Today the issue of relativism is not only an academic subject, it has become a vital concern in sociology and politics, along with the issue of globalisation. This book studies ethical relativism in its most profound and recent forms, and argues that a non-relativist account of morality is capable of validating our moral experiences without undesirable implications. The author demonstrates that unlike during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, support for ethical relativism is now in decline. He proposes that the most promising strategy is first to settle the issue of the foundations of morality, and then to develop a new theory of morality based on self-love, moral ideas and the process of decision-making. This book brings a fresh perspective to the on-going debate on post-modernism and relativism, and should be of interest to all who study philosophy, theology and cultural studies, and those interested in spirituality.

Relativism is a hotly contested doctrine among philosophers, some of whom regard it as neither true nor false but simply incoherent. As Carol Rovane demonstrates in this analytical tour-de-force, the way to defend relativism is not initially by establishing its truth but by clarifying its content. The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism elaborates a doctrine of relativism that has a consistent logical, metaphysical, and practical significance. Relativism is worth debating, Rovane contends, because it bears directly on the moral choices we make in our lives. Three intuitive conceptions of relativism have been influential in philosophical discourse. These include the idea that certain unavoidable disagreements are irresolvable, leading to the conclusion that "both sides are right," and the idea that truth is always relative to context. But the most compelling, Rovane maintains, is the "alternatives intuition." Alternatives are truths that cannot be embraced together because they are not universal. Something other than logical contradiction excludes them. When this is so, logical relations no longer hold among all truth-value-bearers. Some truths will be irreconcilable between individuals even though they are valid in themselves. The practical consequence is that some forms of interpersonal engagement are confined within definite boundaries, and one has no choice but to view what lies beyond those boundaries with what Rovane calls "epistemic indifference." In a very real sense, some people inhabit different worlds--true in themselves, but closed off to belief from those who hold irreducibly incompatible truths.

This volume is devoted solely to the topic of moral relativism. The 19 contemporary selections are nontechnical and fall under five main headings which include general issues of moral relativism, moral diversity, the coherence of moral relativism, and relativism, realism, and rationality.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

The present work addresses itself to one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary ethics-relativism. Relativism has become a formidable argument in Western socio-moral thought under the impact of postmodern writings. The author presents a detailed critique of various relativist and postmodernist theses, without rejecting some of their empirically justified observations. She underscores the fact that the intercultural communication which has been going on since time immemorial puts a question mark to the postmodernist theories of indeterminacy of translation, incommensurability of various conceptual frameworks etc. The author supports cognitivism in ethics according to which the moral properties of the object of moral judgement do in some way determine or `cause` that judgment. This view is not to be confused with any realist ontological commitment. She asserts that universalizability is the necessary condition of all rational judgments, including the moral ones. The author also discusses the relationship between self and others; and in this context she draws upon the insights of ancient Indian thinkers. She proposes that minimum moral principles and maxims can be agreed upon through reasoning and intercultural discourse.

This book analyzes the debate surrounding cultural diversity and its implications for ethics. If ethics are relative to particular cultures or societies, then it is not possible to hold that there are any fundamental human rights. The author examines the role of cultural tradition, often used as a defense against critical ethical judgments, and explores key issues in health and medicine in the context of cultural diversity: the physician-patient relationship, disclosing a diagnosis of a fatal illness, informed consent, brain death and organ transplantation, rituals surrounding birth and death, female genital mutilation, sex selection of offspring, fertility regulation, and biomedical research involving human subjects. Among the conclusions the author reaches are that ethical universals exist but must not be confused with ethical absolutes. The existence of ethical universals is compatible with a variety of culturally relative interpretations, and some rights related to medicine and health care should be considered human rights. Illustrative examples are drawn from the author's experiences serving on international ethical review committees and her travels to countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where she conducted educational workshops and carried out her own research.

In this book, Edward Westermarck grounds ethics in the biological underpinnings of emotion and makes arguments for both psychological and ethical relativism. According to Westermarck, conventional moral judgments are based on moral sentiments, which are neutral moral feelings. Because moral standards are rooted in emotion, Westermarck concludes that they cannot be objective.

On September 11 2001, thousands of people died in the attacks on the United States. How could the terrorists justify these acts? A young man kills his sister to protect his family's honour. How could this be 'right' These are just some of the questions tackled by Neil Levy in an incisive and elegant guide to the philosophy of moral relativism - the idea that concepts of 'rightness' and 'wrongness' vary from culture to culture, and that there is no such thing as an absolute moral code. Opening with a comprehensive definition of this controversial theory, the book examines all the arguments for and against moral relativism, from its implications for ethics to the role of human biology and the difficulty of separating cultural values from innate behaviour

This book aims to clarify the debate between moral relativists and moral absolutists by showing what is right and what is wrong about each of these positions, by revealing how the phenomenon of moral diversity is connected with moral relativism, and by arguing for the importance of relationships between persons as key to reaching a satisfactory understanding of the issues involved in the debate.