This book examines Lacanian psychoanalysis and Christian mystical theology demonstrating the former’s potential for reinvigorating spiritual direction. The author outlines how current methods of spiritual direction become saturated with self-help psycho-pop methodologies, and that desire has therefore been foreclosed in these practices. He suggests that the root of this is a focus on ‘positive affective experientialism’, which means spiritual direction must focus on emotional wholeness, healing and positivity. Finally, he argues that a new dialogue between John of the Cross (a mystic whose writings on spiritual direction formulate part of the core of the Catholic spiritual tradition) and Jacques Lacan can open the way for a spiritual direction beyond the confines of experientialism. The book concludes that we can only escape the experiential commodification of spiritual direction by critiquing the drive to experience in and of itself. This novel work will appeal in particular to students and scholars of psychoanalysis, religion, philosophy and critical theory.

What is it to want something? Or, as philosophers might ask, what is a desire?The idea that we explain and evaluate actions with essential reference to what people want is compelling, as it speaks to common-sense ideas that our wants lie at the heart of our decision-making. Yet our wants seem to have a competitor: our beliefs about what we ought to do. Such normative beliefsalone may often suffice to explain our actions. To try and resolve this tension, this book defends "desire as belief", the view that desires are just a special subset of our normative beliefs. This view entitles us to accept orthodox models of human motivation and rationality that explain thosethings with reference to desire, while also making room for our normative beliefs to play a role in those domains. This view also tells us to diverge from the orthodox view on which desires themselves can never be right or wrong. Rather, according to desire-as-belief, our desires can themselves beassessed for their accuracy, and they are wrong when they misrepresent normative features of the world. Hume says that it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, but he is wrong: it is foolish to prefer the destruction of the wholeworld to the scratching of your finger, precisely because this preference misrepresents the relative worth of these things. This book mounts an engaging and comprehensive defence of these ideas.

Desires lead to actions, influence feelings, and determine what counts as a reward. Recent empirical evidence shows that these three aspects of desire stem from a common biological origin. The author reveals this common foundation and builds a striking new philosophical theory of desire that puts desire's neglected face-reward-at its core.

This book advances an original interpretation of the orthodox Indian theories of motivation in light of the Indian prohibition on desire and evaluates its consequences for Indian ethics and soteriology.

Can your ultimate desire ever be fulfilled? Everywhere you look, every time you listen, with each click and tap, there's something you desire. How do you know if what you desire will satisfy, or if you are seeing a "desire mirage"? The global village presents countless ways to connect to all kinds of information. We think we can scarcely live without these connections. Do we realize, however, that these connections often block or slow down connections to God, self, and others? Divided Desire is a journey along the road of desire--a road everyone travels. Along the journey, Kenny Damara explores why we desire what we desire in the global village today. What role does God have in fulfilling the ultimate desire of the heart? And how should we respond?

Most people have wondered whether anything really matters, some have temporarily thought that nothing really matters, and some philosophers have defended the view that nothing really matters. However, if someone thinks that nothing matters--if they are a "nihilist about value"--then it seems that it is irrational for them to care about anything. It seems that nihilism about value mandates total indifference. This is the "problem of nihilism" Allan Hazlett addresses in The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism. Hazlett argues that the problem of nihilism arises because desire--and thus caring--is a species of evaluation that admits of irrationality. This contradicts the influential Humean view that desire does not admit of irrationality, which has a ready solution to the problem of nihilism: since desire does not admit of irrationality, it cannot be irrational to care about something that you believe does not matter. However, following G.E. Anscombe, Hazlett argues that desire has the same relationship to goodness as belief has to truth: just as truth is the accuracy condition for belief, goodness is the accuracy condition for desire. This reveals desire as an appropriate target of epistemological inquiry, in the same way that belief is an appropriate target of epistemological inquiry. Desires can amount to knowledge (in the same way that beliefs can amount to knowledge) and, crucially for the problem of nihilism, desire admits of irrationality (in the same way that belief admits of irrationality). Nevertheless, although it is obviously irrational to believe something that you believe is not true, Hazlett argues that it is not irrational to desire something you believe is not good, despite the fact that goodness is the accuracy condition for desire. This provides a solution to the problem of nihilism, and shows that nihilism about value can coherently be combined with the anti-Humean view that desire is a species of evaluation.

Desires are central to our lives, yet we rarely understand them. What are they? And are they motivational or evaluative states? Should philosophy adopt an alternative picture entirely? Answering these questions is vital to a number of issues in philosophy of mind and ethics. This volume comprehensively explores this neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.

In Vagaries of Desire, Timo Airaksinen develops a new philosophical account of desire understood as mental state that focuses on a desirable possible world. Literary and philosophical themes, including sexuality, are discussed in terms of their metaphoric and metonymic features.