Disorientations are human experiences of losing one's bearings, such that it is not clear how to go on. Philosophical ethics has emphasized how disorientations can paralyze, overwhelm, and harm moral agents. Disorientation and Moral Life defends a feminist philosophical account of how, in some cases, disorientations instead improve moral and political action.

While most recent studies of Nietzsche's works have lost sight of the fundamental question of the meaning of a life characterized by inescapable suffering, Bernard Reginster's book The Affirmation of Life brings it sharply into focus. Reginster identifies overcoming nihilism as a central objective of Nietzsche's philosophical project, and shows how this concern systematically animates all of his main ideas.

Every year, thousands of young Catholics leave their homes for higher education at our nation's colleges and universities. Very few realize, however, that from orientation day onward, they will be indoctrinated with a vision of reality that is very different from the values their families hold dear. Sadly, many of our young people will fall prey to one or more of the dominant ideologies ingrained in their college education, ideologies that can lead them away from the Church and, ultimately, their faith in God. Students who are not taught how to think critically or who lack the tools needed to sift through the logic of these positions are easily swayed by the smooth sophistry of the intellectual elite. For this reason, twelve of the top Catholic writers in America, who are professors, priests, journalists, philosophers, and theologians, have come together to dissect the trendy ideas that can lead young Catholics away from the Church. Disorientation is intellectual ammunition for every college student and parent, as it breaks down the history, analyzes the appeal, and debunks the empty promises of wildly popular errors such as: Hedonism Relativism Progressivism Modernism Scientism Fundamentalism Radical Feminism Multiculturalism Edited by John Zmirak (author of The Bad Catholic's Guide to Good Living and Choosing the Right College), this book is guaranteed to get college students thinking hard about what their professors are telling them, and what they should really believe.

What does it mean to be sad? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience our own, and other people’s, sadness? Is sadness always appropriate and can it be a way of seeing more clearly into ourselves and others? In this volume, a multi-disciplinary team of scholars - from fields including philosophy, women’s and gender studies, bioethics and public health, and neuroscience - addresses these and other questions related to this nearly-universal emotion that all of us experience, and that some of us dread. Somewhat surprisingly, sadness has been largely ignored by philosophers and others within the humanities, or else under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention. This volume reverses this trend, presenting sadness as not merely a feeling or affect, but an emotion of great moral significance that in important ways underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

The past several decades have witnessed a surge in critiques of justice theory by gender, race, disability, post-colonial, non-Western, and other anti-oppression theorists. These theorists tend to reject ideal theory and instead engage in ‘theorizing’ that takes the details of people’s lives to be central to understanding and alleviating injustices. These theorists reveal injustices emerging from norms assumed in mainstream justice theory and uncover them to challenge liberal accounts of moral reasoning and responsibility rooted in individualist conceptions of the self. Instead, they defend a relational conception of selves as born into relationships and shaped by norms, institutions, and structures that determine needs, opportunities, and life prospects differently for different people and groups. Attention to real world circumstances of injustice reveals inequalities in power between developed and developing countries; former colonizers and those colonized within and across nations; and the powerful and marginalized/oppressed where racism, classism, sexism, heterosexism, and so on still prevail. This volume sets out to examine a range of injustices emerging from, and shaped by, histories and contexts of patriarchy, racism, colonialism, capitalism, and so on. These are the kinds of injustices that affect the lives and well-being of people at the global, national, and local levels. The chapters in this book were originally published in the Ethics and Social Welfare journal.

