The introduction of directed energy weapons into twenty-first century naval forces has the potential to change naval tactics as fundamentally as the transition from sail to steam. Recent advances in directed energy technologies have made the development of both high-energy laser and high-power microwave weapons technically feasible. This study examines the potential adaptation of such weapons for the defense of naval forces. This study considers options for using directed energy systems on naval vessels in the context of the U.S. maritime strategy and emerging threats in international politics. The framework for this study is an integrated system of microwave devices, high-energy lasers, and surface-to-air missiles which are evaluated in terms of their ability to enhance anti-ship cruise missile defense, tactical air defense, and fast patrol boat defense. This study also examines collateral capabilities, such as non-lethal defensive measures and countersurveillance operations. The global proliferation of increasingly sophisticated weapons and the expanding demands placed on its ever-smaller navy require the United States to reassess its current approach to fleet operations. This study concludes that directed energy technology has made sufficient progress to warrant the development of sea-based weapons systems for deployment in the first two decades of the next century. For operational and technical reasons, a Nimitz class aircraft carrier may be the preferred platform for the initial implementation of directed energy weapons. If successful, the robust self-defense capability provided by directed energy weapons will permit a fundamental shift in carrier battle group operations from a massed, attrition oriented defense to a more dynamic, dispersed offense.

The introduction of directed energy weapons into twenty-first century naval forces has the potential to change naval tactics as fundamentally as the transition from sail to steam. Recent advances in directed energy technologies have made the development of both high-energy laser and high-power microwave weapons technically feasible. This study examines the potential adaptation of such weapons for the defense of naval forces. This study considers options for using directed energy systems on naval vessels in the context of the U.S. maritime strategy and emerging threats in international politics. The framework for this study is an integrated system of microwave devices, high-energy lasers, and surface-to-air missiles which are evaluated in terms of their ability to enhance anti-ship cruise missile defense, tactical air defense, and fast patrol boat defense. This study also examines collateral capabilities, such as non-lethal defensive measures and countersurveillance operations. The global proliferation of increasingly sophisticated weapons and the expanding demands placed on its ever-smaller navy require the United States to reassess its current approach to fleet operations. This study concludes that directed energy technology has made sufficient progress to warrant the development of sea-based weapons systems for deployment in the first two decades of the next century. For operational and technical reasons, a Nimitz class aircraft carrier may be the preferred platform for the initial implementation of directed energy weapons. If successful, the robust self-defense capability provided by directed energy weapons will permit a fundamental shift in carrier battle group operations from a massed, attrition oriented defense to a more dynamic, dispersed offense.

Several nations are engaging in development and production of directed energy weapons. Recent scientific advances now enable the production of lethal lasers and high-powered microwaves. The current growth and development in this emerging area strongly suggests that directed energy weapons of lethal power will reach the battlefield before 2010. Since proliferation of lower power laser weapons has already happened, it is likely that proliferation of high power or high energy weapons will occur as well. This paper expands on this development and posits potential impacts on a plausible future battlefield, developed in part from the Alternate Futures of AF 2025, where all comers deploy lethal directed energy technologies. From these impacts, which span doctrine, organization, force structure, and systems design, this paper recommends changes to better posture the United States for this potential future.

At the beginning of the 21st century much has remained the same in naval terms but much has changed. Geoffrey Till's study is an exploration of how change will impact upon the world's navies.

" ... This study concludes that high power microwave weapons systems offer the prospect of significant offensive and defensive capabilities for all of the military services. The principal recommendations include the suggestion that the Department of Defense and the Air Force establish a High Power Microwave Systems Program Office for the purpose of developing these weapons and integrating them into the combatant commands. This systems program office should be a joint program office that involves the participation of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps as well as other agencies. Only then will the U.S. military be able to maximize the development of microwave applications, minimize costs, and facilitate the transition of this unique technology to the military services and other government agencies. Not only should defense contractors be encouraged to develop the technical capabilities that would permit them to participate in microwave weapons programs, but this study also concludes that all U.S. military system should be hardened to protect them against the effects of microwaves."--Page v

Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.

