This book offers a new model for measuring the success and impact of counterterrorism strategies, using four comparative historical case studies. The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures is hard to assess, especially since the social impact of terrorist attacks is a fundamental and complex issue. This book focuses on the impact of counterterrorist measures by introducing the concept of the performative power of counterterrorism: the extent to which governments mobilize public and political support - thereby sometimes even unwittingly assisting terrorists in creating social drama. The concept is applied to counterterrorism in the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in the 1970s. Based on in-depth case study research using new primary sources and interviews with counterterrorist officials and radicals, a correlation is established between a low level of performative power and a decline of terrorist incidents. This is explored in terms of the link between social drama (as enhanced by counterterrorist measures) and ongoing radicalization processes. This book demonstrates that an increase in visible and intrusive counterterrorist measures does not automatically lead to a more effective form of counterterrorism. In the open democracies of the west, not transforming counterterrorism into a performance of power and repression is at least as important as counterterrorism measures themselves. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, discourse analysis, media and communication studies, conflict studies and IR/Security Studies in general.

This book offers a new model for measuring the success and impact of counterterrorism strategies, using four comparative historical case studies. The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures is hard to assess, especially since the social impact of terrorist attacks is a fundamental and complex issue. This book focuses on the impact of counterterrorist measures by introducing the concept of the performative power of counterterrorism: the extent to which governments mobilize public and political support - thereby sometimes even unwittingly assisting terrorists in creating social drama. The concept is applied to counterterrorism in the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in the 1970s. Based on in-depth case study research using new primary sources and interviews with counterterrorist officials and radicals, a correlation is established between a low level of performative power and a decline of terrorist incidents. This is explored in terms of the link between social drama (as enhanced by counterterrorist measures) and ongoing radicalization processes. This book demonstrates that an increase in visible and intrusive counterterrorist measures does not automatically lead to a more effective form of counterterrorism. In the open democracies of the west, not transforming counterterrorism into a performance of power and repression is at least as important as counterterrorism measures themselves. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, discourse analysis, media and communication studies, conflict studies and IR/Security Studies in general.

The Treaty on the European Union stipulates that one of the key objectives of the Union is to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Given that the fight against terrorism is a prominent aspect of this general objective, it is remarkable that, in spite of its political relevance and decade-long history, it has only relatively recently received due attention in the academic community. Yet an analysis of the successes and failures of the EU's involvement in this field is imperative and this is a particularly pertinent moment to take stock of progress. The goal of this book is therefore to look back at the post-9/11 period and answer the question of whether, when it comes to the measures taken to combat terrorism following these attacks, the EU has lived up to the promise made in its founding treaties. In pursuing this goal, this volume presents the views of leading experts casting a critical eye over the EU's performance, recognising achievements but also being suitably critical when the realities did not match the European rhetoric. In doing this, the book makes a significant contribution not only to the scholarly investigation of European Union policies, but also to the study of counter-terrorism in general. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

Since 9/11, counterterrorism has become a national and international priority. Research on violent extremism and terrorism, from homegrown threats to foreign fighters, has adapted accordingly but has not always translated into policymaking. Extremism can be traced to no single cause, and yet governments and law-enforcement agencies continue to spend millions on prevention efforts. Contributors to this book identify persistent challenges for counterterrorism and countering violent extremism and provide analysis from a variety of academic and professional perspectives. Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism cautions against adopting a causal model to understand violent extremism and takes a critical look at how states have managed to cope with the global phenomenon of terrorism. By drawing on the expertise of researchers and practitioners from government, law enforcement, and the military, contributors identify past failures and offer guidance on how to correct these mistakes. With the collective goal of developing more effective strategies, the authors dispel common myths, discard counterproductive tactics, and point to countries in which policies have functioned as intended. As some terrorist organizations' influence wanes, others innovate and thrive, further challenging a state apparatus that is slow to adapt to these mutating threats. An essential and timely book, Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism seeks to change how governments and policymakers consider and respond to security threats.

