Tracing the forty-year history of negotiations to construct exchange rate regimes in the European Union, Money and Power in Europe emphasizes the role of a state's bargaining power for the formation of rules. In contrast to the prevailing literature's emphasis on domestic factors like sectoral and partisan interests, policy ideas and domestic institutional structures, Matthias Kaelberer highlights the structural conflict of interest between weak and strong currency countries over the rules of monetary cooperation. Strong currency countries, in particular Germany, because they do not face a reserve constraint, are in a position to shape the rules of monetary regimes decidedly in their favor, including the refusal to compromise on rules of domestic macroeconomic adjustment.

A Europe Made of Money is a new history of the making of the European Monetary System (EMS), based on extensive archive research. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol highlights two long-term processes in the monetary and economic negotiations in the decade leading up to the founding of the EMS in 1979. The first is a transnational learning process involving a powerful, networked European monetary elite that shaped a habit of cooperation among technocrats. The second stresses the importance of the European Council, which held regular meetings between heads of government beginning in 1974, giving EEC legitimacy to monetary initiatives that had previously involved semisecret and bilateral negotiations. The interaction of these two features changed the EMS from a fairly trivial piece of administrative business to a tremendously important political agreement. The inception of the EMS was greeted as one of the landmark achievements of regional cooperation, a major leap forward in the creation of a unified Europe. Yet Mourlon-Druol’s account stresses that the EMS is much more than a success story of financial cooperation. The technical suggestions made by its architects reveal how state elites conceptualized the larger project of integration. And their monetary policy became a marker for the conception of European identity. The unveiling of the EMS, Mourlon-Druol concludes, represented the convergence of material interests and symbolic, identity-based concerns.

Why have the states of Europe agreed to create an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a single European currency? What will decide the fate of this bold project? This book explains why monetary integration has deepened in Europe from the Bretton Woods era to the present day. McNamara argues that the development of a neoliberal economic policy consensus among European leaders in the years after the first oil crisis was crucial to stability in the European Monetary System and progress towards EMU. She identifies two factors, rising capital mobility and changing ideas about the government's proper role in monetary policymaking, as critical to the neoliberal consensus but warns that unresolved social tensions in this consensus may provoke a political backlash against EMU and its neoliberal reforms.McNamara's findings are relevant not only to European monetary integration, but to more general questions about the effects of international capital flows on states. Although this book delineates a range of constraints created by economic interdependence, McNamara rejects the notion that international market forces simply dictate government policy choice. She demonstrates that the process of neoliberal policy change is a historically dependent one, shaped by policymakers' shared beliefs and interpretations of their experiences in the global economy.

One of the questions about running EMU is whether different strands of macroeconomic policy should be co-ordinated. This work covers the case for and against having an explicit co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policy, with essays from two of the leading architects of the current system.

Official government policies against money laundering in the EU have been in place for roughly 25 years, after much concerted effort and a great deal of time and money invested. This volume examines the anti-money laundering policy of the EU Member States in connection to the threat of money laundering they face.

What is the form of government of the European Union (EU)? And how is the institutional governance of the Eurozone evolving? These questions have become pressing during the last few years. On the one hand, the Euro-crisis and the legal and institutional responses to it have had major implications on the constitutional architecture of the EU and the Eurozone. On the other hand, the May 2014 elections for the European Parliament and the ensuing struggle to form the European Commission have brought to the fore new tensions in the EU political system. The purpose of this book, which brings together the contributions of EU lawyers, comparative constitutional lawyers and political scientists, from all over Europe and the United States, is to offer a new look at the form of government of the EU and the Eurozone and consider its potential for future development. While offering a plurality of perspectives on the form of government of the EU and the Eurozone, this book emphasises how the Euro-crisis represents a watershed in the process of European integration, makes the case for a more legitimate and effective form of government for the EU and the Eurozone, and identifies possible windows of opportunity for future treaty reforms. The volume will provide food for thought for scholars, policy-makers and the public at large as they continue debating the most apt form of government for the EU and the Eurozone.

Many on the Left see the European Union as a fundamentally benign project with the potential to underpin ever greater cooperation and progress. If it has drifted rightward, the answer is to fight for reform from within. In this iconoclastic polemic, economist Costas Lapavitsas demolishes this view. He contends that the EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis represents the ultimate transformation of the union into a neoliberal citadel that institutionally embeds austerity, privatization, and wage cuts. Concurrently, the rise of German hegemony has divided the EU into an unstable core and dependent peripheries. These related developments make the EU impervious to meaningful reform. The solution is therefore a direct challenge to the EU project that stresses popular and national sovereignty as preconditions for true internationalist socialism. Lapavitsas’s powerful manifesto for a left opposition to the EU upends the wishful thinking that often characterizes the debate and will be a challenging read for all on the Left interested in the future of Europe.

This book studies the international coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the world economy. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on monetary and fiscal competition between Europe and America. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on monetary and fiscal cooperation between Europe and America. The spillover effects of monetary policy are negative while the spillover effects of fiscal policy are positive. The policy targets are price stability and full employment. The policy makers follow either cold-turkey or gradualist strategies. Policy expectations are adaptive or rational. The world economy consists of two, three or more regions. The present book is part of a larger research project on European Monetary Union, see the references at the back of the book. Some parts of this project were presented at the World Congress of the International Economic Association in Lisbon. Other parts were presented at the International Institute of Public Finance, at the Macro Study Group of the German Economic Association, at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association, at the Gottingen Workshop on International Economics, at the Halle Workshop on Monetary Economics, at the Research Seminar on Macroeconomics in Freiburg, and at the Passau Workshop on International Economics.

In The Future of the Euro, a group of the world's top political economists analyze the fundamental causes of the euro crisis, determine how it can be fixed, and consider what likely futures lie ahead for the currency. The book makes three interrelated arguments emphasizing the primacy of political over economic factors. First, the original plan for the euro focused on monetary union, but omitted a financial and banking union, mutually supporting institutions of fiscal union and economic government, and a legitimate political union. Second, the euro's unfinished design led to economic divergence-quietly altering the existing distribution of economic and political power within Europe prior to the crisis-which in turn determined the EU's crisis response. The book highlights how the euro's four most important member states-Germany, France, Italy and Spain-each changed once they adopted the euro, why the crisis affected them so differently, and how each has since struggled to live with the commitments the euro necessitates. Third, the book examines three possible "euro futures" through the lens of the politics of its reluctant leader Germany; through the lens of the EU's capacity to move forward through crises; and through the geopolitical lens of the international monetary system. Any successful long-term solution to the euro's predicament will need to start with the political foundations of markets.

The global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis exposed the inadequacy of European economic governance. Despite the multitude of new mechanisms and institutions that have arisen over the last few years, many contend that economic governance remains inadequate and the EU must integrate even further to calm still-volatile markets. A tension exists between creating effective instruments that will not overstep the authority delegated to an EU that has integrated economically but not politically. Can the EU’s economic governance system satisfy the demands of markets and politics? Relevant issues include the ability of supranational institutions to dictate policy to national governments, the harmonization of economic policies and institutions across Europe, and a substantial increase in the transfer of funds across borders. Can monetary union continue without political union? How will the new institutions alter the distribution of power between EU institutions as well as between member states? This edited volume analyzes the major policy challenges and institutional mechanisms at the EU- and international levels to combat the global financial crisis and the EU’s sovereign debt crisis such as financial integration, fiscal cooperation, and the rising power of the ECB. This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of European Integration.