This volume brings together more than three decades of research and writings by Professor Ramesh Thakur on the challenges posed by nuclear weapons. Following an introduction to the current nuclear state of play, the book addresses the challenge of nuclear weapons in three parts. Part I describes the scholar-practitioner interface in trying to come to grips with this challenge, the main policy impact on security strategy, and the various future nuclear scenarios. Part II addresses regional nuclear challenges from the South Pacific to East, South and West Asia and thereby highlights serious deficiencies in the normative architecture of the nuclear arms control and disarmament regime. In the third and final part, the chapters discuss regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, NPT anomalies (and their implications for the future of the nuclear arms control regime) and, finally, assess the global governance architecture of nuclear security in light of the three Nuclear Security Summits between 2010 and 2014. The concluding chapter argues for moving towards a world of progressively reduced nuclear weapons in numbers, reduced salience of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and deployments, and, ultimately, a denuclearized world. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, international organisations, diplomacy and security studies.

These essays, collected to commemorate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 25th anniversary, span not only ACDA's lifetime, but the four decades of the nuclear era. The articles provide a sampling of the arms-control-related speculation and controversy that has existed during those years. Since many of the authors are either current members of the U.S. Government or have strongly influenced its policy over the years, these essays on the formulation of U.S. arms control and national security policies have almost assumed the status of classics. The authors represented include Fred Ikle, Henry Rowen, Paul Nitze, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, and James Schlesinger. S/N 044-000-02164-1: $12.00.

The articles compiled here probe some prominent current and emerging proliferation-related challenges and dilemmas, both regional and global, and propose directions for dealing with them. The articles cover a wide range of issues, from the Pakistani nuclear situation to weapons trafficking in Sinai. Other articles focus on European efforts to confront Iran's nuclear ambitions, the threat of autonomous unmanned robots in future warfare, the phenomenon of complex deterrence equations on the basis of new research into the US-Israel-Iraq deterrence triangle in the 1991 Gulf War, and the possibility of devising an arms control treaty to curb cyber warfare.

Why does the most highly advanced industrial country, commanding unparalleled access to vast sources of global intelligence and information, seem to so often miscalculate the realities and risks of its foreign interventions? In light of current difficulties the United States faces in extricating from its recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in dealing--or not dealing--with the tumultuous and complicated events of the Arab Spring, one has to ask what can possibly account for so little apparent evolution. In Tyranny of Consensus, Janne E. Nolan examines three cases--the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the proxy war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa--to find the limitations of American policymakers in understanding some of the important developments around the world. Assisted by a working group of senior practitioners and policy experts, Nolan finds that it is often the impulse to protect the already arrived at policy consensus that is to blame for failure. Without access to informed discourse or a functioning "marketplace of ideas," policymakers can find themselves unable or unwilling to seriously consider possible correctives even to obviously flawed strategies. "This book goes well beyond what was wrong with key U.S. policies over the years to why the policies came out wrong. Janne Nolan's analysis tells well how the unhappy stews of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places were cooked. Tyranny of Consensus is a key step toward fixing ourselves."--Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former New York Times columnist "Janne Nolan asks a critical question about America's national security policymaking process: why has the quality of policy not been better at critical times in our history? She then proceeds to answer the question, beginning with the suggestive title of her book, Tyranny of Consensus. The author is skilled at the use of case material, and so her well-constructed historical chapters are a pleasure to read.... Nolan's important book should be read and re-read because the lessons she so clearly lays out need to be learned anew with each administration intent on imposing its own coherent framework on events, not withstanding ample evidence that the fit is poor indeed".--Robert L. Gallucci, president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.

On August 24-25, 2010, the National Defense University held a conference titled “Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?” to explore the economic element of national power. This special collection of selected papers from the conference represents the view of several keynote speakers and participants in six panel discussions. It explores the complexity surrounding this subject and examines the major elements that, interacting as a system, define the economic component of national security.

In an era of great power competition, the role of alliances in managing escalation of conflict has acquired renewed importance. Nuclear weapons remain the ultimate means for deterrence and controlling escalation, and are central to US alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, allies themselves need to better prepare for managing escalation in an increasingly challenging geostrategic and technological environment for the US and its allies. While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US alliances differ. This book brings together leading experts from Europe, Northeast Asia, the United States and Australia to focus on these challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence and potential escalation pathways in America’s 21st century alliances. ‘Nuclear weapons play an important role in deterrence and preventing military conflict between great powers, while also posing an existential threat to humanity. It is vital that we have a nuanced understanding of this important challenge, so that such weapons are never used. This book offers many important perspectives and makes a significant contribution to the overall debate about these powerful weapons.’ — The Hon Julie Bishop, Chancellor, The Australian National University, Former Foreign Minister of Australia ‘This timely book identifies a wide range of challenges US alliances both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic face as they seek to ensure the value of US extended deterrence, particular the US nuclear umbrella, against China and Russia. This unique collection of chapters written by experts in US allies in both regions presents widely varying security perceptions and priorities. To understand such differences is the key to globally strengthen the US alliance systems, which are a significant advantage Washington enjoys over the two competitors.’ — Yukio Satoh, former President of The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) ‘This is a timely and thoughtful collection of essays that should serve to jumpstart public discussion and debate—the absence of which is widely noted and much bemoaned. Each contributor examines an aspect of the complicated, multifaceted nuclear debate by discussing the range of dilemmas from deterrence to disarmament. The various views set out here are more relevant than ever as Russia, China and the United States flex their nuclear muscles in new and sometimes dangerous ways. This book should be read by anyone interested in the preventing the use of nuclear weapons and understanding complexities of alliances in an increasingly dangerous world.’ — Madelyn Creedon, former Principal Deputy Administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs

In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for “tactical” nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a “special reminder” of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a “long-route” policy of providing Saigon with a “decent chance” of survival for a “decent interval” after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to unravel this intricate story of the October 1969 nuclear alert. They place it in the context of nuclear threat making and coercive diplomacy since 1945, the culture of the Bomb, intra-governmental dissent, domestic political pressures, the international “nuclear taboo,” and Vietnamese and Soviet actions and policies. It is a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.

This compilation of 10 articles by frequently published arms-control experts captures the story of a young Air Force's initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It documents a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than merely to be a passive recipient. This book also highlights the lesson the Air Force belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: that it has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations. When a treaty goes into effect, the Air Force needs to be ready to execute its responsibilities to ensure complete and timely treaty compliance. Though the Air Force did not seize a prominent role in the early days of post-war arms control, it made up for it quickly and forcefully as it gained a fuller appreciation of what was at stake.