All U.S. agencies with counterterrorism programs that collect or "mine" personal data-such as phone records or Web sites visited-should be required to evaluate the programs' effectiveness, lawfulness, and impacts on privacy. A framework is offered that agencies can use to evaluate such information-based programs, both classified and unclassified. The book urges Congress to re-examine existing privacy law to assess how privacy can be protected in current and future programs and recommends that any individuals harmed by violations of privacy be given a meaningful form of redress. Two specific technologies are examined: data mining and behavioral surveillance. Regarding data mining, the book concludes that although these methods have been useful in the private sector for spotting consumer fraud, they are less helpful for counterterrorism because so little is known about what patterns indicate terrorist activity. Regarding behavioral surveillance in a counterterrorist context, the book concludes that although research and development on certain aspects of this topic are warranted, there is no scientific consensus on whether these techniques are ready for operational use at all in counterterrorism.

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?"In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, and Money has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

Contemporary terrorism is a global phenomenon requiring a globalized response. In this book Peter Romaniuk aims to assess to what extent states seek multilateral responses to the threats they face from terrorists. Multilateral Counter-terrorism is an essential resource for all students and scholars of international politics, criminology and terrorism studies.

This edited book addresses the appropriateness of US and other counter-terrorist (CT) strategies in Europe and Eurasia, the Middle East, the Asia Pacific region and in Latin America, with a view to improving their effectiveness. The book has three main objectives: to re-examine terrorists' strategic goals and sources of legitimacy and the nature of their ideological support to analyze current US and regional CT strategies and assess their success in de-legitimizing terrorists and undermining their support to provide a strategic synthesis and policy recommendations in light of the research findings. This book will be of interest to students of political violence and terrorism, security studies and international relations in general.

The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) program of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) provides funds to major U. S. cities to help them develop plans for coping with the health and medical consequences of a terrorist attack with chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) agents. DHHS asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to assist in assessing the effectiveness of the MMRS program by developing appropriate evaluation methods, tools, and processes to assess both its own management of the program and local preparedness in the cities that have participated in the program. This book provides the managers of the MMRS program and others concerned about local capabilities to cope with CBR terrorism with three evaluation tools and a three-part assessment method. The tools are a questionnaire survey eliciting feedback about the management of the MMRS program, a table of preparedness indicators for 23 essential response capabilities, and a set of three scenarios and related questions for group discussion. The assessment method described integrates document inspection, a site visit by a team of expert peer reviewers, and observations at community exercises and drills.

How should we analyze and assess new terrorist behaviors? What are the particular risks and challenges from new terrorism? Should we negotiate with terrorists, and, if so, how? When should we use force against terrorists? Countering New(est) Terrorism: Hostage-Taking, Kidnapping, and Active Violence—Assessing, Negotiating, and Assaulting improves our knowledge of new terrorist behaviors, and our skills in responding to such attacks. The term "new terrorism" has been in circulation since the late 90’s. This book analyzes the "newest terrorism" that has emerged in recent years—characterized by increased hostage-taking, kidnapping, and active violence—and develops best practices for countering these emerging threats. Along the way, it challenges fashionable wishful thinking that all terrorists are open to rational negotiation or de-radicalization, that military responses always reflect badly on the official side, and that terrorists are not constrained by their own doctrines. The new terrorists are dramatically more ideological, murderous, and suicidal. They are generally less reconcilable, less trusting of official negotiators, less likely to release detainees, and more likely to kill detainees. They are less likely to demand ransoms yet more likely to release hostages in cases in which they do demand ransom. They are more informed about the official side’s policies, tactics, techniques, and procedures. They are more likely to use new information and communication technologies against responding agencies and officials. They are more capable fighters—they kill more people despite deploying fewer fighters per hostage. Most disturbing is the fact that they take advantage of free-er societies to access easier targets. Features: Includes evidence-based definitions and descriptions of political, religious, Jihadi, and new terrorism Presents the first large-n comparison of old and new terrorism, using an original extension of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), with added codes for each of 10,735 hostage crises and more than 500,000 data points from 1970 through 2016 Details a further extension of the GTD covering all terrorist events from 2004 through 2016, roughly 5 million data points. Offers prescriptive advice and visual decision trees on how to negotiate crises, assess the risk of terrorism, and how and when to assault terrorists Reviews official practices, interviews with experienced officials, and real-world simulations of recent terrorist events and attacks Countering New(est) Terrorism will be of interest to researchers, students enrolled in terrorism and Homeland Security programs, crisis negotiators, and police, security, intelligence, and military authorities tasked with counterterrorism and anti-terrorism efforts.