Explores the politics of free trade policies in the United States.

Until the New Deal, most groups seeking protection from imports were successful in obtaining relief from Congress. In general the cost of paying the tariffs for consumers was less than the cost of mounting collective action to stop the tariffs. In 1934, with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, all of this changed. The six decades that followed have produced a remarkable liberalization of trade policy in the United States. This occurred despite the fact that domestic politics, according to some of the best developed theories, should have prevented this liberalization. Michael Gilligan argues that liberalization has succeeded because it has been reciprocal with liberalization in other countries. Our trade barriers have been reduced as an explicit quid pro quo for reduction of trade barriers in other countries. Reciprocity, Gilligan argues, gives exporters the incentive to support free trade policies because it gives them a clear gain from free trade and thus enables the exporters to overcome collective action problems. The lobbying by exporters, balancing the interests of groups seeking protection, changes the preferences of political leaders in favor of more liberalization. Gilligan tests his theory in a detailed exploration of the history of American trade policy and in a quantitative analysis showing increases in the demand for liberalization as the result of reciprocity in trade legislation from 1890 to the present. This book should appeal to political scientists, economists, and those who want to understand the political underpinnings of American trade policy. Michael J. Gilligan is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University.

The liberalization of transatlantic trade relations since the Great Depression is one of the key developments in the global political economy of the last hundred years. This period has seen the negotiated reduction of both tariffs and nontariff barriers among developed countries, which allowed for the rapid expansion of trade flows, a driving force of economic globalization. In Protection for Exporters, Andreas Dür provides a novel explanation for this phenomenon that stresses the role of societal interests in shaping trade politics. He argues that exporters lobby more in reaction to losses of foreign market access than in pursuit of opportunities, thus providing a rationale for periods of acceleration and slowdown in the pace of liberalization. Dür also presents hypotheses about the form in which protection for exporters is provided (preferential or nonpreferential) and the balance of concessions that is exchanged in trade negotiations. Protection for Exporters includes case studies of major developments in international trade relations, such as the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in the 1930s, the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the 1940s, the Kennedy Round in the 1960s, the debate over Fortress Europe in the 1980s, and U.S.-European competition over access to emerging markets in the early 2000s. Dür's rigorous argument and systematic empirical analyses not only explain transatlantic trade relations but also allow for a better understanding of the dynamics of international economic relations.

The Definitive Guide to Selling Abroad Profitably is for entrepreneurs and small business owners-the makers, movers, and shakers in our world-interested in taking their businesses to the next level of growth through exports.

The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 ushered in a new era in world trading arrangements. Building on the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT), the intergovernmental treaty that for 50 years had regulated international trade relations, the WTO is a global organization of equal standing to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and will set the agenda for international trade for decades to come. The authors of this volume were heavily involved in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations that laid the foundations for the creation of the WTO, and were ideally placed to see how the politics of negotiation affects the economics of trade. The Political Economy of the World Trading System is the first comprehensive and accessible introduction to the institutional mechanics, economics, and politics of the global trading networks. It goes beyond description of the rules of the WTO to analyse the political and economic forces that sculpted them, the incentives for countries to abide by them, and the likely future direction of the organization. The authors show how governments are not necessarily the social welfare-maximizing entities often found in textbooks, but instead develop policy subject to the pressures of a variety of interest groups. Although economic theory suggests that countries should pursue liberal trade policies and exchange goods and services on the basis of their comparative advantage, in practice most nations actively intervene in international trade. The political economy approach taken in this volume explains how the WTO functions, why GATT has been very successful in reducing tariffs, and why it has proven much more difficult to expand the reach of multilateral disciplines to domestic policies impacting on trade. This book will increase the reader's understanding of international economics, business, and international relations by supplying in-depth insider knowledge of how trade negotiations take place, how this decision-making affects trade policy, and how the multilateral arrangements that shape world trade are created. This information is crucial to understand why WTO rules are phrased as they are, and to understand the processes by which business organizations, industrial associations, and political lobbies influence the multilateral trading system. In this expanded and thoroughly revised edition, the authors have taken account of the recent developments in international trade relations, included an extra chapter on the historical importance of international trading arrangements, and updated all the references and guides to further reading.

