"This is history as it should be written. In When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans, a logical advancement on his earlier studies, Fine has successfully tackled a fascinating historical question, one having broad political implications for our own times. Fine's approach is to demonstrate how ideas of identity and self-identity were invented and evolved in medieval and early-modern times. At the same time, this book can be read as a critique of twentieth-century historiography-and this makes Fine's contribution even more valuable. This book is an original, much-needed contribution to the field of Balkan studies." -Steve Rapp, Associate Professor of Caucasian, Byzantine, and Eurasian History, and Director, Program in World History and Cultures Department of History, Georgia State University Atlanta When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans is a study of the people who lived in what is now Croatia during the Middle Ages (roughly 600-1500) and the early-modern period (1500-1800), and how they identified themselves and were identified by others. John V. A. Fine, Jr., advances the discussion of identity by asking such questions as: Did most, some, or any of the population of that territory see itself as Croatian? If some did not, to what other communities did they consider themselves to belong? Were the labels attached to a given person or population fixed or could they change? And were some people members of several different communities at a given moment? And if there were competing identities, which identities held sway in which particular regions? In When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans, Fine investigates the identity labels (and their meaning) employed by and about the medieval and early-modern population of the lands that make up present-day Croatia. Religion, local residence, and narrow family or broader clan all played important parts in past and present identities. Fine, however, concentrates chiefly on broader secular names that reflect attachment to a city, region, tribe or clan, a labeled people, or state. The result is a magisterial analysis showing us the complexity of pre-national identity in Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia. There can be no question that the medieval and early-modern periods were pre-national times, but Fine has taken a further step by demonstrating that the medieval and early-modern eras in this region were also pre-ethnic so far as local identities are concerned. The back-projection of twentieth-century forms of identity into the pre-modern past by patriotic and nationalist historians has been brought to light. Though this back-projection is not always misleading, it can be; Fine is fully cognizant of the danger and has risen to the occasion to combat it while frequently remarking in the text that his findings for the Balkans have parallels elsewhere. John V. A. Fine, Jr. is Professor of History at the University of Michigan.

Excerpt from The Burden of the Balkans Tm: diplomat, the geographer, the archaeologist, I do not pretend to be able to teach. My aim is a far humbler one. I wish to give the general reader a somewhat truer idea of the position of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula than he usually possesses. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

From the PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION of 1915. We republish this little book because it has been found by experience to meet a widely-felt need, and to meet it in a compendious form. The dangers against which we uttered so strong a warning have unfortunately been realized: Bulgaria has joined our enemies. As a result, some paragraphs will be found to be out of date. But we have thought it best to leave the whole book unchanged, except that the chapter which deals with the diplomatic methods of the moment is now relegated to an appendix. Nothing has happened to disprove our contention that these methods would have succeeded at the time when they were proposed, and though in the Near East it is the unexpected that happens, the time may come when they will be once more in place. The book in its original form was, and is, a connected whole. It sets forth certain principles and a certain ideal, which have by no means lost their importance. The immediate prospect is obscure, but, to those who look to the ultimate settlement, the complications of the moment represent a movement of the surface rather than of the depths beneath. There are factors in Balkan policy which are fundamental because they are rooted in conditions which do not alter. It was upon these factors that the policy set forth in this book was founded. The first arises from the geographical position of the Balkans, which has made them the battleground for the rivalry of the great neighboring empires -- a rivalry which found material to work upon in the mutual hatred caused by unjust frontiers. It follows from this that so long as such rivalry continues, it is to the real and permanent advantage of every Balkan State, without exception, to look for support to the disinterested Powers of the West. The second factor arises from the distribution of Balkan nationalities. "Room must be found and kept," to use Mr. Asquith's words, " for the independent existence and free development of the small nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its own." Any rearrangement which fails to take this consideration into account will leave behind it the seeds of future war. Others will doubtless be urged at the time of settlement -- Economic and strategic needs, the idea of a Balkan equilibrium or balance of power, and the desirability of rewarding or punishing particular States. But it cannot be too often insisted that peace will not be secured unless, broadly speaking, the lines of nationality are accepted as the basis for the new frontiers. The degree in which this ideal may be attainable is, of course, a matter of uncertainty. But real statesmanship will bear it in mind, and approach as near to it as circumstances allow.