The Navy is developing three new ship-based weapons that could improve the ability of Navy surface ships to defend themselves against missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and surface craft: the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), previously known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP). The Navy refers to the initial (i.e., Increment 1) version of SNLWS as HELIOS, an acronym meaning high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance. EMRG could additionally provide the Navy with a new naval surface fire support (NSFS) weapon for attacking land targets in support of Marines or other friendly ground forces ashore. The Department of Defense is exploring the potential for using GLGP across multiple U.S. military services. Any one of these three new weapons, if successfully developed and deployed, might be regarded as a "game changer" for defending Navy surface ships against enemy missiles and UAVs. If two or three of them are successfully developed and deployed, the result might be considered not just a game changer, but a revolution. Rarely has the Navy had so many potential new types of surface-ship air-defense weapons simultaneously available for development and potential deployment. Although the Navy in recent years has made considerable progress in developing technologies for these new weapons, a number of significant development challenges remain. Overcoming these challenges will require additional development work, and ultimate success in overcoming them is not guaranteed. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's funding requests and proposed acquisition strategies for these three potential new weapons. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: Using currently available air-defense weapons, how well could Navy surface ships defend themselves in a combat scenario against an adversary such as China that has or could have large numbers of missiles and UAVs? How would this situation change if Navy surface ships in coming years were equipped with SNLWS, EMRG, GLGP, or some combination of these systems? How significant are the remaining development challenges for SNLWS, EMRG, and GLGP? Are current schedules for developing SNLWS, EMRG, and GLGP appropriate in relation to remaining development challenges and projected improvements in enemy missiles and UAVs? When does the Navy anticipate issuing roadmaps detailing its plans for procuring and installing production versions of SNLWS, EMRG, and GLGP on specific Navy ships by specific dates? Will the kinds of surface ships that the Navy plans to procure in coming years have sufficient space, weight, electrical power, and cooling capability to take full advantage of SNLWS and EMRG? What changes, if any, would need to be made in Navy plans for procuring large surface combatants (i.e., destroyers and cruisers) or other Navy ships to take full advantage of SNLWS and EMRGs? Given the Navy's interest in HPV, how committed is the Navy to completing the development of EMRG and eventually deploying EMRGs on Navy ships? Are the funding line items for SNLWS, EMRG, and GLDP sufficiently visible for supporting congressional oversight?

"Air Force basic doctrine asserts that the precise application of force can reliably generate desired, discriminate effects at the strategic level of war. A deconstruction of that assertion reveals three necessary assumptions: the ability to clearly define desired discriminate effects at the strategic level of war, the ability to trace the desired discriminate effects back to a triggering action, and the ability to ensure that the actual effects generated by the triggering action are only the discriminate ones being sought. This paper presents evidence that these assumptions suffer from important conceptual weaknesses that are amplified when examined from the perspective of nonlinear and complex systems. Further evidence suggests that technological fixes are not likely to resolve these weaknesses nor produce the strategic efficiencies implied by the doctrinal concept. In fact, such fixes could increase the potential for small errors to combine in unexpected ways to create a system accident, where outcomes diverge in significant and undesirable ways from the intended discriminate strategic effect. This paper cautions against using the term "precision" in ways that imply congruency between technology and war, and recommends that doctrine clearly differentiate technical exactness from strategic correctness. It concludes that effect-based approaches can foreclose adversary option sets with far more reliability than compelling specific, predetermined behaviors, and it emphasizes the need to ensure that adaptation remains a fundamental feature of any effects-based concept."--Abstract.

"This is an exploration, a speculation if you will, on the nature of war in the future. It explores in particular the symptoms of what appears to be a transition, in thought and practice, from a way of warfare that is centered on the notion of destruction to one that has paralysis as its "center of Gravity." At this stage of research, the idea that future war will be "paralysis-based" provides a framework for discerning, interpreting, and organizing a collection of seemingly disconnected phenomena. It is not an argument for a "kinder and gentler" way of war per se ..."--Introduction