Ehud Barak's election as Prime Minister of Israel on 17th May 1999 and his determination to conclude a peace deal with the Palestinians inspired both Israeli voters and the international community. So where did it all go wrong? How did it end, less than two years later, in the total failure of Barak's peace efforts, his defeat at the polls and ejection from office? How did he open the way not to peace, but to Ariel Sharon? Drawing on exclusive interviews with all the major international figures involved, this book traces the history of the Middle East peace process from Barak's election, through the peace talks at Camp David to the current Road Map. It illuminates the characters of Clinton, Arafat, Sharon and many others, and offers many insights into one of the most complex political political situations in the world today.

This book analyzes the first stage of the conflict in Colombia, the twenty-year search for a negotiated settlement which concluded in 2002 with the collapse of peace negotiations, and the transition that took place in 2002 to a new approach to peacemaking under the Uribe administration. Contributors examine the local, regional and international dynamics of the conflict, focusing on the effect of US foreign policy on Colombia and neighboring countries. Included also is discussion of the Colombian drug trade and its impact on attempts for peace and the country's economy; the evolution of Pastrana's 'Plan Colombia'; internal conflict; and the effects of indigenous movements on the current conflict.

This in-depth analysis goes behind the headlines to understand why crucial negotiations fail. The author argues that diplomats often enter negotiations with flawed assumptions about human behavior, sovereignty, and power. Essentially, the international community is using a model of European diplomacy dating back to the 18th century to solve the complex problems of the 21st century. Through numerous examples, the author shows that the key failure in current diplomatic efforts is the entrenched belief that nations, through their representatives, will act rationally to further their individual political, economic, and strategic interests. However, the contemporary scientific understanding of how people act and see their world does not support this assumption. On the contrary, research from decision-making theory, behavioral economics, social neuropsychology, and current best practices in mediation indicate that emotional and irrational factors often have as much, if not more, to do with the success or failure of a mediated solution. Reviewing a wide range of conflicts and negotiations, Noll demonstrates that the best efforts of negotiators often failed because they did not take into account the deep-seated values and emotions of the disputing parties. In conclusion, Noll draws on his own long experience as a professional mediator to describe the process of building trust and creating a climate of empathy that is the key to successful negotiation and can go a long way toward resolving even seemingly intractable conflicts.

As the threat of superpower confrontation diminishes in the post-cold war era, civil wars and their regional ramifications are emerging as the primary challenge to international peace and security. Notoriously difficult to resolve, these internal conflicts seem condemned to escalate with no end in sight. This book recognizes that internal dissidence is the legitimate result of the breakdown of normal politics and focuses on resolving conflict through negotiation rather than combat. Elusive Peace provides a revealing look at the nature of internal conflicts and explains why appropriate conditions for negotiation and useful solutions are so difficult to find. The authors offer a series of case studies of ongoing conflict in Angola, Mozambique, Eritrea, South Africa, Southern Sudan, Lebanon, Spain, Colombia, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. They examine the characteristics of each confrontation, including past failed negotiations, and make suggestions for changes in negotiating strategies that could lead to a more successful outcome. The contributors, in addition to the editor, are Imtiaz Bokhari, Bilkent University, Ankara; Robert Clark, George Mason University; Marius Deeb and Marina Ottaway, Georgetown University; Mary Jane Deeb, American University; Francis Deng, Brookings; Daniel Druckman, National Academy of Sciences; Todd Eisenstadt, University of California, San Diego; Daniel Garcia, University of the Andes, Bogota; Justin Green, Villanova University; Carolyn Hartzell and Donald Rothchild, University of California, Davis; Ibrahim Msabaha, Center for Foreign Relations, Dar es-Salaam; and Howard Wriggins, Columbia University.

For nearly twenty years, Aaron David Miller has played a central role in U.S. efforts to broker Arab-Israeli peace as an advisor to presidents, secretaries of state, and national security advisors. Without partisanship or finger-pointing, Miller records what went right, what went wrong, and how we got where we are today. Here is a look at the peace process from a place at the negotiation table, filled with behind-the-scenes strategy, colorful anecdotes and equally colorful characters, and new interviews with presidents, secretaries of state, and key Arab and Israeli leaders. Honest, critical, and often controversial, Miller’s insider’s account offers a brilliant new analysis of the problem of Arab-Israeli peace and how it still might be solved.

The Elusive Peace, first published in 1979, highlights the crucial developments in the Middle East during the twentieth century: the coming of nationalism, the struggle for independence, the effects of the Cold War and the four ‘hot wars’ in the Middle East. The numerous attempts to solve the conflicts, and the ultimate failure of such attempts, are discussed with particular reference to the war in Lebanon, and its relation to larger conflicts. As an American emissary during the Kennedy, Johnston and Nixon years, William Polk is unique in his ability to assess the key personalities and provide thorough analysis, considering Sadat and Begin, and the American policies of Dulles and Kissinger. This is a fascinating and inclusive study which provides essential background to the on-going turmoil in the Middle East.

Most histories of World War I revolve around gruesome battles, ribboned generals and feats of military heroism. All too often the acts of those who tried to stop the fighting by word or deed have been drowned out by the roar of cannons. Yet even in the heat of battle individuals of courage stepped forward and attempted to bring the better part of humanity out of darkness and to revive the phoenix of peace. This book tells in detail the stories of these people and their organizations, in Asia, North and South America and Europe. Henry Ford's "peace ship" of December 1915, the famous Christmas truce of 1914, secret diplomatic missions by Austro-Hungarian Prince Sixtus, and myriad other efforts are described, showing that the desire for peace was widespread and fervent.

The violent Basque separatist group ETA took shape in Franco's Spain, yet claimed the majority of its victims under democracy. For most Spaniards it became an aberration, a criminal and terrorist band whose persistence defied explanation. Others, mainly Basques (but only some Basques) understood ETA as the violent expression of a political conflict that remained the unfinished business of Spain's transition to democracy. Such differences hindered efforts to 'defeat' ETA's terrorism on the one hand and 'resolve the Basque conflict' on the other for more than three decades. Endgame for ETA offers a compelling account of the long path to ETA's declaration of a definitive end to its armed activity in October 2011. Its political surrogates remain as part of a resurgence of regional nationalism - in the Basque Country as in Catalonia - that is but one element of multiple crises confronting Spain. The Basque case has been cited as an ex- ample of the perils of 'talking to terrorists'. Drawing on extensive field research, Teresa Whitfield argues that while negotiations did not prosper, a form of 'virtual peacemaking' was an essential complement to robust police action and social condemnation. Together they helped to bring ETA's violence to an end and return its grievances to the channels of normal politics.