Any study of communication must take into account the nature and role of speech acts in a broad context. This book addresses questions such as: - What do we mean? - How do we say it? and - How is it understood? in the broad context of universal, socio-cultural and psychological issues that bear on human communication. It presents an overview of current issues in speech act theory that are at the center of human and social sciences dealing with language, thought and action, building on John Searle’s famous article ‘How Performatives Work’ (included in this book). The contributions by linguists, psychologists, computer scientists, and philosophers thus address issues of communication that are crucial in conversation analysis, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, psychology and philosophy, and a general understanding of how we communicate. The book is suitable for courses with an extensive bibliography for further reading and an Index.

Any study of communication must take into account the nature and role of speech acts in a broad context. This book addresses questions such as: - What do we mean? - How do we say it? and - How is it understood? in the broad context of universal, socio-cultural and psychological issues that bear on human communication. It presents an overview of current issues in speech act theory that are at the center of human and social sciences dealing with language, thought and action, building on John Searle's famous article 'How Performatives Work' (included in this book). The contributions by linguists, psychologists, computer scientists, and philosophers thus address issues of communication that are crucial in conversation analysis, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, psychology and philosophy, and a general understanding of how we communicate. The book is suitable for courses with an extensive bibliography for further reading and an Index.

This book collects seventeen essays published between 1984 and 2020, in which Marina Sbisà develops her distinctive approach to speech acts and related pragmatic phenomena. Drawing inspiration from the work of J. L. Austin, the essays examine the categories of speech act theory and apply these categories in the context of natural discourse and conversation, with the aim of providing an accurate analysis of how speech can be action. Sbisà devotes particular attention to normative aspects of language and language use: speech acts reshape the normative context in which they occur by assigning or unassigning deontic properties to relevant parties. Emphasis is placed on the normative aspect of linguistically mandated presuppositions as well as the rational grounds of implicature. The conventionalist view of speech acts developed here turns on the role of intersubjective agreement in deontic updating, in a framework that shifts focus from single utterances to discursive sequences and conversational interaction. This view challenges the main tenets of a Gricean intentionalist understanding of speech act performance, paving the way for a theory of speech actions centred on the normatively transformative power of illocution. Throughout the essays, examples and applications are given to illustrate how the view put forward contributes to understanding the social and political dimensions of linguistic activity, such as hidden persuasive strategies, power imbalances both within and outside the context of conversation, and the relevance of language and discourse to gender issues.

This book collects seventeen essays published between 1984 and 2020, in which Marina Sbisà develops her distinctive approach to speech acts and related pragmatic phenomena. Drawing inspiration from the work of J. L. Austin, the essays examine the categories of speech act theory and apply these categories in the context of natural discourse and conversation, with the aim of providing an accurate analysis of how speech can be action. Sbisà devotes particular attention to normative aspects of language and language use: speech acts reshape the normative context in which they occur by assigning or unassigning deontic properties to relevant parties. Emphasis is placed on the normative aspect of linguistically mandated presuppositions as well as the rational grounds of implicature. The conventionalist view of speech acts developed here turns on the role of intersubjective agreement in deontic updating, in a framework that shifts focus from single utterances to discursive sequences and conversational interaction. This view challenges the main tenets of a Gricean intentionalist understanding of speech act performance, paving the way for a theory of speech actions centred on the normatively transformative power of illocution. Throughout the essays, examples and applications are given to illustrate how the view put forward contributes to understanding the social and political dimensions of linguistic activity, such as hidden persuasive strategies, power imbalances both within and outside the context of conversation, and the relevance of language and discourse to gender issues.

'This small but tightly packed volume is easily the most substantial discussion of speech acts since John Austin's How To Do Things With Words and one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of language in recent decades.'--Philosophical Quarterly

Foundations of Speech Act Theory investigates the importance of speech act theory to the problem of meaning in linguistics and philosophy. The papers in this volume, written by respected philosophers and linguists, significantly advance standards of debate in this area. Beginning with a detailed introduction to the individual contributors, this collection demonstrates the relevance of speech acts to semantic theory. It includes essays unified by the assumption that current pragmatic theories are not well equipped to analyse speech acts satisfactorily, and concludes with five studies which assess the relevance of speech act theory to the understanding of philosophical problems outside the area of philosophy of language.

This book, first published in 1990, combines an introduction to speech-act theory as developed by J. L. Austin with a survey of critical essays that have adapted Austin's thought for literary analysis. Speech-act theory emphasizes the social reality created when speakers agree that their language is performative - Austin's term for utterances like: "we hereby declare" or "I promise" that produce rather than describe what they name. In contrast to formal linguistics, speech-act theory insists on language's active prominence in the organization of collective life. The first section of the text concentrates on Austin's determination to situate language in society by demonstrating the social conventions manifest in language. The second and third parts of the book discuss literary critics' responses to speech-act theory's socialisation of language, which have both opened new understandings of textuality in general and stimulated new interpretations of individual works. This book will be of interest to students of linguistics and literary theory.

In the study of language, as in any other systematic study, there is no neutral terminology. Every technical term is an expression of the assumptions and theoretical presuppositions of its users; and in this introduction, we want to clarify some of the issues that have surrounded the assumptions behind the use of the two terms "speech acts" and "pragmatics". The notion of a speech act is fairly well understood. The theory of speech acts starts with the assumption that the minimal unit of human communica tion is not a sentence or other expression, but rather the performance of certain kinds of acts, such as making statements, asking questions, giving orders, describing, explaining, apologizing, thanking, congratulating, etc. Characteristically, a speaker performs one or more of these acts by uttering a sentence or sentences; but the act itself is not to be confused with a sentence or other expression uttered in its performance. Such types of acts as those exemplified above are called, following Austin, illocutionary acts, and they are standardly contrasted in the literature with certain other types of acts such as perlocutionary acts and propositional acts. Perlocutionary acts have to do with those effects which our utterances have on hearers which go beyond the hearer's understanding of the utterance. Such acts as convincing, persuading, annoying, amusing, and frightening are all cases of perlocutionary acts.

Essays tracing the development of Searle's analytical theory of the speech act, from the conception of linguistic meaning in terms of action, via the analysis of the underlying intentional structure, to the problems of the relation between mind and brain. The 15 essays cover the historical roots of the speech act theory, semantics and pragmatics, intentionality, meaning, the theory of metaphor and fictional discourse, and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. They include sometimes quite pointed criticism, and were written in the expectation that Searle would contribute replies. But he withdrew his involvement before the volume was completed. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The six case studies presented here fall into three distinct groups. They examine the application of speech act theory to Shakespearean drama, consider 18th-century Congressional debates from the perspective of fallacy theory in informal logic, and focus more narrowly on applications of linguistic pragmatics. Specific topics include types and functions of unpleasant verbal behavior in Shakespeare's Coriolanus and Timon of Athens, promises and their contexts in Coriolanus, efforts to block the Bill of Rights in 1789, collocational coloring and electronic corpora, and contexts of phonologically null objects in object control structures in English and in Finnish. c. Book News Inc.