Competition authorities are increasingly interested in understanding the impact of their activities on markets and consumers. The goal is to improve competition policy rules and decision-making practices and to get robust evidence on the benefits of competition and competition policy for society as a whole. Discussions with competition authorities, practitioners and academics have shown the need to take stock of the experience gained in this field by the European Commission and to present it in an easily accessible way. The studies collected in this volume – prepared by senior Commission officials and competition policy experts – range from the ex post evaluation of specific policy interventions to the assessment of the broader impact of competition policy. The issues and topics examined include the following: objectives and scope of evaluations by the European Commission; description of counterfactual evaluation techniques used; conditions for a successful ex post evaluation of a competition policy intervention; a wide selection of individual cases covering a variety of economic sectors; applications in merger control, antitrust and State aid; direct benefits of competition policy interventions for consumers; deterrent effects of such interventions on market participants; and macroeconomic outcomes in terms of job creation, productivity and GDP growth. This matchless book assembles within a single volume all that is needed for competition policy analysts and practitioners to undertake ex post economic evaluations. While its collection of state-of-the-art ex post evaluation studies has a clear value for competition authorities, it is sure to be welcomed as well by competition law practitioners in the private sector, who will greatly appreciate the effort made to cast a critical eye on decisions taken in the past. Moreover, it allows for addressing some of the new challenges facing competition policymakers. Fabienne Ilzkovitz is Principal Advisor responsible for the economic evaluation of competition policy within the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission, and since 2014, she has coordinated various ex post evaluation projects in the Directorate-General. She is also Associate Professor of Economics in the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. Adriaan Dierx is Senior Expert on ex post economic evaluation within the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission. He has managed a number of studies aimed at assessing the economic impact of the European Commission’s competition policy interventions.

Modelling European Mergers presents a comprehensive and fresh perspective on the economic analysis of mergers by leading academics and competition policymakers from Europe and the US. The book frankly discusses the pro's and con's of using applied game theory models in merger control from a historical and theoretical perspective. Seven case studies on the actual use of advanced techniques and models in legal procedures provide a perspective from the national competition authorities in Belgium, Denmark, Italy. The Netherlands and Sweden on markets that range from basic goods such as bread and aperitifs to complex products such as electricity, literature and software. The case studies provide many insights into practical issues such as data collection, procedures and errors of predication, as well as in the relative merits of different econometric approaches. A recurring theme of the book is how economic insights insights can be translated into convincing legal decisions.

Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies provides an up-to-date account of modern industrial organization that blends theory with real-world applications. Written in a clear and accessible style, it acquaints the reader with the most important models for understanding strategies chosen by firms with market power and shows how such firms adapt to different market environments. It covers a wide range of topics including recent developments on product bundling, branding strategies, restrictions in vertical supply relationships, intellectual property protection, and two-sided markets, to name just a few. Models are presented in detail and the main results are summarized as lessons. Formal theory is complemented throughout by real-world cases that show students how it applies to actual organizational settings. The book is accompanied by a website containing a number of additional resources for lecturers and students, including exercises, answers to review questions, case material and slides.

A fundamental economic reconstruction of merger analysis to strengthen our ability to determine mergers’ likely effects and improve merger regulation. Why rethink merger analysis? Because methods employed throughout the world violate basic precepts of decision analysis and economics. Fundamental principles are underdeveloped, inhibiting research, policy formulation, and merger review. In Rethinking Merger Analysis, Louis Kaplow undertakes a foundational analysis of the questions central to understanding and regulating horizontal mergers and shows why many conventional practices need to be altered or replaced. On the empirical front, Kaplow offers insights, identifies shortcomings, and proposes extensions of existing research. Altogether, merger review can be greatly improved to better identify harmful mergers and avoid thwarting beneficial ones. The correct economic analysis of anticompetitive effects conflicts sharply with the reigning market definition paradigm. This protocol is more deeply flawed than appreciated, readily produces large errors, and can result in uncertainty bounds on challenge thresholds of two orders of magnitude. Merger efficiencies are underanalyzed because of the failure to draw on relevant disciplines and pertinent industry expertise. Postmerger entry’s role is mischaracterized in merger guidelines, and its direct welfare effects are ignored. Entry induced by the prospect of a subsequent buyout has until recently been disregarded. Proper assessment requires a dynamic framing that accounts for a merger regime’s influence on the creation and capabilities of new generations of startups that are central to economic dynamism. This book eschews advocacy and instead focuses on clear thinking—indeed, rethinking—about how to improve merger policy and assessment.

This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis.Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies.*Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series*Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields*A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists

A comprehensive analysis of merger outcomes based on all empirical studies, with an assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust policy toward mergers. In recent decades, antitrust investigations and cases targeting mergers—including those involving Google, Ticketmaster, and much of the domestic airline industry—have reshaped industries and changed business practices profoundly. And yet there has been a relative dearth of detailed evaluations of the effects of mergers and the effectiveness of merger policy. In this book, John Kwoka, a noted authority on industrial organization, examines all reliable empirical studies of the effect of specific mergers and develops entirely new information about the policies and remedies of antitrust agencies regarding these mergers. Combined with data on outcomes, this policy information enables analysis of, and creates new insights into, mergers, merger policies, and the effectiveness of remedies in preventing anticompetitive outcomes. After an overview of mergers, merger policy, and a common approach to merger analysis, Kwoka offers a detailed analysis of the studied mergers, relevant policies, and chosen remedies. Kwoka finds, first and foremost, that most of the studied mergers resulted in competitive harm, usually in the form of higher product prices but also with respect to various non-price outcomes. Other important findings include the fact that joint ventures and code sharing arrangements do not result in such harm and that policies intended to remedy mergers—especially conduct remedies—are not generally effective in restraining price increases. The book's uniquely comprehensive analysis advances our understanding of merger decisions and policies, suggests policy improvements for competition agencies and remedies, and points the way to future research.

Competition policy is an integral and prominent part of economic policy-making in the European Union. The EU Treaty prescribes its member states to conduct economic policy ‘in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition’. More precisely, the goal of EU competition policy is “to defend and develop effective competition in the common market” (European Commission, 2000: 7). Under its Commissioners van Miert, Monti and, most - cently, Kroes the EU Commission has stepped up its effort to pursue and achieve the aforementioned goal. A number of so-called hard-core cartels, such as the - torious “vitamin cartel” led by Roche, have been detected, tried in violation of Art. 81 of the Maastricht Accord and punished with severe fines. Also Microsoft was hit hard by the strong hand of the Commission having been severely fined for - ploiting a dominant market position. Economic analysis has been playing an increasingly significant role in the Commission’s examination of competition law cases. This holds true in particular for merger control. Here, however, the Commission has had to accept some poi- ant defeats in court, such as the Court’s reversals of Airtours-First Choice or GE- Honeywell. Among other things, the European Court of Justice found the e- nomic analysis as conducted by the EU’s Directorate General for Competition to be flawed and the conclusions drawn not to be convincing. These rejections by the courts have stirred up the scholarly debate on the conceptual foundations of Eu- pean competition policy.

Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella