The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the international security environment that now exists. In a major regional conflict—such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait—the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense. According to the results of a series of CSIS war games, the United States would likely run out of some munitions—such as long-range, precision-guided munitions—in less than one week in a Taiwan Strait conflict. The war in Ukraine has also exposed serious deficiencies in the U.S. defense industrial base and serves as a stark reminder that a protracted conflict is likely to be an industrial war that requires a defense industry able to manufacture enough munitions, weapons systems, and matériel to replace depleted stockpiles. As timelines for a possible conflict in Asia shrink, the goal should be to support the production capacity required to enable the United States and its allies and partners to deter and, if deterrence fails, fight and win at least one major theater war—if not two. “Just in time” and lean manufacturing operations must be balanced with carrying added capacity. The U.S. Department of Defense, in coordination with Congress, should develop a plan now that involves taking steps to streamline and improve production, acquisitions, replenishment, Foreign Military Sales, ITAR, and other policies and procedures. A revitalization of the defense industrial base will not happen overnight for the United States or its allies and partners. It is time to prepare for the era of competition that now exists.

This book on the economics of defence industry assesses a series of historical and contemporary case studies that consistently demonstrate the need for governments to recognise, and thereafter factor, the financial needs of a narrow industrial sector that is capital intensive, technologically advanced and that requires a highly skilled labour force. Since the end of the cold war, Western governments have systematically reduced financial support to their domestic defence industry and have seemingly ignored planning and funding industrial mobilisation. In all cases, government policy has been to encourage industries to consolidate capacity to become financially viable in a sector that has seen diminished demand. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused Western governments to reassess their previous assumptions. Efforts to increase industrial capacity have been met with the iron laws of economics whereby businesses need to show return on investments. The chapters in this volume posit that efforts to rationalise industrial capacity and innovation to meet short-term financial efficiencies, inevitably results in limited, expensive, and long delays in increased production in times of international crisis. This book serves as an essential guide for academics, researchers and students interested in defence economics, industrial economics, international relations, and industrial policy. The chapters in this book were originally published in various issues of Defense & Security Analysis.

China's defense industrial base is operating on a wartime footing, while the U.S. defense industrial base is largely operating on a peacetime footing. Overall, the U.S. defense industrial ecosystem lacks the capacity, responsiveness, flexibility, and surge capability to meet the U.S. military's production and warfighting needs. Unless there are urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its wartime capabilities. China is heavily investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States. China is also the world's largest shipbuilder and has a shipbuilding capacity that is roughly 230 times larger than the United States. One of China's large shipyards, such as Jiangnan Shipyard, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined.

The Russo-Ukraine War is a vital learning opportunity for military strategists across the globe. The first and clearest lesson to be gleaned from it is this: the soundness of a military’s strategy and the nimbleness with which it can adapt to unforeseen circumstances are the two most important factors in deciding victory or defeat. The War for Ukraine analyzes the war through these twin lenses of strategy and adaptation, detailing how each army has succeeded or failed to plan for and adapt to this twenty-first century war. Author Mick Ryan examines the foundations of Ukrainian and Russian strategy for their ongoing war, looking back over several decades to reveal how both sides have evolved their military strategy and force structure. Each has undertaken institutional-level reforms of their military and national security enterprises in the decade leading up to this war. But because the emergent behavior of military forces after fighting begins cannot be fully predicted, these prewar reforms only constitute a starting point for adaptation during the war. Part I of the book covers the role of strategic leadership, with a focus on evolution of strategy since February 2022. From there, the second part of the book delves into how the Ukrainians and Russians have adapted their tactics, organizations, operational approaches, and strategic foundations for war-making throughout the conflict. Central to this discussion are the ways that, regardless of cutting-edge technology, human elements have remained a crucial deciding factor in Ukraine. Ryan shows how good leadership allows a nation to navigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of conflict, while poor leadership leaves it vulnerable to surprises. Likewise, The War for Ukraine offers case studies of the importance of an institution’s ability to nurture and reward human learning as it relates to combat. The book provides strategists, policymakers, and military leaders with a basis from which to plan for constant adaption in military organizations. General readers of contemporary global conflict will also find The War for Ukraine of great interest.

