This book will be of interest to all decision-makers and analysts concerned with supply contracts. The primary focus of this study is on one particular type of supply contract, namely, the exclusive dealing contract. Its essence is the agreement by a seller (or a lessor) and/or buyer (or lessee) to transact only with the other party for the duration of the contract. This analysis attempts to discern the economic reasons why that type of supply contract was utilized in individual cases, and to aggregate the results in a systematic fashion. It covers all the federal antitrust cases involving exclusive dealing that reached the Court of Appeals level and/or the Supreme Court through 1986. For the interested reader, careful referencing and an extensive bibliography provide easy access to treatments that are more theoretically disposed.

In this unique work, Seplaki integrates economics theory, industrial organization economics, healthcare industry features and antitrust enforcement in healthcare with policy issues. He focuses on how the enforcement of healthcare competition with the antitrust laws did not significantly reduce costs and how private sector initiatives may be the answer. Contents: An Overview of Economic Prerequisites; Antitrust Markets: An Overview of Principles; Healthcare Markets; Competition and its Enforcement in Healthcare; Healthcare Costs, Policy and Prognoses.