The role Hans Hahn played in the Vienna Circle has not always been sufficiently appreciated. It was important in several ways. In the ftrst place, Hahn belonged to the trio of the original planners of the Circle. As students at the University of Vienna and throughout the fIrst decade of this century, he and his friends, Philipp Frank and Otto Neurath, met more or less regularly to discuss philosophical questions. When Hahn accepted his fIrSt professorial position, at the University of Czernowitz in the north east of the Austrian empire, and the paths of the three friends parted, they decided to continue such informal discussions at some future time - perhaps in a somewhat larger group and with the cooperation of a philosopher from the university. Various events delayed the execution of the project. Drafted into the Austrian army during the first world war" Hahn was wounded on the Italian front. Toward the end of the war he accepted an offer from the University of Bonn extended in recognition of his remarkable 1 mathematical achievements. He remained in Bonn until the spring of 1921 when he returm:d to Vienna and a chair of mathe matics at his alma mater. There, in 1922, the Mach-Boltzmann professorship for the philosophy of the inductive sciences became vacant by the death of Adolf Stohr; and Hahn saw a chance to realize his and his friends' old plan.

First Published in 1996. This volume reprints pieces from the Vienna Circle period between the manifesto and the adoption of semantics, as well as two commentaries. During this period, the logical empiricists were the most ambitious and the most confident about the success of their enterprise. The first section consists of four ideological classics, The second section reprints three papers on physicalism. The third section consists of three papers on logic and the fourth on reprints three papers on truth, induction, and confirmation.

This volume collects some of the most significant papers of Arthur Pap. Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This goes beyond the merely historical fact of Pap’s influential views of dispositional and modal concepts. Pap's writings in philosophy of science, modality, and philosophy of mathematics provide insightful alternative perspectives on philosophical problems of current interest.

If there is a movement or school that epitomizes analytic philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century, it is logical empiricism. Logical empiricists created a scientifically and technically informed philosophy of science, established mathematical logic as a topic in and tool for philosophy, and initiated the project of formal semantics. Accounts of analytic philosophy written in the middle of the twentieth century gave logical empiricism a central place in the project. The second wave of interpretative accounts was constructed to show how philosophy should progress, or had progressed, beyond logical empiricism. The essays survey the formative stages of logical empiricism in central Europe and its acculturation in North America, discussing its main topics, and achievements and failures, in different areas of philosophy of science, and assessing its influence on philosophy, past, present, and future.

Clear, comprehensive, and rigorous treatment develops the subject from elementary concepts to the construction and analysis of relatively complex logical languages. Hundreds of problems, examples, and exercises. 1958 edition.

First Published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge.

Covers the state of the art in the philosophy of maths and logic, giving the reader an overview of the major problems, positions, and battle lines. The chapters in this book contain both exposition and criticism as well as substantial development of their own positions. It also includes a bibliography.