Increasing US&– China tensions, Russia' s invasion of Ukraine, disruptions to supply chains and maritime trade, right-wing extremism, gangs and the drug trade . . . The international and domestic security environment is dynamic and fraught. In State of Threat, local and international academics and sector experts discuss the issues facing New Zealand across defence, diplomacy, intelligence, policy, trade and border management.This timely and up-to-date analysis of New Zealand' s most important security issues is a must-read for policy analysts, those working in risk management and industry leaders across all sectors of the economy.

This book argues that domestic politics and political pressures determine the extent of the U.S. role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from the emergence of containment strategy against the Soviet Union to the Russian war in Ukraine. NATO has evolved in the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy from a conventional military alliance to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War to an important instrument in the competition against China and Russia. This book examines American domestic political implications of U.S. security commitments to NATO. It adopts a historical approach and places the U.S. foreign policy toward NATO on the domestic level of analysis by highlighting domestic political determinants in the foreign policymaking process. It also highlights the connections between the Biden Administration’s definition of a struggle between democracy and autocracy and the state of American democracy following the January 6th insurrection by far-right Trump extremists. U.S. These include the evolution of American attitudes towards NATO, societal and economic factors, and entrenched bureaucratic interests shaping U.S. foreign policy. The book incorporates the contributions of major theoretical works on the domestic political factors that shape foreign policy preferences and behavior to understand the extent to which domestic politics influences the historical evolution of the U.S. role in NATO and American foreign policy toward Europe.

Urbanizing China in War and Peace rewrites the history of rural-urban relations in the first half of the twentieth century by arguing that urbanization is a total societal transformation and as important a factor as revolution, nationalism, or modernity in the history of modern China. Linking the global and the local in space and time, China's urbanization was not only driven by industrial capitalism and the expansion of the state, but also shaped how these forces influenced daily life in the city and the countryside. Although the conflict that beset China after the Japanese invasion in 1937 affected the development of cities, towns, and villages, it did not derail previous changes. To truly understand how China has emerged as the world's largest urban society, we must consider such continuities across the first half of the twentieth century—during periods of war as well as peace. The book focuses on Wuxi, a city that lies a hundred miles to the west of Shanghai. In the early twentieth century local industrialists were responsible for it quickly becoming the largest industrial city in China outside treaty ports. They built factories, roads, and other infrastructure outside the old city walls and in surrounding towns and villages. Chapters examine the county's transformation as recorded in guidebooks and travel magazines of the time and the role of the state in the early 1920s and into the Nanjing Decade, when new administrative laws led to the continued expansion of the city under both municipal and county officials. They explore the revival of the silk industry during the Japanese occupation and the industry's role in driving urbanization, as well as efforts by Chinese leaders to carry out prewar development plans despite lockdowns and qingxiang (clean the countryside) campaigns. In the midst of the barbed wire and watch towers, plans to shape the built environment in Wuxi County and the region as a whole persisted and were carried out. Ambitious and well researched, Urbanizing China in War and Peace will appeal to scholars and students of Chinese urban history, the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, and the Republican period. Its engagement with issues of urbanization in general will interest urban historians of other times and places.

World events in recent years have led observers, particularly since late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment in recent years has undergone a shift from the post-Cold War era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. The shift to renewed great power competition has become a major factor in the debate over future U.S. defense spending levels, and has led to new or renewed emphasis on the following in discussions of U.S. defense strategy, plans, and programs: * grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense budgets, plans, and programs; * nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence;* new U.S. military service operational concepts;* U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;* capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare (i.e., largescale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia; * maintaining U.S. technological superiority in conventional weapons;* speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy;* mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia;* minimizing reliance in U.S. military systems on components and materials from Russia and China; and* capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China.

Book Three in the Mars Alone Trilogy 'Brilliantly pacy, imaginative, high-stakes sci-fi' Emma Haughton Earth and Mars are in open conflict, and seventeen-year-old Leo Fischer is right in the thick of things, fighting his own secret war behind enemy lines. When a mission goes tragically wrong, Leo has to get away from Mars, and for that he'll need the help of the one person he knows he can truly trust &– Skater Monroe. But Skater is off somewhere in the Asteroid Belt, and the last time they spoke she wanted to punch his lights out. And besides, Leo's bitterest enemy &– Carlton Whittaker, the crazed president of Mars &– is about to unleash his most devastating weapon against the unsuspecting Terran invasion fleet. Is now really the time to abandon the fight? In this nail-biting climax to the Mars Alone trilogy, Leo must face his greatest challenge yet. He has the chance to save two worlds, but at what cost to himself?