidential constraints on practical reasoning. He rejects all these and defends a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something we can rationally believe that we will do it, even if our belief goes against the evidence.

The sports agent has become a highly significant figure in contemporary sport business. The role of the agent is essential to our understanding of labour markets and labour relations in an increasingly globalised sports industry. Drawing on extensive empirical research into football around the world, this book explains what agents do, how their role has changed, and why this is important for future sport business. Offering analysis from economic, legal, social and historical perspectives, the book explores key topics such as: the history of sports agents including the emergence of the modern agent in US sport typologies and demographic profiles of agents in football valuations and organisational analysis of leading European agents and agencies relations between agents and clubs future directions for research into sports agents. Focusing on the major European leagues, this book goes further than any other in illuminating an important but under-researched aspect of contemporary sport business. It is a valuable resource for any student, researcher or policy-maker with an interest in sport business, sport management, sport policy, the economics of sport or labour economics.

This sixth book in the Prevention Practice Kit provides an introduction to evidence-based prevention in psychology. Counselors, psychologists and mental health workers in schools, government agencies, community settings, and in private practice are increasingly expected to select evidence-based practices and programs, and to document the effectiveness of the care they provide. The book addresses the types of questions that may be most pertinent to counselors, psychologists, and other mental health workers who are engaged in prevention and interested in understanding evidence-based programs, including: What does it mean to for a program to be evidence-based? How should I go about selecting an evidence-based program? How do I know if evidence is trustworthy? How do I gather evidence to evaluate my own prevention program? The book introduces several definitions of evidence-based practice and the common components of these definitions. A broad overview of considerations for evaluating the quality and trustworthiness of prevention research is provided along with a discussion of common features of effective prevention programs. Guidance is provided on identifying evidence-based programs, including detailed descriptions of online registries of prevention programs. The book also provides recommendations for determining the need for a prevention program, selecting and implementing an appropriate program, and evaluating outcomes. Throughout the text, examples from research and practice are used to illustrate important concepts, and learning exercises at the end of each chapter augment comprehension and relevance. This book is part of the Prevention Practice Kit: Action Guides for Mental Health, a collection of eight books each authored by scholars in the specific field of prevention and edited by Dr. Robert K. Conyne and Dr. Arthur M. Horne. The books in the collection conform to the editors′ outline to promote a consistent reading experience. Designed to provide human services practitioners, counselors, psychologists, social workers, instructors, and students with concrete direction for spreading and improving the practice of prevention, the series provides thorough coverage of prevention application including a general overview of prevention, best practices, diversity and cultural relevance, psychoeducational groups, consultation, program development and evaluation, evidence base, and public policy. This book is endorsed by the Prevention Section of the Society of Counseling Psychology of the American Psychological Association. Fifty percent of all royalties are donated to Division 17 of the APA.

Fundamentals of criminal evidence -- The criminal trial process -- Pleadings, motions, sentencing and appeals -- Defense counsel role and strategies -- The Prosecutor's role -- Exclusionary rule of evidence -- Search warrants -- The crime scene -- Physical evidence -- Audio, video, photographic and computer evidence -- Confessions and admissions -- Lay and police witnesses -- Expert witnesses -- Hearsay evidence -- Testimonial privileges

Evidence is a complex and ever-changing subject. This manual deals with all the main principles and cases. It is completely up-to-date and covers all recent developments in law and practice.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Bad beliefs - beliefs that blatantly conflict with easily available evidence - are common. Large minorities of people hold that vaccines are dangerous or accept bizarre conspiracy theories, for instance. The prevalence of bad beliefs may be politically and socially important, for instance blocking effective action on climate change. Explaining why people accept bad beliefs and what can be done to make them more responsive to evidence is therefore an important project. A common view is that bad beliefs are largely explained by widespread irrationality. This book argues that ordinary people are rational agents, and their beliefs are the result of their rational response to the evidence they're presented with. We thought they were responding badly to evidence, because we focused on the first-order evidence alone: the evidence that directly bears on the truth of claims. We neglected the higher-order evidence, in particular evidence about who can be trusted and what sources are reliable. Once we recognize how ubiquitous higher-order evidence is, we can see that belief formation is by and large rational. The book argues that we should tackle bad belief by focusing as much on the higher-order evidence as the first-order evidence. The epistemic environment gives us higher-order evidence for beliefs, and we need to carefully manage that environment. The book argues that such management need not be paternalistic: once we recognize that managing the epistemic environment consists in management of evidence, we should recognize that such management is respectful of epistemic autonomy.