How effective are patents for stimulating economic activity? This volume provides an overview of existing national patent systems and suggests a revised system.

Why does society allow, or even encourage, private appropriation of inventions? When do patents encourage competition, when do they hamper it? These questions and many more are addressed by two eminent scholars in this groundbreaking analysis of the economic foundations of the European patent system.

At head of title: 85th Cong., 2d sess. Committee print. Bibliography: p. 81-86.

The Case for Patents offers an affirmative case for the many economic benefits of the patent system and shows how patents provide incentives for invention, innovation, and technological change. The discussion highlights the many contributions of patents to economic growth and development. The Case for Patents helps restore balance to public policy debates by recognizing the important contributions of the patent system.

Why does society allow, or even encourage, private appropriation of inventions? When do patents encourage competition, when do they hamper it? How should society design the compromise between the interest of the inventor and the interest of the users of patented inventions? How should the patent system adapt to new technological areas? These questions and many more are addressed by the authors in this groundbreaking analysis of the economics behind the European patent system.Beginning with the history and principles of the patent system, the book then examines the economic effects of patenting on innovation and the diffusion of technology and growth. Throughout the book the theory and the reality are discussed alongside real world examples and comparison between the European,USA, and Japanese patent systems.

This essay is the introduction to a book of the same title, forthcoming in summer of 2021 from Oxford University Press. The purpose is to document the ways in which patent systems are products of battles over the economic surplus from innovation. The features of these systems take shape as interests at different points in the production chain seek advantage in any way they can, and consequently, they are riven with imperfections. The interesting historical question is why US-style patent systems with all their imperfections have come to dominate other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The essays in the book suggest that the creation of a tradable but temporary property right facilitates the transfer of technological knowledge and thus fosters a highly productive decentralized ecology of inventors and firms.