The emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe has raised anew the question of the relationship between economic reform and political liberalization. Should economic reform come first, then political liberalization? Or political reform first, followed by economic change? Or both at the same time? In Economic Reform and Democracy Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner bring together a distinguished group of authorities to examine this question as it relates to Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Topics include the challenges of consolidation; the myth of the authoritarian advantage; the second stage of reform in Latin America; linkages between politics and economics; the case for radical reform; going beyond shock therapy; the puzzle of East Asian exceptionalism; an alternative for Africa; the ability of the Middle East to compete; democratization and business interests; the politics of safety nets; and the problems of simultaneous transitions. Contributors: Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Stephan Haggard, Robert R. Kaufman, Jos Mara Maravall, Moiss Nam, Joan M. Nelson, Barbara Geddes, Anders ?slund, Leszek Balcerowixz, Padma Desai, Minxin Pei, Adebayo Adedeji, Thomas Callaghy, Nicholas van de Walle, Henri Barkey, John D. Sullivan, William Douglas, Carol Graham, Leslie Elliot Armijo, Thomas J. Biersteker, and Abraham F. Lowenthal.

The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a dramatic, worldwide reform of political and economic systems. Never have so many people enjoyed, or at least experimented with democratic institutions. However, many strategies for economic development in Eastern Europe and Latin America have failed with the result that entire economic systems on both continents are being transformed. This major book analyzes recent transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Drawing in a quite distinctive way on models derived from political philosophy, economics, and game theory, Professor Przeworski also considers specific data on individual countries. Among the questions raised by the book are: What should we expect from these experiments in democracy and market economy? What new economic systems will emerge? Will these transitions result in new democracies or old dictatorships?

This book provides an in-depth analysis of neo-liberal and progressive economic reforms and policies implemented in Chile since the Pinochet dictatorship. The core thesis of the book is that there is not just 'one Chilean economic model', but that several have been in force since the coup of 1973.

This book takes issue with existing theories of the relationship between democracy and economic liberalisation.

As economic reform in developing countries has shifted from macroeconomic stabilization to liberalization, opportunities for legislators to influence the process and outcome of reform have increased and their role has become more important. This book focuses attention on differences in institutional structure, in political parties and electoral rules, to show how they create incentives that can explain the varying ways in which legislators respond to policy initiatives from the executive branch. In Argentina and the Philippines, presidents proposed similar fiscal reforms in the 1990s: expanding tax bases, strengthening tax administration, and redesigning tax revenue-sharing with subnational governments. Drawing on archival research and interviews with policy makers, Kent Eaton follows the path of legislation in these three areas from initial proposal to final law to reveal how it was shaped by the legislators participating in the process. Obstacles to the adoption of reform, he demonstrates, are greater in candidate-centered systems like the Philippines&’ (where the cultivation of personal reputations is paramount) than in party-centered systems like Argentina&’s (where loyalty to party leaders is emphasized). To test his argument further, Eaton looks finally at other kinds of reform ventured in these two countries and at tax reforms attempted in some other countries.

The joint report of twenty-one social scientists who collaborated over two years under the name of the Group on East-South Systems Transformations (ESST) identifies the principal political and economic choices confronting new democracies in Southern and Eastern Europe and South America.

In Economic Justice and Democracy, Robin Hahnel puts aside most economic theories from the left and the right (from central planning to unbridled corporate enterprise) as undemocratic, and instead outlines a plan for restructuring the relationship between markets and governments according to effects, rather than contributions. This idea is simple, provocative, and turns most arguments on their heads: those most affected by a decision get to make it. It's uncomplicated, unquestionably American in its freedom-reinforcement, and essentially what anti-globalization protestors are asking for. Companies would be more accountable to their consumers, polluters to nearby homeowners, would-be factory closers to factory town inhabitants. Sometimes what's good for General Motors is bad for America, which is why we have regulations in the first place. Though participatory economics, as Robert Heilbronner termed has been discussed more outside America than in it, Hahnel has followed discussions elsewhere and also presents many of the arguments for and against this system and ways to put it in place.

Empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy and economic reforms is limited to few reforms, countries, and years. This paper studies the impact of democracy on the adoption of economic reforms using a new dataset on reforms in the financial, capital and banking sectors, product markets, agriculture, and trade for 150 countries over the period 1960 - 2004. Democracy has a positive and significant impact on the adoption of economic reforms but there is no evidence that economic reforms foster democracy. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a large variety of controls and estimation strategies.

Offers an insight into the circumstances under which the policies were developed, implemented and reviewed, as well as a study of the outcomes. This book addresses questions such as: How could an organisation with no previous experience of governing accomplish a peaceful transition to democracy? How did they do it and where are they going?

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.