From the PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION of 1915.We republish this little book because it has been found by experience to meet a widely-felt need, and to meet it in a compendious form. The dangers against which we uttered so strong a warning have unfortunately been realized: Bulgaria has joined our enemies. As a result, some paragraphs will be found to be out of date. But we have thought it best to leave the whole book unchanged, except that the chapter which deals with the diplomatic methods of the moment is now relegated to an appendix. Nothing has happened to disprove our contention that these methods would have succeeded at the time when they were proposed, and though in the Near East it is the unexpected that happens, the time may come when they will be once more in place... The book in its original form was, and is, a connected whole. It sets forth certain principles and a certain ideal, which have by no means lost their importance. The immediate prospect is obscure, but, to those who look to the ultimate settlement, the complications of the moment represent a movement of the surface rather than of the depths beneath. There are factors in Balkan policy which are fundamental because they are rooted in conditions which do not alter. It was upon these factors that the policy set forth in this book was founded. The first arises from the geographical position of the Balkans, which has made them the battleground for the rivalry of the great neighboring empires -- a rivalry which found material to work upon in the mutual hatred caused by unjust frontiers. It follows from this that so long as such rivalry continues, it is to the real and permanent advantage of every Balkan State, without exception, to look for support to the disinterested Powers of the West. The second factor arises from the distribution of Balkan nationalities. "Room must be found and kept," to use Mr. Asquith's words, " for the independent existence and free development of the small nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its own." Any rearrangement which fails to take this consideration into account will leave behind it the seeds of future war. Others will doubtless be urged at the time of settlement -- Economic and strategic needs, the idea of a Balkan equilibrium or balance of power, and the desirability of rewarding or punishing particular States. But it cannot be too often insisted that peace will not be secured unless, broadly speaking, the lines of nationality are accepted as the basis for the new frontiers. The degree in which this ideal may be attainable is, of course, a matter of uncertainty. But real statesmanship will bear it in mind, and approach as near to it as circumstances allow.

After having been fueled by the events of the distant and recent past, the current wars in the former Yugoslavia finally may be grinding to a halt. An understanding of that past, and of how history and myth combine to influence the present and help to define the future in the Balkans, is no less relevant today than it was two years ago when the original version of this monograph was published. Events of the intervening years have largely validated the insights and conclusions offered in the initial report. That said, strategic conditions have evolved, and two years of additional study and analysis provide a greater understanding of the long-term roots of conflict in the Balkans, as well as a firmer grasp of the proximate historical factors that contributed to the outbreak of violence. Despite the revisions, the focus of the monograph remains on the tangled history of the region, and how policy options fit into the larger historical context that has influenced, and will continue to affect, the course of events in the Balkans. The primary purpose of this monograph is not to argue for or against U.S. military intervention in the former Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Balkans. The main intent is to garner insights through historical examination that will shed light on the long-standing bases of the ongoing conflicts in the region. Some might question the relevancy of an historical exploration when the first European war since 1945 engulfs the former Yugoslavia and threatens to spill over to other parts of the Balkans. The purpose of historical study, however, is not simply to understand the past, but to inform the present and, hopefully, prepare for the future. Nor is this report simply an academic exercise. Proponents of single-issue solutions, such as "surgical" air strikes, economic sanctions, lifting the arms embargo, or enforcement of "no-fly" zones neither comprehend the complexities of the issues involved nor address the root causes of conflict. Policymakers and analysts should seek, instead, comprehensive solutions to the multiple, interwoven sources of the conflict. As anyone familiar with problem solving understands, a comprehensive solution first requires a definition of the fundamental nature of the problem. Without an adequate understanding of the problem and its ramifications, proposed solutions may not address issues adequately to ensure resolution. Moreover, what on first consideration seems a relatively straight-forward solution may actually prove counterproductive when implemented. The intent of this report is also to get beyond the emotional headlines of the day and to open the eyes of policymakers to local perceptions; as everyone should know, perception is reality in the eyes of the beholder. An understanding of perceptions will also help policymakers grapple with the underlying currents which run so deep in the Balkans and avoid the pitfall of mirror imaging their own ideas, values, and perceptions onto a radically different culture. Only through an understanding of these conditions can policymakers make informed decisions on the best ends, ways, and means to resolve the situation. As importantly, historical example may offer potential insights into second or third order consequences that may result from any decisions. In this revised monograph, the first four chapters that provide the historical examination of the Balkan enigma remain substantially unchanged. The last chapter of the original version has been expanded into three chapters. Chapter 5 first offers insights that are drawn from the first portion of the report. Because the passage of time has foreclosed some alternatives, and the changed strategic conditions have created the possibility for new options to be examined, the policy assessments that are now Chapter 6 have been substantially rewritten. Similarly, a new Chapter 7, Conclusions, contains revised reflections on the preceding analysis.