What does it mean to be in the middle of a pandemic—for us, for our country, or for the world? How do our current inequalities and injustices become amplified by the demands of the pandemic and what, if anything, can be done? Who is most impacted—and why does it seem that so many of the same people are, once again, deemed expendable and "less-than"? How do we explain COVID-19 and its attendant traumas to our children, and what do we teach them about hope, justice, grief, and the role of imagination in survival? And once the worst has passed, how do we start again, and what should we care about as we contemplate individual and collective repair? In this collection of public and political philosophy, philosophers come together to address these and other questions born of a devastating pandemic to which they are neither objective spectators nor external observers insulated by the passage of time. The contributors to this volume are both grounded in, and immediately affected by, their own lived realities as source material for the questions that move and motivate them. Contributors: Alexios Alexander, J. S. Biehl, Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir, Daniel Conway, Barrett Emerick, Anna Gotlib, Ruth Groenhout, Claire Katz, Eva Feder Kittay, Corey McCall, Jamie Lindemann Nelson, Jennifer Scuro, Kevin Timpe, Vanessa Wills

"Suffering is an unavoidable reality in health care. Not only are patients and families suffering but also the clinicians who care for them. Commonly the suffering experienced by clinicians is moral in nature, reflecting the increasing complexity of health care, their roles within it, and the expanding range of available interventions. Moral suffering is the anguish experienced in response to various forms of moral adversity including moral harms, wrongs or failures, or unrelieved moral stress. Confronting moral adversity challenges clinicians' integrity: the inner harmony that arises when their essential values and commitments are aligned with their choices and actions. The most studied response to moral adversity is moral distress. The sources and sequelae of moral distress, one type of moral suffering, have been documented among clinicians across specialties. Recent interest has expanded to include a more corrosive form of moral suffering, moral injury. Moral resilience, the capacity to restore or sustain integrity in response to moral adversity, offers a path designing individual and system solutions to address moral suffering. It encompasses capacities aimed at developing self- regulation and self-awareness, buoyancy, moral efficacy, self-stewardship and ultimately personal and relational integrity. Moral resilience has been shown to be a protective resource that reduces the detrimental impact of moral suffering. Clinicians and healthcare organizations must work together to transform moral suffering by cultivating the individual capacities for moral resilience and designing a new architecture to support ethical practice. Used worldwide for scalable and sustainable change, the Conscious Full Spectrum Response, offers a method to solve problems to support integrity, shift patterns that undermine moral resilience and ethical practice, and source the inner potential of clinicians and leaders to produce meaningful and sustainable results that benefit all"--

This volume is composed chiefly of papers first presented and discussed at the Research Symposium on Feminist Phenomenology held November 18-19, 1994 in Delray Beach, Florida. Those papers have been revised and expanded for publication in the present volume and several essays have been added. We would like to thank very much all the participants in the symposium, including the session chairs and others in attendance, whose interest and enthusiasm contributed greatly. The symposium and this volume, including the name for it, were conceived of by Lester Embree, who also arranged sponsorship, local arrangements, and publication through the William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar Chair at Florida Atlantic University and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. The invitees were decided upon jointly. Linda Fisher has been chiefly responsible for the editing and the preparation of the camera-ready copy. Linda Fisher Lester Embree Acknowledgments The editing and preparation of this volume has spanned several cities and two continents and I am indebted to many people from each place.

In The Evolution of Moral Progress, Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell resurrect the project of explaining moral progress. They avoid the errors of earlier attempts by drawing on a wide range of disciplines including moral and political philosophy, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, history, and sociology. Their focus is on one especially important type of moral progress: gains in inclusivity. They develop a framework to explain progress in inclusivity to also illuminate moral regression--the return to exclusivist and "tribalistic" moral beliefs and attitudes. Buchanan and Powell argue those tribalistic moral responses are not hard-wired by evolution in human nature. Rather, human beings have an evolved "adaptively plastic" capacity for both inclusion and exclusion, depending on environmental conditions. Moral progress in the dimension of inclusivity is possible, but only to the extent that human beings can create environments conducive to extending moral standing to all human beings and even to some animals. Buchanan and Powell take biological evolution seriously, but with a critical eye, while simultaneously recognizing the crucial role of culture in creating environments in which moral progress can occur. The book avoids both biological and cultural determinism. Unlike earlier theories of moral progress, their theory provides a naturalistic account that is grounded in the best empirical work, and unlike earlier theories it does not present moral progress as inevitable or as occurring in definite stages; but rather it recognizes the highly contingent and fragile character of moral improvement.

In Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view—according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths—is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensive—defending Robust Realism against traditional objections—it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections. The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed here—the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)—are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.