Contrary to traditional theories of statutory interpretation, which ground statutes in the original legislative text or intent, legal scholar William Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies. It does so, first of all, because it involves richer authoritative texts than does either common law or constitutional interpretation: statutes are often complex and have a detailed legislative history. Second, Congress can, and often does, rewrite statutes when it disagrees with their interpretations; and agencies and courts attend to current as well as historical congressional preferences when they interpret statutes. Third, since statutory interpretation is as much agency-centered as judgecentered and since agency executives see their creativity as more legitimate than judges see theirs, statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory state is particularly dynamic. Eskridge also considers how different normative theories of jurisprudence--liberal, legal process, and antiliberal--inform debates about statutory interpretation. He explores what theory of statutory interpretation--if any--is required by the rule of law or by democratic theory. Finally, he provides an analytical and jurisprudential history of important debates on statutory interpretation.

Today, statutes make up the bulk of the relevant law heard in federal courts and arguably represent the most important source of American law. The proper means of judicial interpretation of those statutes have been the subject of great attention and dispute over the years. This book provides new insights into the theory and practice of statutory interpretation by courts. Cross offers the first comprehensive analysis of statutory interpretation and includes extensive empirical evidence of Supreme Court practice. He offers a thorough review of the active disputes over the appropriate approaches to statutory interpretations, namely whether courts should rely exclusively on the text or also examine the legislative history. The book then considers the use of these approaches by the justices of the recent Rehnquist Court and the degree to which they were applied by the justices, either sincerely or in pursuit of an ideological agenda.

Neil Duxbury combines analytical legal philosophy and legal history to explore the concept of legislation.

Are legislatures able to form and act on intentions? The question matters because the interpretation of statutes is often thought to centre on the intention of the legislature and because the way in which the legislature acts is relevant to the authority it does or should enjoy. Many scholars argue that legislative intent is a fiction: the legislative assembly is a large, diverse group rather than a single person and it seems a mystery how the intentions of the individual legislators might somehow add up to a coherent group intention. This book argues that in enacting a statute the well-formed legislature forms and acts on a detailed intention, which is the legislative intent. The foundation of the argument is an analysis of how the members of purposive groups act together by way of common plans, sometimes forming complex group agents. The book extends this analysis to the legislature, considering what it is to legislate and how members of the assembly cooperate to legislate. The book argues that to legislate is to choose to change the law for some reason: the well-formed legislature has the capacity to consider what should be done and to act to that end. This argument is supported by reflection on the centrality of intention to the nature of language use. The book then explains in detail how members of the assembly form and act on joint intentions, which do not reduce to the intentions of each member, before outlining some implications of this account for the practice of statutory interpretation. Developing a robust account of the nature and importance of legislative intention, the book represents a significant contribution to the literature on deliberative democracy that will be of interest to all those thinking about legal interpretation and constitutional theory.

A history of the discretion accorded U.S. judges in interpreting legislation (from the Revolution to the present), culminating in the author's own theory of the proper scope of judicial discretion.

""Interpreting Law" is an accessible introduction to statutory and constitutional interpretation by the nation's leading legislation scholar. This concise treatise not only identifies the primary "canons" or precepts that guide interpretation, but demonstrates how they operate and interact, as a matter of both practice and evolving aspiration. Unlike earlier academic treatises, which rummage through a potpourri of often arcane Supreme Court decisions, Professor Eskridge's new book focuses on a statute prohibiting "vehicles" in Lafayette Park, across the street from the White House. Each chapter engages the law student and the experienced practitioner to consider the application of the statute and its statutory and institutional context to a wide and often delightful array of situations. As the preface by Justice John Paul Stevens suggests, the reader will emerge from this book with a deeply enriched understanding of-and excitement about-legal interpretation."

Statutory Interpretation in Australia is one of the most cited books in judgments of Australian courts & tribunals. It has been there for the last 40 years to assist lawyers and judges in any case that required interpretation of legislation. It has become a vital tool of practice for anyone engaged in statutory interpretation.Geddes UNE; Pearce ANU.

Judicial interpretation of federal statutes has often been at the center of political controversy in recent years. In fact, it would be difficult to find a major domestic policy area in which statutory interpretation by the federal courts has not played a significant role in shaping the activities of government. In most important cases, judges base their interpretation not on the letter of the law, but on their reading of its history, purpose, and spirit. What judges discover between the lines of statutes often has major policy consequences. This book examines how statutory interpretation has affected the development of three programs: Aid to Families with Dependent Children, education for the handicapped, and food stamps. It explores how these decisions have changed state and national policies and how other institutions—especially Congress—have reacted to them. Although these three programs differ in several important ways, in each instance court action has expanded program benefits and increased federal control over state and local governments. R. Shep Melnick ties trends in statutory interpretation to broader policy developments, including the expansion of the agenda of national government, the persistence of divided government, and the resurgence and decentralization of Congress. He demonstrates that Congress frequently modifies or overturns court rulings, and he explains why statutory interpretation became so controversial in the 1980s. Between the Lines also explores the understanding of welfare rights that has guided the development of welfare policy over the past fifty years. What basic beliefs about the welfare state underlie court decisions interpreting these statutes? To what extent do members of Congress share these views? How have the assumptions of judges and members of Congress changed over time? These are some of the questions addressed in this detailed study of American welfare policy.

In this groundbreaking book, Scalia and Garner systematically explain all the most important principles of constitutional, statutory, and contractual interpretation in an engaging and informative style with hundreds of illustrations from actual cases. Is a burrito a sandwich? Is a corporation entitled to personal privacy? If you trade a gun for drugs, are you using a gun in a drug transaction? The authors grapple with these and dozens of equally curious questions while explaining the most principled, lucid, and reliable techniques for deriving meaning from authoritative texts. Meanwhile, the book takes up some of the most controversial issues in modern jurisprudence. What, exactly, is textualism? Why is strict construction a bad thing? What is the true doctrine of originalism? And which is more important: the spirit of the law, or the letter? The authors write with a well-argued point of view that is definitive yet nuanced, straightforward yet sophisticated.