Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.

Epistemic cognition, the philosophical core of metacognition, concerns people’s knowledge about the justification and truth of beliefs. Multiple literatures in psychology and education address aspects of epistemic cognition. In the absence of a coherent conceptual framework, however, these literatures mostly fail to communicate with each other and often connect only loosely to genuine epistemology. This complicates any effort to achieve a systematic theoretical understanding of epistemic cognition and its development. Deanna Kuhn writes in her foreword, "Moshman is not the first to take on this challenge, but he fulfills it elegantly and, I think, the most comprehensively and astutely." After reviewing the basics of philosophical epistemology and cognitive psychology, Epistemic Cognition and Development provides a compelling account of developmental change across childhood and beyond in knowledge about knowledge, especially with regard to fundamental conceptions of objectivity, subjectivity, rationality, justification, and truth. This is followed by detailed consideration of domain-specific epistemologies of science, logic, morality, social convention, history, and identity, including associated forms of reasoning. The final section provides theoretical conclusions, educational and social applications, and suggestions for further research.

The Handbook of Epistemic Cognition brings together leading work from across disciplines, to provide a comprehensive overview of an increasingly important topic: how people acquire, understand, justify, change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts. Research into inquiry, understanding, and discovery within academic disciplines has progressed from general models of conceptual change to a focus upon the learning trajectories that lead to expert-like conceptualizations, skills, and performance. Outside of academic domains, issues of who and what to believe, and how to integrate multiple sources of information into coherent and useful knowledge, have arisen as primary challenges of the 21st century. In six sections, scholars write within and across fields to focus and advance the role of epistemic cognition in education. With special attention to how researchers across disciplines can communicate and collaborate more effectively, this book will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the future of knowledge and knowing. Dr. Jeffrey A. Greene is an associate professor of Learning Sciences and Psychological Studies in the School of Education at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Dr. William A. Sandoval is a professor in the division of Urban Schooling at the UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies. Dr. Ivar Bråten is a professor of Educational Psychology at the Faculty of Educational Sciences at the University of Oslo, Norway.

This is the first book to provide a comprehensive overview of the theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of personal epistemology from a psychological and educational perspective. Both theory building and empirical research have grown dramatically in the past decade but, until now, this work has not been pulled together in a single volume. That is the mission of this volume whose state-of-the-art theory and research are likely to define the field for the next 20 years. Key features of this important new book include: *Pioneering Contributors--The book provides current perspectives of each of the major theoreticians and researchers who pioneered this growing field, as well as contributions from new researchers. *Diverse Perspectives--The contributors represent a variety of perspectives, including education, educational psychology, developmental psychology, higher education, and science and mathematics education. *Editorial Integration--Opening and closing chapters by the editors set out key issues confronting the field.

Cognition is a basic introductory text for college courses in the philosophy of knowledge. Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., here expands the narrowly metaphysical treatment of knowledge given in his earlier book, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, into a full-fledged epistemology. This text utilizes the traditions of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to reacquaint students of philosophy with a number of insights basic for a philosophic understanding of knowledge. These insights into the nature of abstraction, truth, the ground of certitude, and other major concerns of epistemology will help students clarify the approaches of contemporary philosophies.

These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism.

An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various philosophical issues. In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls “perception”) that results in representational states with nonconceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, “bottom-up,” theory-neutral ways. Raftopoulos applies this insight to problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and examines how we access the external world through our perception as well as what we can know of that world. To show that there is a theory-neutral part of existence, Raftopoulos turns to cognitive science and argues that there is substantial scientific evidence. He then claims that perception induces representational states with nonconceptual content and examines the nature of the nonconceptual content. The nonconceptual information retrieved, he argues, does not allow the identification or recognition of an object but only its individuation as a discrete persistent object with certain spatiotemporal properties and other features. Object individuation, however, suffices to determine the referents of perceptual demonstratives. Raftopoulos defends his account in the context of current discussions on the issue of the theory-ladenness of perception (namely the Fodor-Churchland debate), and then discusses the repercussions of his thesis for problems in the philosophy of science. Finally, Raftopoulos claims that there is a minimal form of realism that is defensible. This minimal realism holds that objects, their spatiotemporal properties, and such features as shape, orientation, and motion are real, mind-independent properties in the world.

On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, Mikkel Gerken presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics, while also contributing to epistemology. For example, Gerken develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion and moreover, critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, this volume develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, critical epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging sub-field that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: The empirical study of folk epistemology.

An argument that we understand the world through many special-purpose mental models of different content domains, and an exploration of the philosophical implications. Philosophers have traditionally assumed that the basic units of knowledge and understanding are concepts, beliefs, and argumentative inferences. In Cognitive Pluralism, Steven Horst proposes that another sort of unit—a mental model of a content domain—is the fundamental unit of understanding. He argues that understanding comes not in word-sized concepts, sentence-sized beliefs, or argument-sized reasoning but in the form of idealized models and in domain-sized chunks. He argues further that this idea of “cognitive pluralism”—the claim that we understand the world through many such models of a variety of content domains—sheds light on a number of problems in philosophy. Horst first presents the “standard view” of cognitive architecture assumed in mainstream epistemology, semantics, truth theory, and theory of reasoning. He then explains the notion of a mental model as an internal surrogate that mirrors features of its target domain, and puts it in the context of ideas in psychology, philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and theoretical cognitive science. Finally, he argues that the cognitive pluralist view not only helps to explain puzzling disunities of knowledge but also raises doubts about the feasibility of attempts to “unify” the sciences; presents a model-based account of intuitive judgments; and contends that cognitive pluralism favors a reliabilist epistemology and a “molecularist” semantics. Horst suggests that cognitive pluralism allows us to view rival epistemological and semantic theories not as direct competitors but as complementary accounts, each an idealized model of different dimensions of evaluation.

This monograph investigates the development of human spatial knowledge by analyzing its elementary structures and studying how it is further shaped by various societal conditions. By taking a thoroughly historical perspective on knowledge and integrating results from various disciplines, this work throws new light on long-standing problems in epistemology such as the relation between experience and preformed structures of cognition. What do the orientation of apes and the theory of relativity have to do with each other? Readers will learn how different forms of spatial thinking are related in a long-term history of knowledge. Scientific concepts of space such as Newton’s absolute space or Einstein’s curved spacetime are shown to be rooted in pre-scientific structures of knowledge, while at the same time enabling the integration of an ever expanding corpus of experiential knowledge. This work addresses all readers interested in questions of epistemology, in particular philosophers and historians of science. It integrates forms of spatial knowledge from disciplines including anthropology, developmental psychology and cognitive sciences, amongst others.