This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policies. There are two main results. First, real interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system have an asymmetric impact on financial stability: they increase the probability of a financial crisis (relative to the case of flexible interest rate) in response to contractionary shocks to the economy, while they act as automatic macro-prudential stabilizers in response to expansionary shocks. Second, when the interest rate is the only available policy instrument, a monetary authority subject to the same constraints as private agents cannot always achieve a (constrained) efficient allocation and faces a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability in response to contractionary shocks. An implication of our analysis is that the weak link in the U.S. policy framework in the run up to the Global Recession was not excessively lax monetary policy after 2002, but rather the absence of an effective regulatory framework aimed at preserving financial stability.

This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policies. There are two main results. First, real interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system have an asymmetric impact on financial stability: they increase the probability of a financial crisis (relative to the case of flexible interest rate) in response to contractionary shocks to the economy, while they act as automatic macro-prudential stabilizers in response to expansionary shocks. Second, when the interest rate is the only.

The Inaugural Camdessus Central Banking Lecture

Barely two decades after the Asian financial crisis Asia was suddenly confronted with multiple challenges originating outside the region: the 2008 global financial crisis, the European debt crisis, and finally developed economies' implementation of unconventional monetary policies. The implementation of quantitative easing, ultra-low interest rate policies, and negative interest rate policies by a number of large central banks has given rise to concerns over financial stability and international capital flows. Macroeconomic Shocks and Unconventional Monetary Policy: Impacts on Emerging Markets explains how shocks stemming from the global financial crisis have affected macroeconomic and financial stability in emerging Asia. Macroeconomic Shocks and Unconventional Monetary Policy: Impacts on Emerging Markets brings together the most up-to-date knowledge impacts of recent macroeconomic shocks on Asia's real economy; the spillover effects of macroeconomic shocks on financial markets and flows in Asia; and key challenges for monetary, exchange rate, trade and macro prudential policies of developing Asian economies. It is authored by experts in the field of international macroeconomics from leading academic institutions, central banks, and international organizations including the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlement, and the Asian Development Bank Institute.

Using firm-level data for approximately 1,000 bank and nonbank financial institutions in 22 countries over the past 15 years we study the impact of prolonged monetary policy easing on risk-taking behavior. We find that the leverage ratio, as well as other measures of firm-level vulnerability, increases for banks and nonbanks as domestic monetary policy easing persists. Cross-border effects are also notable. We find effects of roughly similar magnitude on foreign financial sector firms when the U.S. eases policy. Results appear robust to a variety of specifications, and to be non-linear, with risk-taking behavior rising most quickly at the onset of monetary policy easing.

The Global Financial Crisis has reopened discussions on the role of the monetary policy in preserving financial stability. Determining whether monetary policy affects financial variables domestically—especially compared to the effects of macroprudential policies— and across borders, is crucial in this context. This paper looks into these issues using U.S. exogenous monetary policy shocks and macroprudential policy measures. Estimates indicate that monetary policy shocks have significant and persistent effects on financial conditions and can attenuate long-term financial instability. In contrast, the impact of macroprudential policy measures is generally more immediate but shorter-lasting. Also, while an exogenous increase in U.S. monetary policy rates tends to reduce credit and house prices in other countries—with the effects varying with country-specific characteristics—an increase driven by improved U.S. economic conditions tends to have the opposite effect. Finally, we do not find evidence of cross-border spillover effects associated with U.S. macroprudential policies.

Since the financial crisis of 2008/09, the world’s major central banks have been struggling to return their economies to higher growth and to reach their inflation targets. This concise book analyzes the importance of central bank policies for the economy, and specifically investigates the reasons why they have failed to steer inflation as desired. The author, the Chief Economist at Allianz SE, argues that, in an environment of great uncertainty concerning the pass-through of monetary stimulus to the economy, central banks should not focus too narrowly on inflation targets, but should increasingly take the side effects of their actions into account. In particular, he contends that they must seek to minimize the risk of financial booms and busts in order to maximize long-term growth and prosperity. Building on existing research and contributing to the current debate, the book offers a valuable reference guide and food for thought for policymakers, professionals and students alike.

This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries

There is growing recognition that prolonged monetary policy easing of major economies can have extraterritorial spillovers, driving up financial system leverage in other countries. When faced with such a rise of threats to financial stability, what can countries do? Specifically, is there a role for macroprudential tools, capital controls or foreign exchange intervention in safeguarding financial stability from risks arising externally? We examine the efficacy of these policy interventions by exploring whether preemptive or reactive policy interventions can mitigate such risks. Using a sample of 950 bank and nonbank financial firms across 28 non-U.S. economies over the past two decades, we show that if policymakers are able to implement policies prior to an additional consecutive decline in U.S. interest rates, financial institutions do not increase their leverage by as much as they otherwise would. By contrast, it is more difficult to counter the spillovers with reactive policy interventions. In practice, however, policymakers need to remain cautious about the timing of preventative tightening, especially when their economies face large negative shocks such as a pandemic.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.