According to Byzantium's leaders, their imperial order anchored in Constantinople was the centre of excellence - spiritual, moral, material and aesthetic. They rewarded individuals willing to join, and favoured outside groupings prepared to cooperate militarily or politically. Interactions with outsiders varied over place and time, complicated by the sometimes differing priorities of Byzantine churchmen and monks on or beyond Byzantium's borders. These studies consider the dynamics of such interactions, notably the interrelationship between the Bulgarians and their Byzantine neighbour. The Bulgarians' reaction to Byzantium ranged from 'contrarianism' to the systematic adaptation of Byzantine religious orthodoxy, ideals of rulership and normative values after Khan Boris' acceptance of eastern Christianity. For their part, Byzantine rulers were readier to do business with their Bulgarian counterparts than official pronouncements let on, occasionally even adopting aspects of Bulgarian political culture. Byzantium's interrelationship with other ruling elites was less intensive, but the process of Christianisation and the need to format this in readily comprehensible terms could make even distant potentates look to the template of effective Christian sole rulership which Byzantium's rulers embodied. Hungarian and Rus leaders were of abiding geopolitical interest to imperial statecraft, and the studies here show how during the generations around 1000 Byzantine political imagery resonated throughout the region.

The blood-soaked Balkan Wars have come to an end after years of violence, hatred, and extreme genocide. For a soldier named Tom, however, the battle has just begun. He is recruited in secret to hunt war criminalssome of whom are still in power. Europe cannot handle another period of embattlement; national forces will stop at nothing to keep the well-earned peace. This is where Tom comes in. He is recruited by an old friend to track and hunt the worst of the worst and bring them to justice before an international court. He heads into war-ravaged Bosnia, and, although his intentions are good, it isnt always easy ?nding the bad guy. Political unrest is still prevalent, and it seems as though no one is willing to help this ambitious soldier on a mission to do right. Worse, there could be a leak in their own department. Tom suspects theres a mole, so its his teams ?rst duty to destroy the villain. Then, they can go after the head honchothe president of Serbia. Nothing is clear on the battlefront; friends become enemies, and enemies become friends. Tom must travel the whole of Europe to ?nd his target, but he will stop at nothing to bring justice to an unjust world.

" Yugoslavia was well positioned at the end of the cold war to make a successful transition to a market economy and westernization. Yet two years later, the country had ceased to exist, and devastating local wars were being waged to create new states. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992, the country moved toward disintegration at astonishing speed. The collapse of Yugoslavia into nationalist regimes led not only to horrendous cruelty and destruction, but also to a crisis of Western security regimes. Coming at the height of euphoria over the end of the cold war and the promise of a ""new world order,"" the conflict presented Western governments and the international community with an unwelcome and unexpected set of tasks. Their initial assessment that the conflict was of little strategic significance or national interest could not be sustained in light of its consequences. By 1994 the conflict had emerged as the most challenging threat to existing norms and institutions that Western leaders faced. And by the end of 1994, more than three years after the international community explicitly intervened to mediate the conflict, there had been no progress on any of the issues raised by the country's dissolution. In this book, Susan Woodward explains what happened to Yugoslavia and what can be learned from the response of outsiders to its crisis. She argues that focusing on ancient ethnic hatreds and military aggression was a way to avoid the problem and misunderstood nationalism in post-communist states. The real origin of the Yugoslav conflict, Woodward explains, is the disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of a political and civil order, a process that occurred over a prolonged period. The Yugoslav conflict is inseparable from international change and interdependence, and it is not confined to the Balkans but is part of a more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration. Woodward's analysis is based on her first-hand experience before the country's collapse and then during the later stages of the Bosnian war as a member of the UN operation sent to monitor cease-fires and provide humanitarian assistance. She argues that Western action not only failed to prevent the spread of violence or to negotiate peace, but actually exacerbated the conflict. Woodward attempts to explain why these challenges will not cease or the Yugoslav conflicts end until the actual causes of the conflict, the goals of combatants, and the fundamental issues they pose for international order are better understood and addressed. "