In many discussions of nations' development, we often focus on their economic and social development. Is it becoming wealthier? Is its society modernizing? Is it becoming more technologically sophisticated? Are social outcomes improving for the broad mass of the public? The process of development policy implementation, however, is always and inevitably political. Put simply, regime type matters when it comes to deciding on a course of development to follow. Further, political institutions matter. When a government's institutional capacity is low, the chances of success severely decline, regardless of the merits of the development plan. In The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of Development, two of America's leading political scientists on the issue, Carol Lancaster and Nicolas van de Walle, have assembled an international cast of leading scholars to craft a broad, state-of-the-art work on this vitally important topic. This volume is divided into five sections: major theories of the politics of development, organized historically (e.g. modernization theory, dependency theory, the Washington consensus of 'policies without politics,' etc.); key domestic factors and variables; key international factors and variables; political systems and structures; and geographical perspectives, inclusive of regional dynamics. A comprehensive and cross-regional examination on key issues of political development, this Handbook not only provides an authoritative synthesis of past scholarship, but also sets the agenda for future research in this discipline.

Undergraduate students in most preliminary courses in international politics are introduced to realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches, supplementing this theoretical introduction with conceptual discussions of the state, international system, and/or decision-making and policy formation. By the end of their college experience, undergraduate IR majors will engage coursework more narrowly focused on an empirical outcome, such as war, economic integration, development, or migration. These advanced courses are directly linked to modern research agendas and graduate level course material, usually with few references to the theoretical paradigms taught in introductory classes. This volume seeks to bridge the gap between what is taught in early undergraduate education and what is created by scholars, uniting abstract theoretical principles with practical contemporary policy and testable empirical questions.

International trade often inspires intense conflict between workers and their employers. In this book, Adam Dean studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in support of the same trade policies. Dean argues that capital-labor agreement on trade policy depends on the presence of 'profit-sharing institutions'. He tests this theory through case studies from the United States, Britain, and Argentina in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; they offer a revisionist history placing class conflict at the center of the political economy of trade. Analysis of data from more than one hundred countries from 1986 to 2002 demonstrates that the field's conventional wisdom systematically exaggerates the benefits that workers receive from trade policy reforms. From Conflict to Coalition boldly explains why labor is neither an automatic beneficiary nor an automatic ally of capital when it comes to trade policy and distributional conflict.

This book unveils a potent new approach to one of the oldest debates in political economy--that over whether class conflict or group competition is more prevalent in politics. It goes further than any study to date by outlining the conditions under which one type of political conflict is more likely than the other. Michael Hiscox focuses on a critical issue affecting support for and opposition to free trade--factor mobility, or the ability of those who own a factor of production (land, labor, or capital) to move it from one industry to another. He argues that the types of political coalitions that form in trade politics depend largely on the extent to which factors are mobile between industries. Class coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high, Hiscox demonstrates, whereas narrow, industry-based coalitions predominate where it is low. The book also breaks new ground by backing up the theory it advances with systematic evidence from the history of trade politics in six nations over the last two centuries, using a combination of case studies and quantitative analysis. It makes fresh conclusions about the forces shaping trade policy outcomes--conclusions that yield surprising insights into the likely evolution of the global trading system and U.S. trade policy in particular. International Trade and Political Conflict is a major contribution to the scholarly literature while being accessible to anyone interested in understanding and predicting developments in trade policy.

The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Trade surveys the literature on the politics of international trade and highlights the most exciting recent scholarly developments. It examines the impact of domestic societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interactions on trade policy and trade flows, as well as building on this basic analytical framework. Including contributions from prominent scholars around the globe, and from multiple theoretical and methodological traditions, the volume considers the development of concepts and policies about international trade; the influence of individuals, firms, and societies; the role of domestic and international institutions; and the interaction of trade and other issues, such as monetary policy, environmental challenges, and human rights. Showcasing both established theories and findings and cutting-edge new research, the Handbook is a valuable reference for scholars of political economy.