Event and Subjectivity presents a rich phenomenological analysis of the event in contemporary phenomenology by focussing on the work of Claude Romano and Jean-Luc Marion. Although the event is a major topic of contemporary philosophy, its centrality has not been acknowledged enough in the phenomenological movement. The book starts with the idea that the event cannot find a proper place in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. It proposes a phenomenological version of the event that transforms the definition of phenomenon, subjectivity and phenomenology itself in order to do justice to the phenomenality of the event. At the same time, Event and Subjectivity is the first book on Claude Romano’s understanding of phenomenology in English. It also offers a fresh reading of the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion by highlighting the phenomenon of the event.

The author of The Origins of Responsibility presents “a major contribution to philosophical scholarship on . . . the very idea of the event” (Edward S. Casey, author of The World on Edge). In Thinking the Event, continental philosopher François Raffoul explores the question of what constitutes an event as an event: not what happens or why it happens, but what “happening” means. If it’s true that nothing happens without a reason, as Leibniz famously posited, then does this principle of reason have a reason? Bringing together philosophical insights from Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jean-Luc Marion, Raffoul shows how the event, in its disruptive unpredictability, always exceeds causality, subjectivity, and reason. He then goes on to examine the inappropriability of this “pure event” and how this inappropriability may inform ethical and political considerations. In the wake of the exhaustion of traditional metaphysics, the notion of the event comes to the fore, with key implications for philosophy, ontology, ethics, and theories of selfhood. Raffoul’s Thinking the Event is essential reading on this fascinating topic.

Experience has been a pivotal philosophical topic since Greek antiquity. The phenomenological movement has also played a crucial role in the history of philosophical theories or ideas of experience. The major contributions of Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology to the philosophical understanding of experience can hardly be overestimated. The ambition of this volume is to illustrate how phenomenology still remains a very fruitful approach that is essential to current philosophical and interdisciplinary debates on experience.

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

“This exciting collection of essays challenges existing interpretations of several key moments of Nietzsche’s philosophy.” —Paul Patton, Scientia Professor of Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australia Throughout his writing career, Nietzsche advocated the affirmation of earthly life as a way to counteract nihilism and asceticism. This volume takes stock of the complexities and wide-ranging perspectives that Nietzsche brings to bear on the problem of life’s becoming on Earth by engaging various interpretative paradigms reaching from existentialist to Darwinist readings of Nietzsche. In an age in which the biological sciences claim to have unlocked the deepest secrets and codes of life, the essays in this volume propose a more skeptical view. Life is both what is closest and what is furthest from us, because life experiments through us as much as we experiment with it, because life keeps our thinking and our habits always moving, in a state of recurring nomadism. Nietzsche’s philosophy is perhaps the clearest expression of the antinomy contained in the idea of “studying” life and in the Socratic ideal of an “examined” life and remains a deep source of wisdom about living.

What does it mean to be human? The traditional answers from the past remain only theoretical possibilities unless they come to mean something to today's generation. Moreover, in light of new knowledge and circumstances, a new generation may call these old answers into question, and seek to reinterpret, or, indeed, provide alternatives to them. In the 1960s, the Catholic Church's Second Vatican Council attempted such a reinterpretation, an aggiornamento, for the post-war generation of the mid-twentieth century by proposing, in Gaudium et Spes, a theological anthropology founded upon the ideas of human dignity and the common good. Fifty years later is an appropriate time to revisit those answers, and

The world into which we are born as the horizon of all our behavior is a world both of things and of events. But what are events? Though familiar to all of us, they are philosophically obscure. However central they may be to the question of being in Western thought, from Aristotle to Heidegger, events have always been assigned a derivative status, indeterminate, at the margins of philosophy. Claude Romano seeks to change all that, to describe precisely what sort of phenomenon an event is and to establish how it can be grasped via a phenomenology. He seeks, above all, to understand a human being as one to whom events can occur, who is able to face them and to appropriate them through experience. "Evential hermeneutics" is the name he gives this approach, which conceives human being as an undergoing of events for which there can be no substitution and as thereby becoming himself. Romano at once forces us to think human existence--or rather, human adventure--in the light of events and helps us understand how and why the event has been neglected in the ontological tradition.

This book starts off from a philosophical premise: nobody can be in the world unless they are born into the world. It examines this premise in the light of the theological belief that birth serves, or ought to serve, as a model for understanding what resurrection could signify for us today. After all, the modern Christian needs to find some way of understanding resurrection, and the dogma of the resurrection of the body is vacuous unless we can relate it philosophically to our own world of experience. Nicodemus first posed the question "How can anyone be born after having grown old? Can one enter a second time into the mother's womb and be born?" This book reads that problem in the context of contemporary philosophy (particularly the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze). A phenomenology of the body born "from below" is seen as a paradigm for a theology of spiritual rebirth, and for rebirth of the body from "on high." The Resurrection changes everything in Christianity—but it is also our own bodies that must be transformed in resurrection, as Christ is transfigured. And the way in which I hope to be resurrected bodily in God, in the future, depends upon the way in which I live bodily today.

Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Chouraqui argues, are linked by how they conceive the question of truth. Although both thinkers criticize the traditional concept of truth as objectivity, they both find that rejecting it does not solve the problem. What is it in our natural existence that gave rise to the notion of truth? The answer to that question is threefold. First, Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty both propose a genealogy of “truth” in which to exist means to make implicit truth claims. Second, both seek to recover the preobjective ground from which truth as an erroneous concept arose. Finally, this attempt at recovery leads both thinkers to ontological considerations regarding how we must conceive of a being whose structure allows for the existence of the belief in truth. In conclusion, Chouraqui suggests that both thinkers’ investigations of the question of truth lead them to conceive of being as the process of self-falsification by which indeterminate being presents itself as determinate.

While humanists have pondered the subject of love to the point of obsessiveness, philosophers have steadfastly ignored it. One might wonder whether the discipline of philosophy even recognizes love. The word philosophy means “love of wisdom,” but the absence of love from philosophical discourse is curiously glaring. So where did the love go? In The Erotic Phenomenon, Jean-Luc Marion asks this fundamental question of philosophy, while reviving inquiry into the concept of love itself. Marion begins his profound and personal book with a critique of Descartes’ equation of the ego’s ability to doubt with the certainty that one exists—“I think, therefore I am”—arguing that this is worse than vain. We encounter being, he says, when we first experience love: I am loved, therefore I am; and this love is the reason I care whether I exist or not. This philosophical base allows Marion to probe several manifestations of love and its variations, including carnal excitement, self-hate, lying and perversion, fidelity, the generation of children, and the love of God. Throughout, Marion stresses that all erotic phenomena, including sentimentality, pornography, and even boasts about one’s sexual conquests, stem not from the ego as popularly understood but instead from love. A thoroughly enlightening and captivating philosophical investigation of a strangely neglected subject, The Erotic Phenomenon is certain to initiate feverish new dialogue about the philosophical meanings of that most desirable and mysterious of all concepts—love.